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A B S T R A C T 
Gilles Deleuze’s monograph on Francis Bacon, The Logic of Sensation (1981), proposes 
a theory of aesthetic experience that prioritizes the material depths of sensation over stable, 
identifiable forms. Deleuze’s key references in The Logic of Sensation to playwright Antonin 
Artaud arouse the suspicion that Artaud’s schizophrenic experience of language, wherein 
words are reduced to phonetic ramblings, illuminates how Deleuze interprets this chaos of 
sensation in Bacon’s art. My work therefore calls back to The Logic of Sense (1969) and the 
first section of his book on Masochism (1967) to explore the waves of consistency between 
Deleuze’s understanding of language and the body, which is also to say between literature 
and painting. Yet while The Logic of Sensation may read like an exhaustive theory of art, 
Deleuze subtly indicates in this text that his system has its limits. Along with the molecular, 
material depths of sensation, Deleuze alludes to a cosmological, immaterial function of art. 
He observes this to exist almost exclusively in music and its force of floating time. Rather 
than turning solely to Plateau 11: Of the Refrain, I also adopt his earlier writings on Proust 
to explore a Deleuzian musicology. This Proust-music aesthetic schema (which I coin the 
musical pole) contrasts sharply with that of Bacon-Artaud (the painterly pole). Through an 
examination of the painterly and musical poles and to what extent the two can be 
synthesized, my work examines the enthralling disjunction in Deleuze’s aesthetics.  
K E Y W O R D S  
Gilles Deleuze, aesthetics, painting, hysteria, music, schizophrenia, Francis Bacon, Marcel 
Proust, time, sensation, depths, heights, molecular, refrain, territory, Antonin Artaud, Pierre 
Boulez, Olivier Messiaen, spirit, immateriality, modernism 
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“Only the signs of art are immaterial.”1 
I N T R O D U C T I O N  
A friend of a friend once claimed that Gilles Deleuze’s The Logic of Sense is a treatise 
on photography. His explanation must have been convincing, for my friend had inscribed 
these words—in pen—on the flyleaf of his copy. I have not asked for the supporting 
arguments, mainly because I one day hope to find it out for myself all Socratic-like. Really 
though, it is a principle of self-discovery I model off 90s hip-hop production. Like a magic 
trick, a musician need not reveal the samples they use, but can leave it up to the audience to 
find them out on their own. There are certain legal issues in not declaring your sources, 
though there is no doubt also beauty in not being told where a vocal chop or drum loop 
comes from, and having to seek it out for yourself as if on a treasure hunt. It makes sense 
then that we refer to shopping for old records as “digging.”  
My work does not focus on Gilles Deleuze and photography, though I remain deeply 
inspired by this friend’s formula of The Logic of Sense when I claim that Proust and Signs is a 
treatise on music. As with photography, Deleuze never wrote a book on music. We are 
forced to read between the lines, always in the “middle [milieu]” of his thought on this topic.2 
He certainly had plans for a book, and as his biographer François Dosse describes, Deleuze’s 
late encounter with Pascale Criton spurred an interest in chromatics (microtones and tuning 
that exceeds twelve intervals an octave), something Deleuze hoped would evolve into an 
extended study had it not been for his declining health.3 Like his unfinished book “on the 
greatness of Marx,” in my mind his musical writings would always remain on the horizon. 
And where we must resort to Anti-Oedipus to find the clues of Deleuze’s Marxism, when it 
                                                            
1 Gilles Deleuze, Proust and Signs, trans. Richard Howard (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 
39. 
2 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 21.  
3 François Dosse, Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives, trans. Deborah Glassman (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010), 444-5. 
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comes to music we continually seem to turn to Plateau 11: Of the Refrain from A Thousand 
Plateaus.  
But any glance at Félix Guattari’s independent work betrays that the main ideas in 
Plateau 11 were not really Deleuze’s contributions. We need to look elsewhere for a 
Deleuzian musicology, and in the absence of any substantial work written directly on the 
matter, I resort to adopting his ideas on Proust. It is an aberrant Proust of course, “a child 
that would be his own offspring, yet monstrous,” and hopefully still worthy of adoption.4 
For Deleuze, Proust gets at “a bit of pure time,” time freed from measure, and this is 
precisely what also attracts Deleuze to modernist composers like Olivier Messiaen and Pierre 
Boulez.5 There is an intimate connection between how Proust handles speed and slowness— 
the effect of the world’s rhythms on consciousness—and Deleuze’s interest in modern 
music. I thus use Proust and Signs as a map to get to a fuller understanding of Deleuze’s 
thought on music. A map, that is, and not a tracing, for “[w]hat distinguishes the map from 
the tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real.”6  
Yet this is just one side of my project, and as it unfolded what became apparent is 
that the Proust-music chimera is one beast among many others, a wolf among several 
perhaps.7 Deleuze ceaselessly uses the arts to explain one another, and Proust mapping 
Boulez only grazes the surface of these junctions. Time and again he employs analogies 
across media—literature explains music, painting explains cinema. It is an important trope 
running through Deleuze’s writing, though not often discussed. Perhaps because it is 
counterintuitive that Deleuze of all thinkers would draw on analogies, given his metaphysical 
animosity for them. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze opposes an analogical conception of 
                                                            
4 Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 6.  
5 Gilles Deleuze, “Making Inaudible Forces Audible,” in Two Regimes of Madness, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. 
Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina (South Pasadena: Semiotext(e), 2007), 157. 
6 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 12.  
7 Ibid., 26.  
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being. To paint this picture, I call to mind one of the greatest emissaries for this analogical 
(equivocal) metaphysics, Saint Thomas Aquinas.  
Grounded upon an irreducible difference between finite beings and God, Aquinas 
inquired into the nature of certain concepts (goodness, justice, knowledge, etc.) that we 
nevertheless use to describe both entities. The Thomistic model finds its roots in the 
Aristotelian categorization of identity—any difference (such as species) must refer back to a 
shared point (genus)—making identity always the priority. In Aquinas’ case, what finite 
creatures share with God is a resemblance based on cause and effect. God’s goodness, for 
example, causes ours, despite the fact that when we compare the two we equivocate. Think 
how sacrilegious it would be to reduce God’s qualities to those of His human analogues—
you see Aquinas’ point. Yet this is in a sense what Deleuze wants to do—and not so much 
to profane the divine, but to elevate difference to a positive position (difference in itself, not 
subordinate to identity). Following Duns Scotus, Spinoza, and Nietzsche, Deleuze outlines 
the univocity of being: that being is said “in a single and same sense.”8 Distinct entities are 
thus distinguished not by some ontological chasm (Aristotle, Aquinas), but rather now by 
degree (Duns Scotus) and modality (Spinoza).       
While Deleuze’s employment of analogies in describing the arts then comes as a 
surprise, I argue it is in fact incredibly useful: it helps to uncover a key function of the Body 
without Organs. As Deleuze articulates the ways in which music renders inaudible forces 
audible and painting makes visible the invisible, as music puts “an ear in the stomach” and 
painting gives us the sense of touch in our eyes, we feel ourselves moving beyond and below 
the organized body.9 
                                                            
8 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 36. 
9 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. Daniel W. Smith (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), 45. 
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As Deleuze develops connections across sense experience and likewise across the 
works of distinct artists (such as Proust and Boulez), what we come to appreciate is that the 
networks created are not neutral—some succeed and others come up against (and are 
pedagogically meant to show) a limit. The rhizome’s powers of connection, infinite nodes 
that can link up at any stage, are not always actualized. 
My work therefore explores two sets of connections—the first between surrealist-
impressionist painter Francis Bacon and playwright Antonin Artaud, the second between 
Proust, Boulez, and Messiaen. However, between these constellations there is also an 
impasse. The model of aesthetics illustrated by Deleuze’s work on Francis Bacon is 
incompatible with that of Proust and music. Unforgettably, Deleuze interrupts his 
monograph on Bacon, The Logic of Sensation, to declare that “music begins where painting 
ends, and this is what is meant when one speaks of the superiority of music. It is lodged on 
lines of flight that pass through bodies, but which find their consistency elsewhere, whereas 
painting is lodged farther up, where the body escapes from itself.”10 My first chapter 
addresses this rift, while more generally exploring what I have coined the painterly pole of 
Deleuze’s aesthetics. Centred around Deleuze’s claim that in Bacon’s paintings “hysteria 
becomes art . . . [and] color is a direct action on the nervous system,” I explore the depths of 
sensation, the molecular forces, at work in this art form.11 Throughout my study, I also 
explain a critical distinction Deleuze makes between the hysteria of painting and what he 
calls the “galloping schizophrenia” of music.12  
Moreover, to chart the depths of sensation, I continually turn, as Deleuze himself 
does, to his earlier explorations into the philosophy of language. Primarily, I build off of his 
                                                            
10 Ibid., 47. 
11 Ibid., 52-3. 
12 Ibid., 47. 
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work on Masoch and Sade, where we find a striking similarity to his description of Bacon. In 
Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty, Deleuze writes that “it seems that, for Masoch as for Sade, 
language assumes its full value in acting directly on the senses [sur la sensualité].”13 Note how 
closely this aligns to Bacon’s “color [a]s a direct action on the nervous system.”14 Similarly in 
The Logic of Sense, for Artaud language is reduced to purely phonetic elements: “clappings, 
crackings, gnashings, cracklings, explosions, the shattered sounds of internal objects, and 
also the inarticulate howls-breaths [cris-souffles] of the body without organs.”15 Artaud is the 
key conceptual persona informing the painterly pole, and in Chapter I we explore both 
Bacon and Artaud, exemplars of the intersection of painting and literature. 
In Chapter II, I ask whether it is possible to include Proust within this model of 
aesthetics, which often tempts us with a grand narrative for understanding all experiences 
and functions of art. The pre-conceptual realm of sensation, how art produces the new, and 
what it says about human and animal creation, all seems sufficiently addressed in The Logic of 
Sensation. First supposing that there is an alternative aesthetic schema for Proust and music, 
we examine how Deleuze’s thought on painting and music communicate with one another. 
Do they in fact speak in one and the same sense, or must Deleuze resort to analogies given 
their radical difference? Ultimately, I conclude that the immaterial (spiritual) forces in 
Proust—time, rhythm, and perception—are incompatible with the material depths in Bacon. 
There then arises the need to explain the musical pole of Deleuze’s aesthetics, and this is my 
task primarily in Chapter III. Making use of ideas found in Proust and Signs and A Thousand 
Plateaus, I outline the intimate connection between Proust and music and its repulsion from 
the painterly pole. Following Ronald Bogue’s theory that “[i]n music, Deleuze finds the key 
                                                            
13 Gilles Deleuze, Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty, trans. Jean McNeil and Aude Willam (New York: Zone Books, 
2006), 17. 
14 Deleuze, The Logic of Sensation, 53. 
15 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, ed. Constantin V. Boundas, trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 193. 
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to an understanding of art’s relation to the natural world . . . [and] regards painting as the 
paradigmatic art of sensation, and hence as the medium that most fully discloses the inner 
dimension of aesthetic experience,” I distinguish the molecular from the cosmological as two 
divergent aesthetic movements, irreducible yet indispensible.16  
As part of this project, I situate these two aesthetic poles within the greater art-
historical tradition. It is important to appreciate Deleuze’s indebtedness to elements of 
phenomenology and impressionism, including the theory and practice of Erwin Straus, 
Henri Maldiney, and Paul Cézanne. These figures arise in Chapter I. As for his sources on 
the musical pole, save for Messiaen and Boulez who are at once case studies of and sources 
for Deleuze’s theory, one must also include Friedrich Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy, 
specifically the distinction between the Apollonian and the Dionysian. Chapter III explores 
these influences for the musical pole. The systems Deleuze inherits and reprises illuminate 
the fundamental properties and distinctions between the painterly and musical pole. 
It is not enough, however, simply to describe their differences. As already 
mentioned, Deleuze insists on the “superiority of music.”17 My conclusion therefore weighs 
the implications of this hierarchy and, following Peter Hallward’s idea that insofar as the 
immateriality of music resembles a kind of “pure thought,” namely the virtual potential in 
thinking, it achieves an aesthetic production unmatched by the other arts. Revisiting Proust 
and Signs, I examine the concept of the immaterial (spiritual) in Deleuze’s aesthetics and its 
ties to a philosophy of the virtual. In sum, I examine the two poles of Deleuze’s aesthetics, 
the possibility of integrating one into the other (with Proust as a limit case of the Baconian 
model), and the diverse ways in which aesthetic media analogically explain and are explained 
by other art forms.
                                                            
16 Ronald Bogue, Deleuze on Music, Painting, and the Arts (New York: Routledge, 2003), 2. 
17 Deleuze, The Logic of Sensation, 47. 
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“And who suffered more from judgment in its harshest form, the terror of psychiatric expertise, 
 than Artaud-Van Gogh?”1 
C H A P T E R  I  
~ A N T O N I N  A R T A U D ,  A  P A N O R A M I C ~  
Between The Logic of Sense (1969) and The Logic of Sensation (1981) one finds the 
conceptual trajectory of the Body without Organs, and, more generally, the bulk of 
Deleuze’s critical-clinical engagement with French dramatist Antonin Artaud. First 
referenced in the Thirteenth Series of “the Schizophrenic and the Little Girl,” Artaud’s Body 
without Organs is employed by Deleuze to chart what he calls the depths of the body. Of 
particular interest to Deleuze during these younger years is the status of language, signs, and 
signification. At large, The Logic of Sense is the closest Deleuze comes to a philosophy of 
language, and though its genesis is of interest to him, so too is the possibility of its 
disintegration, which is to say the withdrawal of sense back into the chaotic ramblings of a 
body devoid of any language.  
In alignment with Freudian psychoanalysis, Deleuze builds on Melanie Klein’s claim 
that the child’s original experience of undifferentiated noise eventually becomes the voice—
something not yet a language, but which sets the stage for things other than just bodies and 
corporeal clamours.2 But as one moves down from the Ideational heights to the purely 
phonetic depths, a fall of language occurs wherein words are no longer separated from 
objects of reference. The voice of the heights becomes a barrage of noise that, following 
Artaud, Deleuze describes as emitting a force that acts directly on the body. Upon 
introducing this schizophrenic, intensely physical, mode of language, Deleuze echoes a claim 
inaugurated in Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty (1967) about the effect any language can have 
                                                            
1 Gilles Deleuze, “To Have Done with Judgment,” in Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and 
Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 126. 
2 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, ed. Constantin V. Boundas, trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 193-95.  
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on the body. There he writes, “it seems that, for Masoch as for Sade, language assumes its 
full value in acting directly on the senses [sur la sensualité].”3 This conception of language 
foreshadows Deleuze’s aesthetic turn in the 1980s. In fact, a language that attacks the body is 
reborn in Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation under the umbrella of a transformed aesthetic 
implication (fig. 1, fig. 2).4 Francis Bacon’s paintings have a force that acts on the nervous 
system, and the weight Deleuze gives to this statement marks a move his philosophy 
undergoes from a study of language and the body (Masoch, Carroll) to a language of the body 
(Artaud, Bacon), which in many ways is to say a path from sense to sensation.       
                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
3 Gilles Deleuze, Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty, trans. Jean McNeil and Aude Willam (New York: Zone Books, 
2006), 17. 
4 An umbrella, that is, in light of the recurrence of this prop in Bacon’s work.  
Figure One. Oil on canvas, Painting, Francis Bacon, 1946, © The Estate of Francis Bacon.  
All rights reserved. DACS / SOCAN (2018). 
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There are a number of elements in need of explication to develop how The Logic of 
Sensation establishes a form of nondiscursive language that Deleuze was already outlining in 
The Logic of Sense, and which paves the way for his aesthetics of painting. By way of Artaud’s 
schizophrenic writing and the role he plays as a conceptual persona in Deleuze’s corpus, I 
argue, one can trace the cohesion and evolution of Deleuze’s ideas on representation and the 
way the two series of bodies and language interact. This corporeal conception of language 
also prefigures an important role it will have after his collaboration with Félix Guattari. By 
first treating The Logic of Sensation with broad strokes and explaining, naturally by way of 
Bacon’s paintings, Deleuze’s key concepts in this work, we shall begin to see the role Artaud 
plays in this text. Following this, The Logic of Sense will be reintroduced so as to notice how 
Artaud’s persona unfolds from this early work, onward until its painterly form in Sensation. 
How the Body without Organs is replaced by the concept of the Figure in the latter 
text will also be addressed. I shall defend Deleuze’s rationale for substituting Artaud’s term, 
Figure Two. Oil on canvas, Triptych—Studies of the Human Body, Francis Bacon, 1970,  
© The Estate of Francis Bacon. All rights reserved. DACS / SOCAN (2018). 
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or at the least committing a kind of “buggery” to it,5 by pointing to the need for Deleuze to 
diverge from Artaud’s notions of the self and ego that still remain in his original conception 
of the Body without Organs.  
The depths, in Artaud’s case, are still too personal for Deleuze. The way the self 
inheres in Artaud’s depths is central to Deleuze’s interpretation in The Logic of Sense. 
However, following his collaboration with Guattari and as the concept of the Body without 
Organs will arise in relation to aesthetics and sensation, Deleuze, as it were, deforms or 
remoulds Artaud in hopes of reaching a logic below the individual, a logic of presubjective 
forces, the likes of which Deleuze defines as the very goal of aesthetics. Painting, for 
Deleuze, battles with impersonal molecular forces—corpuscles of the nonhuman and 
inorganic.   
~ B O D I L Y  S I G N S ~  
As we shall encounter in the next two chapters, when it comes to the role of the 
bodily sign in Deleuze’s writing between Proust and Signs (1964) and A Thousand Plateaus 
(1980) what diverges by the time he writes The Logic of Sensation is a certain recreation of the 
sign’s status of affection. The sign, as we find in Bacon and Deleuze’s aesthetics in general, is 
something that can be felt through the material vibrations it creates upon the body. 
Language is not something that removes us from the world; its ideas and concepts are still 
strings that pull on our body. Bearing in mind a distinction Deleuze makes in The Logic of 
Sense between, on the one hand, eating, and, on the other, speaking, Deleuze is clearly 
entertaining the zone of indiscernibility between the two.6 What would it mean to feel 
concepts? For now, I’ll let my reader chew on this thought. There is one thing, however, I 
                                                            
5 Gilles Deleuze, “Letter to a Harsh Critic,” in Negotiations, 1972-1990 (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1995), 6. 
6 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 186.  
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shall lay bear before you: this indiscernibility between eating and speaking adds an interesting 
layer to Deleuze’s fascination with how Bacon paints the mouth, which, after all, is the site 
(erogenous zone we might say) at which eating becomes speaking (fig. 3, fig. 4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure Three. Oil on canvas, Three Studies for Figures at the Base of a Crucifixion, Francis Bacon, 1944,  
© The Estate of Francis Bacon. All rights reserved. DACS / SOCAN (2018). 
. 
Figure Four. Oil and sand on canvas, Study for a Head, Francis Bacon, 1952, © The Estate of Francis Bacon.  
All rights reserved. DACS / SOCAN (2018). 
. 
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In this renewed conception of the sign and of language, Deleuze is building on a 
specific lineage of art history that emerges from Erwin Straus’s The Primary World of the Senses 
(1963), as well as the theory and practice of Henri Maldiney, Paul Cézanne, Vincent van 
Gogh, and Paul Klee. Each of these figures will arise throughout this chapter, and what 
connects all of them is the Deleuzian task of establishing the genetic principles of sensation 
and how aesthetics plays a key role in revealing this process. In the words of Klee, the task 
of aesthetics is “not to render the visible, but to render visible.”7 As I examine in my 
conclusion, art equally so reveals much about the production of the new and the act of 
creation. What we must also grapple with, though, is how some art forms (in Deleuze’s 
mind, music) can move closer to the potential of pure thought. Philosophical thought, for 
Deleuze, immerses itself far more in the virtual than the actual (the material world that art 
subsists in), and it remains the case that certain works of art can launch us more into the 
virtual while others fall short.8   
Paul Klee’s statement repeats itself in many forms throughout the family of thinkers 
above. Just as Cézanne sought to “paint the sensation,” Bacon intended to “record the fact.”9 Van 
Gogh has his own form of bringing to the surface imperceptible forces of the sunflower, and 
so do Straus and Maldiney from a more theoretical perspective. Deleuze, rightly so, brings 
each of these declarations into a single aesthetic manifesto, and in so doing gestures to his 
greater intention of directing the artist and spectator (although Deleuze prefers the word 
“attendant” or “witness”10) to a plane below the level of the individual, thus opening up a 
nonorganic state where self and world amalgamate. There, one experiences the sign, a pure 
                                                            
7 Paul Klee, quoted in Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. Daniel W. Smith (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 48. 
8 Thinking of it as a “fall” will prove important, for Deleuze frequently refers to the depths of sensation in 
Bacon’s work as such.  
9 Paul Cézanne and Francis Bacon, quoted in Deleuze, The Logic of Sensation, 32.   
10 Deleuze, The Logic of Sensation, 62-70. 
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sign, beyond the dogmatic image of thought, which in art exists as representation, as 
narrative, and above all else as cliché. They are the three aesthetic powers of negation rather 
than affirmation. 
Deleuze’s Logic of Sensation focuses on the imperceptible forces that congregate on 
Francis Bacon’s canvas, and these include powers such as gravity (fig. 5), time passed by (fig. 
6), cramps (fig. 7) and inner contortions of the body (fig. 8).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure Five. Oil and sand on canvas, Lying Figure in a Mirror, Francis Bacon, 1971, © The Estate of  
Francis Bacon. All rights reserved. DACS / SOCAN (2018). 
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Figure Six. Oil on canvas, Two Seated Figures, Francis Bacon, 1979, © The Estate of  
Francis Bacon. All rights reserved. DACS / SOCAN (2018). 
 
Figure Seven. Oil and dry transfer lettering on canvas, Figure at a Washbasin, Francis Bacon, 1976, 
© The Estate of Francis Bacon.All rights reserved. DACS / SOCAN (2018). 
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Recalling Proust and Signs, one thinks of how Marcel Proust captured several imperceptibles: 
“time wasted, time lost, time rediscovered, and time regained.”11 In Bacon’s case, these 
invisible forces go hand-in-hand with the erasure or disintegration of the organic (organized) 
body, and in these instances Deleuze emphasizes the way in which we encounter an image of 
the Body without Organs. Bacon, however, is not alone in this feat. As Deleuze and Guattari 
argue in What is Philosophy? (1991) the role of any work of art is to capture and preserve “a 
bloc of sensation . . . a compound of percepts and affects,” a kind of slice of chaos or lightning in a 
bottle.12 What the artist captures is something unique to her form, some invisible affect that 
works on the body but that our eyes and common language gloss over.  
                                                            
11 Gilles Deleuze, Proust and Signs, trans. Richard Howard (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000, 
87.  
12 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New 
York: Columbia, 1994), 164. 
Figure Eight. Oil on canvas, Two Studies of George Dyer with Dog, Francis Bacon, 1968, 
© The Estate of Francis Bacon All rights reserved. DACS / SOCAN (2018). 
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Deleuze cites Cézanne, whose paintings present the great rhythm of deep time 
expressed by mountains as they fold, grow, and experience shifting climates (fig. 9), and 
apples as they germinate and receive their particular redness and texture (fig. 10).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure Nine. Oil on canvas, Mont Sainte-Victoire, Paul Cézanne, 1904. 
Figure Ten. Oil on canvas, Apples, Paul Cézanne, 1878. 
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In such rhythms, one can hazard a guess why Deleuze showed such interest in molecular 
biology and epigenetics. Biology for its attention to minute forces, epigenetics for how it 
tracks the speeds and slowness of gene development and how an organism evolves given its 
environment. Think of the way locusts are predominantly solitary creatures quite similar to 
grasshoppers, but when plants and water become available and they congregate, they turn 
into gregarious creatures and are spurred into a rapid change of gene expression, for 
example, growing wings. Deleuze likens painting to charting these changes in speed and the 
ability to pick up on imperceptible forces.13 But it is not always about finding such forces. 
For example, what is remarkable about van Gogh is that he can be accredited with creating 
forces of the sunflower (fig. 11).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
13 As Chapter III shows, painting comes nowhere near how music can track such speeds. 
Figure Eleven. Oil on canvas, Sunflowers, Vincent van Gogh, 1889. 
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Van Gogh, says Deleuze, “invented unknown forces, the unheard-of-force of a sunflower 
seed,” although each “recomposition” of the sunflower necessarily entails a kind of 
“decomposition” or erasure of its prior form.14 Art overwrites the actualized world, and the 
painter’s inventions are much like the philosopher tasked with creating new concepts. 15 The 
painter and the philosopher perform a dual kind of creation meant to spark a new image of 
thought. As my conclusion meditates on, in Deleuze’s thinking it seems to be the case that 
some art (and, more provocatively, art forms) move closer to this philosopher-creator, who 
enters into the virtual realm by way of pure thought. As the end of this chapter develops, 
and as I continue to revisit throughout my work, it is music that Deleuze considers capable 
of leaving the material body and reaching out to the raw potential of pure thought in ways 
painting cannot. At this stage, however, I ask my reader simply to prepare to see the 
dichotomy between how Deleuze describes painting and music.   
While still focused on painting, however, note how Deleuze’s Logic of Sensation 
achieves the pairing of philosophical concepts with those affects and bodily languages an 
artist invents or captures on the canvas.16 As we shall see, it is not the case that music 
monopolizes the virtual, though for Deleuze the processes of music (time, rhythm, interval) 
match strongly with the immateriality of thinking. Deleuze is infamous for these kinds of 
“pairings.” We might call A Thousand Plateaus, for example, the pairing of philosophical 
concepts with modern science, providing the metaphysics adequate for ideas of non-linear 
mathematics, complexity theory, the irreversibility of time, and so on (though this summary 
                                                            
14 Deleuze, The Logic of Sensation, 49. 
15 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 15-34.  
16 While there may be a hierarchy in Deleuze’s aesthetics at reaching the virtual, this is not to say painting is 
devoid of a connection to it. Remember that it is all a matter of degree—painting always has something that 
connects to the virtual, despite Deleuze seeing it as a far more carnal, material, actualized art. 
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does not even glaze the surface of that rhizomatic work).17 But with any pairing, of course, 
not every force is neutral; there are always stronger or weaker connections. For this reason, 
at the end of Chapter III we examine the particular resonances Deleuze sees between 
literature and painting as aesthetic media, and the lack thereof between painting and music. 
Moreover, as I shall focus on in this chapter and Chapter III, time and again Deleuze 
effectively uses the arts to explain one another, especially in The Logic of Sensation. Painting 
and literature are effectively drawn on to explain the other. Yet prior to focusing on this 
trope in Deleuze’s aesthetics, let us reflect on the role of the artist and creation. That is, 
before explaining how art disciplines interact, we must see how they act in solitude. 
~ T H E  A R T I S T  A T  W O R K ~ 
One of the central aims of The Logic of Sensation is to explain the process an artist 
must go through in capturing the nonorganic forces of the world, and thus finding a way of 
creating images that act, in a hysteric sense, directly on the body. For reasons we shall get 
into, Deleuze opts to call this process hysteria (rather than schizophrenia) in The Logic of 
Sensation, and this proves to be an indispensible distinction in understanding the function of 
painting versus music (the latter which according to Deleuze takes on a “galloping 
schizophrenia” not as tethered to the body like painting).18 Nonetheless, the creator as 
painter is not wholly tied to the actualized material world. Deleuze claims that artists like 
Bacon come upon a reservoir of clichés, concepts, representations, and figurations that must 
be battled against and bypassed at a subterranean level of sensation (depth). Rather than 
through the virtual power of thought—the Ideational heights—the painter goes deeper into 
                                                            
17 While they in turn characterize Bergson with the “profound desire” to catch philosophy up to science 
(Cinema 1, 60), and credit him with major discoveries in consciousness and time, Deleuze and Guattari, 
especially in A Thousand Plateaus, are also attempting to synthesize philosophy and modern science.   
18 Deleuze, The Logic of Sensation, 47. 
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matter. In encountering the pre-givens of the world that must be combatted, Deleuze writes 
the following of the artist: 
It is a mistake to think that the painter works on a white surface. The figurative belief 
follows from this mistake. If the painter were before a white surface, he could 
reproduce on it an external object functioning as a model, but such is not the case. 
The painter has many things in his head, or around him, or in his studio. Now 
everything he has in his head or around him is already in the canvas, more or less 
virtually, more or less actually, before he begins his work.19  
 
While this quote has become somewhat of a cliché in Deleuze scholarship, it is truly an 
undeniable fact of artistic process.20 There are many signs that cut off the artist’s ability to 
capture a pure sensation. Of all these pre-existing signs that must be dismantled, the face is 
one of the main antagonists. (fig. 12, fig. 13).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
19 Ibid., 71.  
20 What many do not know, however, is that the line really comes from painter, Gérard Fromanger, a close 
friend of Deleuze. Fromanger recalls telling Deleuze, “I told him, ‘you see it as blank, but in fact it’s black.’ 
And his reaction was, ‘Ah, fantastic! It’s black, black with what?’ and I answered, ‘It’s black with everything 
every painter has painted before me,’ and he said, ‘So it’s not about blackening the canvas but about whitening 
it.’” (Gérard Fromanger, quoted in Dosse, Intersecting Lives, 441).  
Figure Twelve. Oil on canvas, Self Portrait,  
Francis Bacon, 1971, © The Estate of  
Francis Bacon. All rights reserved.  
DACS / SOCAN (2018).  
Figure Thirteen. Oil on canvas, Portrait of  
Michel  Leiris, Francis Bacon, 1976,  
© The Estate of Francis Bacon. All rights  
reserved. DACS / SOCAN (2018). 
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As we shall see in Chapter II, how applicable the breadth of Deleuze’s Logic of Sensation is—
how well it can account for the function of all art and not just painting—will have to 
confront how artists construct and deconstruct faces. By exploring Deleuze’s commentary 
on Marcel Proust, who according to Deleuze constructs faces everywhere, we begin to 
realize that Deleuze’s aesthetics has two irreconcilable poles. Francis Bacon and Marcel 
Proust stand sentinel at the two sides.  
When I refer to faces and faciality, this does not necessarily mean a simple human 
visage. Recalling Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of the face from an ethico-political 
perspective (and contra-Levinas) in A Thousand Plateaus, the face signifies any form of 
overcoded identity and alterity.21 The face is a surface effect, not a universal sign that 
commands anything from us, and the face of the other in Levinas’s work tempts us to forget 
this.22 For Deleuze and Guattari, whatever the ethical call of the other we are responsible for 
may be, reaching it involves dismantling our imperialisms of the face—commonly 
hierarchized around the white, male face of Christ. It helps to remember that, historically, 
Jesus almost certainly was not white, and this is one element of Nietzschean genealogy and 
political resistance Deleuze and Guattari exhibit. Yet in The Logic of Sensation the influence is 
just as much Artaud who was antithetical to a topology of the body where everything 
assembled around and was subordinated by one organ or part (say, the face).  
Bacon’s paintings embark on a deterritorialization of the face, and the role this has in 
Deleuze’s overall concern with regimes of signs is that he emphatically states that the history 
of art is a history of the process of facialization. He is clear that the face is not a matter that 
concerns only figurative or representative works of art like portraiture; rather, all painting 
                                                            
21 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 167-91. 
22 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), 
187-203. 
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implies the face and depicts it amid a system centralized by this organ. Deleuze and Guattari 
unmask the majoritarian presuppositions of faciality, which is to say how recognition (and 
here let us interpret it in the sense of a Levinasian politics of the gaze) is always already 
wrapped up in a process of selection: what counts as a face, whether the subject of our gaze 
abides by the norm, and so on. Aesthetics disrupts and indeed has the power to expose the 
genesis of representation, calling forth signs that cannot be mitigated by our pre-existing 
formulae of recognition. One could argue that for this reason Bacon’s paintings often appear 
as gross or cruel; they stutter and deform, getting their energy from a chthonic realm below 
organization—and for this reason does Bacon paint the head and not the face. Unlike the 
face, the head is without structure; the distinction here is schematically the same as the 
opposition between bone and flesh also in The Logic of Sensation. Referring to Bacon’s Three 
Figures and a Portrait (fig. 14), and Bacon’s inspiration for this in how Edgar Degas paints the 
woman’s spine in After the Bath (fig. 15), Deleuze writes, “what achieves this tension 
[between flesh and bone] in the painting is, precisely, meat, through the splendor of its colors. 
Meat is the state of the body in which flesh and bone confront each other locally rather than 
being composed structurally.”23 All these arguments relate to a move away from a body as 
something structured, also known as the “organism” as opposed to the Body without 
Organs.24 This organism, as organized, has ties to the parasitism of representation and the 
concepts that impinge on how one is affected by the work of art.  
What Bacon accomplishes is a series of undecidable signs, each which opens up a 
space for sensations to hit the viewer directly and unfiltered by concepts. These signs 
                                                            
23 Deleuze, The Logic of Sensation, 20-1. 
24 “The organs distribute them- selves on the BwO, but they distribute themselves independently of the form 
of the organism; forms become contingent, organs are no longer anything more than intensities that are 
produced, flows, thresholds, and gradients. ‘A’ stomach, ‘an’ eye, ‘a’ mouth: the indefinite article does not lack 
anything; it is not indeterminate or undifferentiated, but expresses the pure determination of intensity, intensive 
difference” (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 164).  
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Deleuze calls the zone of indiscernibility and in Bacon the primary undecidable is between 
the human and the animal. The mutations that Bacon’s figures undergo do not depict a 
movement from the human to the animal, but rather seek to enter into the common traits 
that demonstrate the very instability of our concepts and linguistic barriers, especially the 
primacy of becoming over being, difference over identity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure Fourteen. Oil, pastel, alkyd paint, and sand on canvas, Three Figures and a Portrait, Francis Bacon, 1975, 
© The Estate of Francis Bacon. All rights reserved. DACS / SOCAN (2018). 
 
Figure Fifteen. Oil on canvas, After the Bath, Edgar Degas, c. 1895. 
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In the words of Lyotard, whose Discourse, Figure (1971) influences one of Deleuze’s terms in 
The Logic of Sensation, painting seeks to capture the Figure without figuration. As summarized 
by Ronald Bogue, in Discourse, Figure Lyotard’s primary opponent is structuralism’s 
“textualization of the world and [Lyotard wants] to insist [instead] that the visual constitutes 
a domain unassailable within codes and regulated oppositions.”25 He hopes to replace it with 
a kind of sign that cannot be codified in the structures of, for instance, binary linguistic 
categories. In The Logic of Sense, for example, Deleuze explores a more positive (rather than 
differential) idea of the sign. There, signifier and signified are complementary but 
nevertheless distinct series: the signifier as “empty place” and the signified as “occupant without a 
place.”26 As Bogue continues: “To the extent that the visual is recognized, comprehended, 
and assimilated within a rational order . . . its truth is lost, for it is thereby coded, made 
‘readable’ and textualized. Its truth is only revealed in ‘the event,’ which ‘presents itself as a 
fall, as a sliding and an error.”27 This concept of the fall will also inform Deleuze’s definition 
of sensation in his work on Francis Bacon. Along with Lyotard, let us return to Straus, 
Maldiney, and the quasi-phenomenological tradition that Deleuze is equally drawing on in 
his aesthetics. 
~ A R T - H I S T O R I C A L  P R E D E C E S S O R S ~  
Erwin Straus’s work can be captured in a distinction he makes between geography 
and landscape as two distinct modes of perception. Perception as geographical can be 
understood as viewing the world from a fixed and removed vantage point. In contrast, the 
view from a landscape is one that shifts with the spectator. What is also valuable is that the 
landscape grants us the capacity to get lost in it—something that cannot be attained from the 
                                                            
25 Ronald Bogue, Deleuze on Music, Painting, and the Arts (New York: Routledge, 2003), 113.  
26 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 41. 
27 Bogue, Deleuze on Music, Painting, and the Arts, 113.  
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sober outside offered by the geographic mode. As “Cézanne’s enigma” goes, one must 
create a being of sensation where “Man is absent from but entirely within the landscape.”28 
What will resonate above all else with Deleuze’s aesthetics is how the landscape, with its 
constant movement and lack of an ideal vantage point, pivots perspective away from a 
representation of fixed objects and beyond the classic distinction between subject and 
object. There are three rhythms at work in the genesis of representation and it should be 
noted that Deleuze attaches each of these to one of three elements at work in Bacon’s 
triptychs. These three rhythms are (i) the attendant-witness; (ii) a diastolic enclosure of 
sensation into a discernible object; and (iii) a systolic event that captures the dissolution of 
these shapes.29 Like blood being pumped to the heart, forms are filled and emptied on 
Bacon’s canvas, and the fine balance he strikes between the two is what Deleuze finds so 
compelling. It is vital for the work of art to express the cohabitation of these forces, and the 
shortcomings of certain forms of modern art that lean toward abstraction or expressionism 
lie in how they overemphasize one of these rhythms—usually (ii) or (iii).  
Given that the following chapters of my work take up the musical pole of Deleuze’s 
aesthetics and how it differs radically from painting, it is interesting to reflect on how similar 
the rhythmic triunes in Bacon’s triptychs are to how Deleuze and Guattari explain (the 
musical concepts of) territories, the cosmos, and the refrain in A Thousand Plateaus. As 
Chapter II unpacks, there are numerous moments like this where the irreconcilability of 
painting and music seems to begin resolving itself. The ultimate realization in Chapter II, 
however, is that there always remains an asymptote between the function of painting and 
music no matter how close they may come at times. More often than not, Bacon stands as 
                                                            
28 Paul Cézanne, quoted in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy? trans. Hugh Tomlinson and 
Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 169.  
29 Deleuze, The Logic of Sensation, 64-5. 
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the antithesis of music, sometimes even framed as pitiable compared to “the superiority of 
music.”30 It gives a whole new meaning to Bacon’s injunction to “pity the meat!”31 While it 
would take much to forget the merits of painting—how it taps into molecular forces and 
erases the world’s worn-out forms—Deleuze does not hesitate to note when painting takes 
on a musical quality, and thus reaches beyond its material limitations. This is how Deleuze 
explains Bacon’s exceptional32 musical instant, this time referring to his Triptych, August 1972 
(fig 16): 
If the attendant in the center is furnished with elongations and a well-defined mauve 
oval, we find a diminished torso in the Figure on the left, since a whole portion of it 
is missing, while the torso on the right is in the process of being built up, half of it 
having already been added . . . Correlatively, the mauve oval in the center changes 
status, turning into a pink pool lying next to the chair, in the left panel, and a red 
discharge from the leg, in the right panel. In this way, Bacon uses mutilations and 
prostheses in a game of added and subtracted values. It is like a collection of 
hysterical “sleepings” and “awakenings” affecting the diverse parts of a body. But it is 
above all one of Bacon’s most profoundly musical paintings [my emphasis].33    
 
 
                                                            
30 Ibid., 47. 
31 Ibid., 21.  
32 In both senses of the word: unusual and unusually good.  
33 Deleuze, The Logic of Sensation, 66. 
Figure Sixteen. Oil and sand on canvas Triptych, August 1972, Francis Bacon, 1972, 
© The Estate of Francis Bacon. All rights reserved. DACS / SOCAN (2018). 
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The combination of hysteric sensations produces a rhythm that points beyond the actualized 
world and this is what is so musical about it in Deleuze’s mind. But we must not forget how 
attached these hysterical bodies are to the material plane in ways music is not. Sensation, 
after all, is a fall where “the flesh descends from the bones, the body descends from the arms 
and the raised thighs.”34 Music, in contrast, is an ascent. How it moves away from the 
molecular upward to the rhythms of territories and the cosmos will be the focus of Chapter 
III.  
Moving beyond Straus and the descriptions of sensation offered above, Henri 
Maldiney explains what this realm of sensation below the organized subject must feel like. At 
this level, Being is but a Mitwelt with no boundaries between the world and us. In a Strausian 
sense, this means that our engagement with the world disassembles our sense of subjectivity; 
it is a moment of radical connection where the ‘I’ is suspended. From this disintegration, we 
begin to see why Bacon describes his paintings as “matter[s] of fact” or the recording of 
facts.35 His mission is to get beyond the subject and this involves a radical focus on the 
objectivity (the object- and not subject-focused aspect of sensation). What Deleuze therefore 
reads Bacon as inheriting is a deep recognition for how art should be about the immediacy 
of sensation and that, to gain this state, that is to capture this force, art needs to fight against 
forms that are narrative or representational. The figurative must become the figural. Art 
must be made into pure images.  
Several dangers come with art that seeks to be representational, though the ones 
Deleuze focuses on are the cliché and the subordination of the eye to a model of recognition 
which does not allow the possibility for an immediate, pure sensation. There then arises in 
The Logic of Sensation the following question: Bacon says, “It is a very, very close and difficult 
                                                            
34 Ibid., 67. 
35 Ibid., 128-9.  
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thing to know why some paint comes across directly onto the nervous system and other 
paint tells the story in a long diatribe through the brain.”36 There are two major attempts by 
modern painting to move beyond representation and these, as mentioned earlier, are 
figural/expressionist and abstract art. For expressionist art, Jackson Pollock stands as the 
poster boy. His work, along with abstract expressionists en masse, signifies a rejection of 
material forms. In their place, emerge what Deleuze calls the “manual” aspect of painting—
that is, the return of an autonomous matter on the canvas that he names manual chaos.37  
Deleuze is sympathetic to their project insofar as it seeks to move beyond the duality 
of matter and form, substituting it for the intensities and forces at work in the world that our 
minds selectively recognize, turn into stale identities, and deny the vital possibilities inherent 
in becoming. Deleuze’s hesitance in committing himself to the mode of expression 
characterized by expressionist art is that it plunges too deeply into chaos. Likewise, on the 
other end of the spectrum of modern art we find abstractionists such as Piet Mondrian (fig. 
17) and Wassily Kandinsky (fig. 18). Unlike the manual traits of Pollock, abstractionists 
reintroduce form (lines and shape) and do so under the authority of an optical code. 
Ultimately, Deleuze’s claim is that this art manages to be too organized; there is still a 
subordination of the body to the eye based on figures, no matter how minimalist, on the 
canvas. What Deleuze searches for is a haptic perception that will restore sensation and 
becoming (in other words, the becoming-hand of the eye), which we shall get into later. In 
an Aristotelian fashion, Deleuze seeks a golden mean between expression and abstraction 
and finds it in Bacon.   
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Figure Seventeen. Oil on canvas, Composition with Large Red Plane, Yellow, Black, Gray, and Blue, Piet Mondrian, 1921.   
Figure Eighteen. Oil on canvas, Black and Violet, Wassily Kandinsky, 1923.  
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This is one of the central problems that Bacon’s art addresses: how can we “[s]ave the 
contour,” that which gives determinacy to a figure, all the while presenting an image without 
the dominance of narration, representation, and individuated bodies.38 With expressionism 
and abstraction, the scale tips too heavily resulting in an unliveable chaos. It is the kind of art 
that cannot give intensity. Bacon’s third approach to the problematic of modern art (getting 
beyond representation) expresses a passage, a becoming, that demonstrates the processes, 
many imperceptible, that a body undergoes as it moves beyond and below what can be 
conceptualized, and in fact what counts as a discernible individual or form of 
subjectification. Bacon thus treats the human form much as Nietzsche does, a kind of bridge 
or tightrope that is always on the way to the overman (which is to be read as nonhuman). 
There is, however, always a return of the human figure on the canvas—what Cézanne refers 
to as that “stubborn geometry” or “geologic lines” of representation—but there are valuable 
ways of demonstrating it undergoing a process or movement.39 This is one of Bacon’s 
fundamental accomplishments.   
Deleuze defines this process of movement and erasure as the intervening of the 
Diagram on the Figure. The construction of form and its disintegration is a process that 
takes several forms throughout Deleuze’s work, including the “distinctness and obscurity” of 
Difference and Repetition, itself a Dionysian reprisal of the Apollonian “distinct and clear” that 
Deleuze addresses in Nietzsche and Philosophy.40 I return to Nietzsche and Philosophy, which in 
certain respects is the foundation of Deleuze’s aesthetics, in Chapter III.  
There is another distinction that complements the Figure and Diagram, which also 
comes out of The Logic of Sensation: the digital and the analogue. A digital code homogenizes 
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40 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 161, 213.  
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and codifies data by sorting it primarily into a binary set. In contrast, there exists the 
analogical mode, which organizes elements based on the immediate sensations created. For 
example, take synthesizers—“[a]nalogical synthesizers are ‘modular’: they establish an 
immediate connection between heterogeneous elements.”41 What is of interest to the overall 
goal of this chapter—the development of the sign, language, and body that define the 
painterly pole of Deleuze’s aesthetics—is that Deleuze actually discusses an analogical form 
of language: “analogical language would be a language of relations, which consists of 
expressive movements, paralinguistic signs, breaths and screams . . .”42 As I shall get into in 
the next section of this chapter, this is exactly what Deleuze describes in The Logic of Sense as 
the language of the schizophrenic. One can therefore demonstrate one of the major 
consistencies in Deleuze’s thought based on the life of this idea. There is a kinship in his 
philosophy of language and his aesthetics, most notably in the case of painting, which he 
calls “the analogical art par excellence.”43 
~ T H E  L A N G U A G E  O F  T H E  S C H I Z O P H R E N I C ~  
From the outset of Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense, it is clear that 
Antonin Artaud is one of the key conceptual personae in Deleuze’s oeuvre. Artaud’s concept 
the Body without Organs gains significant traction from The Logic of Sense onward. While its 
role and description sways both with and without the influence of Guattari (and this 
movement is no aberration for many of the concepts Deleuze employs) the Body without 
Organs and its creator, Artaud, can be observed throughout Deleuze’s work and thus 
surveyed to draw out the waves of consistency in his thought—a gesture fundamental to a 
systematic thinker like Deleuze, whose philosophy must be taken as a whole, though open, 
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structure. While on the topic of the Body without Organs, though, I should mention that 
Deleuze once remarked to Claire Parnet that he and Guattari did not share a common 
understanding of this term. 
Now, the introduction of Artaud is, as many of Deleuze’s figureheads, in response to 
a particular problem. For Deleuze, Artaud “pursues . . . the terrible revelation of a thought 
without image, and the conquest of a new principle which does not allow itself to be 
represented.”44 The Body without Organs is what Artaud calls this.45 Furthermore, Artaud’s 
theatre of cruelty expresses this “terrible revelation” with fervent precision. As Catherine 
Dale states in “Cruel: Antonin Artaud and Gilles Deleuze,”  
Artaud’s theatre is not designed to represent or reproduce (describe) man but to 
create a being which moves. The language of Artaud is a symbiosis of 
technologies—asignifying semiotics, affective gestures, violent sounds and painful 
noises—challenging the organization of the organism in its collectivity (audience, 
participant, body) and in its singularity (event), occurring at the chasm between 
language and the body.46 
 
At the heart of this process is what Artaud deems “cruelty.” This is not the cruelty of war, 
but something far more eternal. For Artaud, “everything that acts is cruelty,” and in 
announcing this he carves out his position in a philosophy of affect that deals with the 
pervasiveness of cruelty.47 Deleuze will reprise how he takes up Artaud’s cruelty with regard 
to Bacon’s artwork. Everyday forces of sitting (fig. 19) standing over a washbasin (fig. 7), 
falling asleep (fig. 20), and so on come to bear a weight that exhausts the body, disturbing its 
rhythmic speeds and slowness.  
                                                            
44 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 147. 
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Figure Nineteen. Oil on canvas, Portrait of George Dyer Talking, Francis Bacon, 1966, 
© The Estate of Francis Bacon. All rights reserved. DACS / SOCAN (2018).  
Figure Twenty. Oil on canvas, Lying Figure, Francis Bacon, 1961, 
© The Estate of Francis Bacon. All rights reserved. DACS / SOCAN (2018). 
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This weight is cruelty; and if Saint Augustine once spoke of his weight being his love, 
we now find in Artaud a weight of cruelty. What Deleuze inherits from Artaud is an 
understanding of this force as affecting the body in all circumstances. In The Logic of Sense, 
Deleuze examines the affection even language (something that seems to be an Idea not an 
affect of the body) has on us at the level of immediate forces. He defines this as the 
schizophrenic depth of language. 
Two versions of linguistic depth arise in The Logic of Sense, the first being the 
schizophrenic’s and the second being what Deleuze calls the “crack”—a kind of return of 
depth to the surface.48 The second version is equally as fascinating as the first and elucidates 
the communication of the distinct planes of depth and surface, shedding light on the 
divergent series of ascending away from or descending to the depths—each does not exist 
on the same straight line that can be traced from depth upward finally to the heights; the 
communication of series is not that straightforward. For our purpose, however, it is the first 
version of depth that concerns us. It is the realm of the pre-Socratics, Nietzsche to a certain 
extent (though he floats to the surface at times), and finally Artaud. Think of the way they all 
philosophize; qu’est-ce que s’orienter dans la pensée? [what is orientation in thinking?]. Thales, 
Anaximander, Heraclitus, Empedocles—each a natural philosopher or physicist—who 
sought out the nature of things in the material world as such.49 The orientation of their 
thinking was down into the caverns and into the deep. As legend has it, Thales once fell in a 
well for gazing upward at the stars, so perhaps the orientation of his thinking was up to the 
heights, though that fall forced him back to the ground with the other pre-Socratics. And in 
those caves we will eventually find Nietzsche toiling away with his hammer, a tool we must 
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remember is that of the geologist or speleologist, and not necessarily a statue-crushing 
mallet.   
 What we find in Artaud is a language reduced to its purely phonetic elements: 
“clappings, crackings, gnashings, cracklings, explosions, the shattered sounds of internal 
objects, and also the inarticulate howls-breaths [cris-souffles] of the body without organs.”50 
For Deleuze, this is not to be understood as the primary or proto-linguistic state before 
order descends onto nonsense—literally descends, that is, given that the voice of the father 
is necessarily positioned above the child. Instead this state should be recognized as a 
schizophrenic mode of language. What the schizophrenic mode reveals is the condition of 
language that does not abide by any separation between words and bodies. A system of 
schizophrenic language reinvents the connection between bodies and language.  
 While in The Logic of Sense Artaud is burdened by a kind of impotence, an inability to 
rise to the surface of sense, by the time of Anti-Oedipus (1972) he signifies the “fulfillment of 
literature.”51 Artaud’s writing achieves immediate contact with the reader, just as on the stage 
the audience receives words in ways that resemble how the schizophrenic does—pure 
consonants, indigestible sentences, and screams that vibrate the body. Let us begin with an 
example. Artaud’s translation of Lewis Carroll’s famous ‘nonsense’ poem, Jabberwocky, creates 
a certain fusion of words into unpronounceable or what Deleuze calls non-decomposable 
blocks. In essence, this illustrates a linguistic form of the Body without Organs, much as in 
The Logic of Sensation painting will as well. While Sense and Sensation are obviously working 
with different languages (the verbal and pictorial respectively), one must acknowledge that 
“the expression of intensities and bodily sensations, however, is common to both works and 
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Artaud is a key figure for Deleuze in that discussion.”52 Where this is leading us is a complete 
understanding of one aesthetic pole, that of painting, which we shall see Deleuze contrasts 
with the functions of music. Put simply, painting and music stand for the two sides of what 
art can accomplish. Furthermore, since Deleuze’s writing on certain literature (primarily 
Sade, Masoch, and Artaud) bears such a striking resemblance to what he says about painting, 
and literature is frequently employed in The Logic of Sensation to explicate the function of 
painting, a study of Artaud begets an understanding of painting.     
 Turning to Artaud’s translation from Carroll’s Jabberwocky, what jumps out to us is 
that he abandons what Deleuze calls the playful and clean aspect of the original. Carroll is a 
thinker of the surfaces; he glides across them without entering the dirty depths that Artaud 
famously refers to as a place where “[a]ll writing is PIG SHIT (that is to say, every fixed or 
written word is decomposed into noisy, alimentary, and excremental bits).”53 As Deleuze 
describes it, there is a body-sieve filled with holes in the language of the schizophrenic, and 
therefore no proper distinction can be made between language and bodies. Recall Freud’s 
definition of the ego in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, where he calls it a barrier that applies the 
classic Kantian categories (time, space, contiguity) only as checks that filter out immediate 
experience, the presence of which, when it manages to bypass the ego, becomes unconscious 
trauma.54 The ego, like the surface of sense, orders the world in such a way that it negates 
pure affection. A border is necessary in this process of rejection, no matter how incorporeal 
the margin may be, and its absence opens up the floodgates to piercing words and wounding 
tonic elements. In a chapter on orality in The Logic of Sense, Deleuze constructs two series that 
commonly demarcate the distinctions between words and bodies. On the one hand, there is 
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eating. Objects are things in the world insofar as they are edible, can be taken up and 
chewed. On the other hand, however, there is speaking. This is an incorporeal series 
removed from the objects it signifies: “Language is rendered possible by that which 
distinguishes it. What separates sounds from bodies makes sounds into the elements of a 
language. What separates speaking from eating renders speech possible; what separates 
propositions from things renders propositions possible.”55 These two series are brought 
together in Artaud, who is quite explicit not only about the effect language has on his body 
but who also prescribes this connection as fundamental to what he sees as the pinnacle of 
aesthetics. What poets like Charles Baudelaire and Edgar Allan Poe accomplished, according 
to Artaud, was a tetanus art. If words are wounding for Artaud and they infringe on the body 
as a disease does, it is no surprise that he affirms a tetanus-like aesthetics. Yet there is a less 
apparent meaning that Robert Mark Causey and Geoffrey Bennington suggest. Artaud is 
likely drawing on the phonetic similarity between tetanus and the conjunction of the French 
tête + anus. Artaud’s work is a monstrous combination of eating and speaking or that which 
becomes and has close ties to excrement (anus) and Idea (tête).56  
 Despite Artaud’s work describing the zone of indiscernibility between signifier and 
signified, this is not to say that such nonsense does not carry an effect. In literally inscribing 
the body of the schizophrenic with words, it is not the case that one cannot speak of it, 
having to as it were pass such nonsense over in silence. On the contrary, it becomes clear 
that, not only is a full appreciation of this effect fundamental to a clinical approach to 
schizophrenia, it marks a watershed moment in the history of aesthetics that substantiates a 
move toward immediate experience. As for the experience of the schizophrenic, a useful 
example is Franz Kafka’s “In the Penal Colony.” It matters not whether the prisoners 
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understand their sentence; that it be carved on their flesh is sufficient to understand how 
one’s body is affected by it. Though like most examples, even this does not fully capture the 
essence of Artaud’s experience. It is not, as we read in Kafka’s short story, that words are 
superfluous in expressing the experiences of the prisoners. Rather, Artaud stands in a far 
more antithetical position to language and its capacity of properly representing or standing in 
for his sensations.  
 Artaud elevates this schizophrenic relation to language to the level of an aesthetic 
framework. In the end, aesthetics according to Artaud and Deleuze strives to the experience 
of that which occurs directly between bodies, or nerve upon nerve, as Artaud prefers to label 
the connection in The Nerve Meter. Where Deleuze intervenes, however, is in suggesting that 
this is a sufficient though not necessary aesthetic function. As this chapter begins to unravel, 
music begins where painting ends and accomplishes a vastly different potential: a distinct 
relation to time and the natural world. Where for Deleuze painting is molecular, music is 
cosmological. This will be the central focus of Chapter III, while currently Artaud’s language 
and the carnal depths occupies our attention. 
~ O R G A N - I Z E D  S E N S A T I O N ~ 
In this chapter so far, the role the body and language play in Artaud’s life and work 
have spoken to their psychoanalytic and aesthetic status. Along with these two sides to 
Artaud’s work, one can also suggest that there is an ontological importance to his claims; in 
other words, Artaud’s writing and experience outline an ontology about how matter 
organizes itself and what lies below the organism. It is this ontology that arguably shifts in 
Deleuze’s interpretation between The Logic of Sense and The Logic of Sensation. This ontology is 
that of the Body without Organs. How it develops in between these two texts is where we 
now turn so as to feel the consistency between his thought on literature (as encountered in 
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The Logic of Sense) and painting (in Sensation).  
Artaud technically uses the term just once in his radio play, “To Have Done with the 
Judgement of God,” though its truth resonates throughout his work. Its explicit appearance 
is worth quoting in its entirety:  
Man is sick because he is badly constructed.  
We must make up our minds to strip him bare in order to scrape  
off that animalcule that itches him mortally, 
 
god, 
and with god  
his organs.  
 
For you can tie me up if you wish,  
but there is nothing more useless than an organ.  
 
When you will have made him a body without organs,  
then you will have delivered him from all his automatic reactions  
and restored him to his true freedom.  
 
Then you will teach him again to dance wrong side out  
as in the frenzy of dance halls  
and this wrong side out will be his real place.57  
 
The Body without Organs represents a twofold movement for Artaud. It names a pre-
individual experience of force and it also appears as a kind of protection constructed by 
Artaud in light of the pain experienced by a purely phonetic language.58 As for the first 
characteristic, the Body without Organs illustrates a primary order of our body that does not 
subordinate sensation to cognitive faculties like thinking or judgement. These faculties are 
moments of static organization (concepts, Ideas, logical reasoning) in an otherwise 
heterogeneous and smooth flow of bodies. Following Artaud, Deleuze conceives of 
embodiment beyond a so-called developed or organized form. For this reason is he 
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particularly interested in embryology, a study concerned more so with the genesis of 
organization, and its emergence from an undifferentiated mass toward the organisms we 
observe, than intuiting bodily structures as readymade and teleological substances. The 
amorphous becoming of the Body without Organs forces us to imagine divergent ways of 
being and to treat organization as something that is passed through, not ended in or 
culminated with. Here I am employing language more in line with Deleuze’s appropriation 
of Artaud in his Capitalism and Schizophrenia collaboration with Guattari. It is clear, however, 
that Deleuze’s approach to Artaud in The Logic of Sense outlines some of the key insights and 
instructions, as it were, in “making yourself a Body without Organs.”59  
Approached through the lens of the effect language can have on bodies, the 
schizophrenic experience represents a nonorganic (non-organized) relation of signifier to 
signified, deterritorializing our standard relationship to language where words stand apart 
from the things being signified. As the Thirteenth Series of “the Schizophrenic and the Little 
Girl,” explores, this unmediated experience of language stands at the interstice of madness 
and creation. In the words of Edward Scheer, “how can a schizophrenic be an artist, when 
they are ‘out of control’? What is the status of art that risks nonsense . . . ?”60 These are the 
very questions that made aspects of Deleuze’s Logic of Sense cause “something of a furore in 
France in the late 1960.”61 At first, Deleuze appears simply to be grappling with the aesthetic 
potential of nonsense and chaos—something that he will return to in The Logic of Sensation 
and his writing on music mainly in A Thousand Plateaus, which I focus on in Chapter III. Yet 
his engagement with Artaud goes further than explaining a neutral act of creation, and this is 
what causes such a “furore.”  Deleuze, in line with Artaud, demonstrates that concomitant 
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to this direct experience of language is visceral pain experienced by the creator-subject. This 
last point sheds light on why Artaud arguably created the Body without Organs as a way of 
making the barrages and piercings of language something less destructive and more 
productive, perhaps even the origin of a new aesthetic experience.  
 The way in which Deleuze says Artaud’s Body without Organs “transform[s] the 
painful passion of the body into a triumphant action, obedience into command” is a 
complex process.62 One of its defence mechanisms is its refusal to conform to what Deleuze 
calls the language of the “heights.”63 While this language appears to the schizophrenic as 
generating wounds on their body, Artaud is able to appropriate this effect by reproducing it 
on the stage. What his body receives is the pain of words, yet Artaud does not choose to 
escape this harm, knowing full well the greater cruelty of static concepts and that of the 
foreign language of the heights. The depths break away from the organization that comes 
from on high, generating the autonomy of sensation that grounds Deleuze’s writing on art.  
 In The Logic of Sensation, Deleuze draws on Artaud’s Body without Organs as a way to 
conceptualize cruelty. This cruelty is not so much that of a represented scene (e.g., that there 
is something screamed about) but quite simply a metaphysics of force—the brute result of 
bodies and sensations interacting, which does not require the presupposition of a subject 
acted upon. That the theatre of cruelty does not have to do with representation is also 
picked up on by Jacques Derrida in an essay from Writing and Difference, stating, “the theatre 
of cruelty is not a representation. It is life itself, in the extent to which life is unrepresentable.”64 
Through gestures and not speech, Artaud lays bear the flesh of language and explains that in 
this state repetition is impossible—a claim that has significant implications for Deleuze.  As 
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Deleuze writes, 
 Bacon and Artaud meet on many points: the Figure is the body without organs  
(dismantle the organism in favor of the body, the face in favor of the head); the body  
without organs is flesh and nerve; a wave flows through it and traces levels upon it; a  
sensation is produced when the wave encounters the Forces acting on the body, an  
‘affective athleticism,’65 a scream-breath.66  
 
This scream-breath is almost certainly akin to the “breath-words [mots-souffles] and howl-
words [mots-cris]” we heard from the Artaud of The Logic of Sense.67 The protagonist of the 
depths has thus begun to take on a painterly form. It is equally so worth noting that The Logic 
of Sensation compares and contrasts the work of Francis Bacon to several other literary figures 
like Beckett, Carroll, Kafka, and Proust, to name an important bunch. As Deleuze will 
explain later in his career, in What is Philosophy?, the artist, philosopher, and scientist create 
and respond to a unique set of problems and harness forces in ways particular to their field. 
This is not to say, however, that these areas cannot speak about the other. Indeed in The 
Logic of Sensation we witness Deleuze creating and organizing concepts specific to certain 
affects, the likes of which are the domain of the artist. Art does not need philosophy to be 
capable of thinking itself, though certain shifts in aspect [Gestalt] occur with the intervention 
of other realms of creation, be it other discourses (philosophy, science) or aesthetic media 
(literature, sculpture, music). This is one possible defence for why Deleuze selects literary 
figures for the most part to give potential readings of Bacon’s work. Above everyone else, 
though, Artaud is Deleuze’s guide through how Bacon renders the body and cruelty on the 
canvas, how it acts on the flesh at a molecular level and this being the essence of painting.  
 Artaud’s presence in The Logic of Sensation immediately recalls his role in The Logic of 
Sense as a figure of the depths, and in this later text Deleuze makes clear Bacon’s affinity to 
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the depths not just by how much he has in common with Artaud but with how little Bacon’s 
work relates to thinkers of another plane, namely, the surface. The figurehead of the surface, 
Lewis Carroll, unmatched in this capacity except perhaps by the Stoics, overlaps with Bacon 
on but one claim. Deleuze states, “Bacon and Lewis Carroll meet on this single point: the 
smile of a cat.”68 Beyond this modest connection, a convergence between the Cheshire Cat’s 
grin and Bacon’s series of hysteric smiles that seem to outlive the rest of the parts of his 
canvas, there is not much else that relates Bacon to those who glide along the surface of 
sense. The depths are his home, and for this reason is Artaud his true match.  
 Together, Artaud and Bacon articulate a sensation detached from the individual. The 
schizophrenic depths of an immediate sensation occur even with regard to language and the 
status of words once thought to be immaterial and ideational. This materiality constitutes a 
whole aesthetic pole for Deleuze. But there is a curious transition that occurs in how 
Deleuze describes this aesthetic in Bacon’s case. Though he is adamant on the affinity 
between Artaud and Bacon, he does not attach the schizophrenic label to Bacon’s sensation. 
Perhaps this is simply because one ought not call someone who is not clinically 
schizophrenic such terms. Although, at least as it pertained to Artaud, the term was as 
critical as it was clinical. Examining why Deleuze chooses not to call Bacon’s depths 
schizophrenic is valuable given its prominence in The Logic of Sense onward through until his 
collaborations with Guattari. In The Logic of Sensation, however, the depths as characterized by 
Bacon are not given the title of schizophrenia; rather, they are called hysteric. According to 
Deleuze, Bacon’s paintings represent a hysteric art in its truest form.  
~ P A I N T I N G  H Y S T E R I A ~  
 By now it is hopefully apparent why Deleuze takes a critical-clinical interest in 
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Artaud and treats his relation to language and the body as fundamental to a proper 
understanding of the depths and for an aesthetics of painting. Despite how consistent 
Deleuze’s treatments of Artaud and Bacon are, specifically regarding the forms of language 
and/or sensation that act directly on the body, Deleuze substitutes the term schizophrenia 
for hysteria. Whether this is due to the mileage the term has had with Guattari, or the desire 
not to use the term to describe a non-schizophrenic artist, is up for discussion. Allow us to 
begin with hysteria and sensation, since schizophrenia has been one of the chief focuses in 
this chapter already.  
Tomas Geyskens essay, “Painting as Hysteria: Deleuze on Bacon,” analyzes the use 
Deleuze has for describing an art as hysteric among an array of other choice concepts. 
Arguably, if set on pulling a term from psychoanalysis, there are numerous ones less out-
dated in their applicability than hysteria—a term equal parts misogynistic as it is inaccurate. 
This is not to say that, in making use of it, Deleuze is participating in any of this; as always 
he is likely pushing the term beyond its clichéd and gendered presuppositions such that it 
unfolds another use, namely, in designating an aesthetics of visceral forces. At this time, let 
us turn to the relation between aesthetics and hysteria.  
Geyskens begins by directing us to the limitations of Freud’s understanding of 
hysteria. Freud reads it, like many other symptoms in his diagnoses, by focusing too heavily 
on the ‘psychic content’ it contains, and in so doing elides “the corporeal and affective 
madness of hysteria.”69 In affirming that the hysteric body itself says just as much as the 
speech and beliefs of the patient, we find Deleuze returning to nondiscursive signs much like 
those in the schizophrenic Artaud of The Logic of Sense. Geyskens continues, “[i]n symptoms 
such as anorexia, bulimia and self-mutilation, contemporary hysteria disposes of Freud’s 
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142. 
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‘psychic content’ and only shows the excessive presence of the body, the quivering of the 
flesh that does not speak but works directly on the nerves.”70 Bacon illustrates this relation 
to the body in works such as Figure at a Washbasin (fig. 7). The body paradoxically seems to 
be escaping from itself. This relation can be called hysteric insofar as we define it as a certain 
kind of bodily communication, that is, one “not about me escaping from my body, but about 
the body trying to escape from itself through one of its openings, in an immobile spasm.”71 
Finally, Geyskens describes the immediacy of sensation tied to hysteria by referencing the 
work of Josef Breuer, whose writing transitioned from psychology (which deals with 
representations) to electromechanics and its focus on affects or vibrations. The scream and 
the smile are not results of or signs related to a general narrative; they belong to the hysteria 
of painting, and by this Deleuze has in mind a kind of pathic response a work of art can 
evoke. We might recall Maldiney’s distinction between sensation and perception, where the 
latter tells a story (narration) but the former purveys something far more primary.    
The smile is something nondiscursive and hysteric for both Bacon and Deleuze 
(perhaps even for Lewis Carroll). It is that which remains when the rest of the body 
disappears. Yet, just as much, the smile is hysterical for the way it is divorced from any 
narrative; it is purely of the paint and the body, not of the individual or in response to some 
state of affairs. To adopt a phrase from What is Philosophy?, “the smile on the canvas is made 
solely with colors, lines, shadow, and light . . . it is the percept or affect of the material itself, 
and the smile of oil.”72 Bacon’s famous study of Velázquez’s Pope Innocent X (fig. 21, fig. 
22), a haunting reminder of the autonomy of parts of the body, presents a scream like no 
other.  
                                                            
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid., 145. 
72 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 166. 
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Bacon cites Battleship Potemkin as an influence (fig. 23), and following its experimentation in 
montage, Bacon is pointing to something beyond classical representation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure Twenty-One. Oil on canvas, Study after  
 Velázquez’s Portrait of Pope Innocent X, Francis  
Bacon, 1953, © The Estate of Francis Bacon.  
All rights reserved. DACS / SOCAN (2018). 
 
Figure Twenty-Two. Oil on canvas, Portrait  
of Innocent X, Diego Velázquez, 1650.   
Figure Twenty-Three. Battleship Potemkin (detail), Sergei Eisenstein, 1925.   
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His tools are not those of the non-human eye of the camera, but rather of visibility, 
invisibility, and framing—ideas Deleuze also takes up in Foucault. Bacon’s Pope Innocent X 
presents a pure scream that is cut off from a scene that might explain its origin. Why the long 
face, Pope? No answer; just a bottomless mouth, a guttural cry that shakes the canvas. Bacon 
withholds the scene that would work to explain the scream. There is an effect of a pure 
scream brought on by spontaneity, what Deleuze would call the Diagram, and Bacon 
accomplishes this usually (emphasis on usually) not by erasing the figure it is attached to, but 
by presenting it as something on the brink of randomness and sutured to a narrative being 
represented. Again, Bacon walks a fine line between abstraction and expressionism.  
Bacon’s Pope gives off a similar sensation. He separates the scream from a 
represented scene by enveloping the figure in curtains. The curtains in Bacon’s Pope 
resemble those on a stage as if playing the role of a backdrop upon which a scene stands in 
front. However, such an interpretation could not be more antithetical to the way ground, 
contour, and figure interact in a Bacon painting. Deleuze makes clear that the three always 
exist on the same plane in Bacon’s works; they bleed into one another. What at first looks to 
be a ground that sets up a scene ends up revealing itself as another piece beside, and not 
behind, the figure. It loses the ability to establish a rhythm out of which a story can be 
extracted. How painting resists or cannot live up to this rhythm of stories, motifs, 
narratives—perhaps we can boil it right down to modes of temporality—is a significant way 
in which music, which Deleuze considers more accomplished in these areas, begins where 
painting ends. This claim I return to in Chapter III.  
Another method of removing representation and narration used by Bacon is his 
constant reference to the “pity” of his works. While it works well in conjunction with ideas 
of “cruelty” à la Artaud, it has a use beyond the clean dualism of pity-cruelty. Pity is 
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something religious for Bacon and meat and flesh are the objects of this pity. The face that 
lets off a scream is not something horrific or sensational (a term Deleuze rejects in readings 
of Bacon), though this is precisely where our mind goes when confronted with its force. 
“Pity the meat,”73 Deleuze proclaims, an idea that calls to mind the “pity of stones” from his 
Logic of Sense: “How can we help but experience an unbearable pity for stones, a petrifying 
identification?”74 
  What links these two texts, and one could easily include Masochism and the 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia series in this conversation, is a study into the dual forces of 
madness and creation. Madness and creation, which is also to say madness and the invention 
of languages, signs, and images, are true points of connection between Deleuze’s earlier and 
later writing. Hysteria, schizophrenia, and masochism (when properly understood), to name 
some of Deleuze’s focuses, are certain expressions of madness that are capable of creating 
new signs.75 Yet the particular kind of sign created evolves as Deleuze moves from a Logic of 
Sense to Sensation. As Anne Sauvagnargues writes in Deleuze and Art, as we move forward 
chronologically in Deleuze’s writings “[t]he sign is no longer indebted to a hermeneutics of 
sense which deciphers signifying procedures, but belongs to a logic of forces . . . The 
ethology of the affect creates a path from The Logic of Sense to The Logic of Sensation.”76 Like 
the experience of the schizophrenic, Deleuze imagines an aesthetics divorced from the 
common linguistic structure of the sign. In its place is “[a]rt as a vital machine and 
assemblage of signs that is irreducible to language.” We know these to be the threads 
running through Sensation and that the harnessing of forces always involves a kind of 
madness. By this madness Deleuze means the occupation of an anomal/anomalous position, 
                                                            
73 Deleuze, The Logic of Sensation, 21-22.  
74 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 155. 
75 Deleuze, Masochism, 69-80. 
76 Anna Sauvanargues, Deleuze and Art, trans. Samantha Bankston (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 10.  
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one which can make language stutter and bring forth new series of becoming—be it woman, 
animal, molecular, and so on. We might entertain thinking of schizophrenia and hysteria as 
two lines of flight, both working from within anomalous engagements with the body. Where 
the path of the schizophrenic plummets us into the howling depths, and there we find the 
Body without Organs and all its processes prior to “differenciated” organs, the hysteric 
arguably commits another escape from the organized body.77 As presented in Bacon’s 
paintings, we encounter the body as it attempts to discharge itself from itself. Excrement, 
vomit, cramps, and contortions are the everyday forces that do not necessarily act on the 
body, as words do for the schizophrenic, but are the body—parts that seep out of other parts 
are the result of a constant yet impossible task wherein the hysteric is determined to have the 
whole body exit out of a single organism as with the mouth and bulimia.  
Deleuze wants us to understand that hysteria is not just what Bacon paints; it is also 
prompted in the viewer in the vertiginous movement of their sight. Now what do we mean 
by this? Deleuze contends that painting “gives us eyes all over: in the ear, in the stomach, in 
the lungs,” and this appears to be something on the brink of schizophrenia and hysteria, 
though Deleuze positions it as something more so the latter.78 The hysteric does not 
necessarily experience all entities—whether corporeal (things) or incorporeal (language)—as 
affects on the body as we have seen with the schizophrenic. Rather, the hysteric experiences 
a kind of heightened sensation, a synaesthesia not so much where one sense prompts 
another, but where one sense is experienced in another zone: the stomach that sees, the ear 
that smells. These are radical examples that Deleuze does not bother with (though he does 
say music puts an ear in our belly). Nevertheless, he is set on explaining one sensation, 
                                                            
77 “Whereas differentiation determines the virtual content of the Idea as problem, differenciation expresses the 
actualisation of this virtual and the constitution of solutions” (Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 209).  
78 Deleuze, The Logic of Sensation, 45. 
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namely, the hysteric experience of touch through the eyes. This experience is called haptic 
perception. Deleuze leads us through its history in art and brings us back to the hysteria we 
experience as spectators of Bacon’s work. What we should keep in the back of our mind is 
also the communication of aesthetic media this process entails. The synaesthesia of 
overlapping sensations is one of the most important tropes in how Deleuze writes art 
criticism.     
~ H A P T I C  S E N S A T I O N ~ 
The concept of the haptic arises from a distinction made by Alois Riegl between two 
forms of perception (haptic and optic). The brilliance of the haptic is that it makes possible a 
way of seeing with the hand that does not simply regress into a subservience of the hand to 
the eye. Egyptian art is said to be haptic, and indeed it is in reference to its bas-relief that 
Riegl coins the term, which comes from the Greek aptô [touch]. Riegl’s study of Egyptian art 
highlights its planar quality, especially how all its parts—background, contour, and figure—
strike the viewer as equidistant from each other. Deleuze will also emphasize this aspect in 
Bacon, who he thinks represents a becoming-Egyptian in art. This Egyptology will also 
prove important in Chapter II, as we examine a possible synthesis of the aesthetics of Bacon 
and Proust. A rare term, Egypt somehow arises in Deleuze’s writings on Bacon and Proust.  
Before examining the haptic in the work of Riegl and Deleuze and Guattari (who 
first mention it in A Thousand Plateaus in the section on “The Smooth and the Striated”), let 
us make one parenthetical note. Riegl’s use of the term haptisch is surprisingly sparse and in 
fact makes but one appearance (and this appearance is merely an added note made by the 
editor, Emile Reisch, mind you) in his 1964 work, Spätrömische Kunstindustrie. In explaining the 
quality of Egyptian bas-relief, Riegl originally uses the word taktisch, though he would go on 
to question his choice of words, thus informing Reisch of his desire to change it to haptisch. 
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It is not unlike Deleuze to amplify such parenthetical additions—his most famous example 
being the Body without Organs in Artaud, though let us not forget Leibniz’s “fold,” an 
equally sparse term in the source text. As we shall see next, it is not just that Deleuze inherits 
a lightly used term from Riegl; he also reworks it in a large way. As for its original 
appearance though, Riegl writes as follows:  
[A] tactile plane suggested by the eye of touch . . . is the plane which the eye 
perceives when it comes so close to the surface of an object, that all the silhouettes 
and, in particular all shadows which otherwise could disclose an alteration in depth, 
disappear. The perception of objects, which characterises this first level of the 
ancient Kunstwollen, is thus tactile, and in as much as it has to be optical to a certain 
degree, it is nahsichtig; ancient Egyptian art expresses it in almost its purest form.79 
 
As you may have noticed, the word haptic is not in the above passage, and this is due to the 
word tactile being substituted for haptic, as already mentioned, in a later note made by the 
editor. What Riegl is ultimately saying is that the denial of depth creates a vision that is like 
touching. Deleuze wants to take this claim much further.  
The haptic comes on the scene first in A Thousand Plateaus where it exemplifies one 
of the ways in which the striated cuts up smooth space, dividing it into the five senses that 
each play their own role. The haptic breaches this set of boundaries. By experiencing touch 
by way of sight, one enters into a smooth space where the senses are not cordoned off into 
certain abilities.80 As Deleuze constantly says, and here he is following Henri Bergson, 
perception is also a mode of selection and of interests and desires that exclude and select 
that which is sensed. The haptic is a line of flight that grants the possibility for selecting 
anew, tapping into a territory of force unlike the expected modes of the senses. Where 
Deleuze picks up on Riegl in The Logic of Sensation follows closely on this first appearance in 
A Thousand Plateaus. Bacon, Deleuze shows, can be called Egyptian for the way he too puts 
                                                            
79 Alois Riegl, Late Roman Art Industry, trans. Rolf Winkes (Rome: Bretschneider, 1985), 24-5. 
80 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 492-99. 
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all the elements of the painting on the same plane, making them equidistant from the viewer 
and communicating with one another. This communication also works with light and 
shadow, something like chiaroscuro in the Baroque, which gives an enormous sense of 
depth, so much so that it brings the background forward. As Deleuze states in Cinema 1 
(1983), in the Baroque, “the elements of a plane act and react on the elements of another 
plane, where no form, no colour is restricted to a single plane, where the dimensions of the 
foreground are abnormally enlarged in order to enter directly into relationship with the 
background by an abrupt reduction in sizes.”81 Likewise, Bacon has the parts of his painting 
communicate through the way in which the pictorial ground and Figure bleed into one 
another by way of the contour, or those shapes (parallelepipeds, ovals, rings) that both divide 
the work and disintegrate it back into unity. One thinks of the erasure of the face as a 
moment where the Figure not only ceases to be representational but also where it begins to 
become the material structure, the indiscernible “background,” which is, obviously, never 
“back,” as in behind, in Bacon’s works of art.82 
 One element not yet accounted for is how Bacon is a master colourist and Deleuze 
uses this quality of his paintings to show how Bacon dissolves the background, creating a 
haptic sensation, and shows painting as hysteria. If there is a special relation between hysteria 
and painting, and what characterizes Bacon is his use of colour, it follows that something 
hysteric is caused by colour. Painting renders invisible forces visible and this corresponds to 
a hysteric act because it releases “presences” by way of a sensation of colour. Deleuze states 
this directly: “[w]ith painting, hysteria becomes art” and painting is the most hysteric art 
                                                            
81 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 26. 
82 Deleuze, The Logic of Sensation, 103.   
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given the way in which “color is a direct action on the nervous system.”83 What this hysteria 
ends up being is a vibration or rhythm instigated by Bacon’s colours, who like Titian (fig. 
24), Rembrandt (fig. 25), Rubens (fig. 26), Cézanne (fig. 27), and van Gogh (fig. 28) to name 
a few, stand in the art historical tradition as masters of colour.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
83 Ibid., 52-3. 
Figure Twenty-Four. Oil on canvas, The Gypsy Madonna, Titian, c. 1511.   
Figure Twenty-Five. Oil on canvas, Self-Portrait, Rembrandt van Rijn, 1660.   
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Figure Twenty-Six. Oil on panel, The Descent from the Cross, Peter Paul Rubens, 1614.   
Figure Twenty-Seven. Oil on canvas, The Large Bathers, Paul Cézanne, 1905.   
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As Ota Yoshitaka explains, Deleuze’s theory of colour has a foot in two traditions: the 
Newtonian and the Goethean theories. Following Newton, Deleuze states that there is a 
relation involved in colour that deals with the interplay of white and black—Deleuze calls 
these “relations of value” [rapports de valeur]. Alongside these, there are also “relations of 
tonality” [rapports de tonalité].84 Here we find colour arranged as a spectrum corresponding to 
feelings of warmness and coolness—it is a familiar model to us raised on the colour wheel. 
Deleuze derives this model of colour from Goethe’s physiological theory of colour. One 
thinks of the way complementary colours make a work of art ripple and flow. For example, 
in Cézanne’s landscapes, it is not enough to include the green grass; one must add some red, 
creating a differential relation that amplifies the constant movement and communication 
between these tones. Similarly, it pervades van Gogh’s work. Even in the greenest paintings, 
like his Portrait of a One-Eyed Man (fig. 29), van Gogh knows he must add a touch of red to 
                                                            
84 Ota Yoshitaka, “What is the ‘Haptic’: Consideration of Logique de la Sensation and Deleuze’s theory of 
sensation,” in Aesthetics vol. 17 (2013), 19. 
Figure Twenty-Eight. Oil on canvas, Wheatfield with Crows, Vincent van Gogh, 1890.   
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make the green all the more vibrant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
He adds this red right in the middle, a small but impossible to miss dash where the cigarette 
is lit. Indeed this man with a cigarette translates perfectly to this green with a red, and it 
would not be far off to stay this green has an addiction to red, needing it to feel most alive, 
in the way the man does his smoke.   
 It is quite musical—there are ratios in colour that correspond to moods, and it is 
true that certain emphases create dominant chords or colours in music and painting 
respectively. As we read in What is Philosophy?, “[c]onsonance and dissonance, harmonies of 
tone or color, are affects of music or painting.”85 As we shall see again in Chapter III, this is 
an important point of resonance between painting and music, two disciplines that according 
                                                            
85 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 164. 
Figure Twenty-Nine. Oil on canvas, Portrait of a One-Eyed Man, Vincent van Gogh, 1889.   
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to Deleuze rarely speak the same language.86 Bacon, a master colourist, creates these rhythms 
of the flesh with his juicy pinks and meaty reds.  
Flesh is movement and Deleuze sees Bacon as harnessing the virtual powers of the 
Body without Organs by playing with the very contours of flesh and giving it a kind of 
“affective athleticism” by way of colour.87 What might this rhythm look like? It is systole and 
diastole, contraction and expansion. Yoshitaka uses the example of the Sahara desert, which 
is relevant given Deleuze’s odd claim that the Sahara desert cuts a figure’s head in half in 
Bacon’s paintings. Yoshitaka writes, “[c]olor behaves like the Sahara . . . chang[ing] on a large 
scale with wind or sudden rainfall. However, it is still the Sahara even though it changes. But 
each grain of sand that constitutes the Sahara is not the same as the one that constituted the 
last Sahara.”88 There is a structure, though one that moves at every instant, a Sahara of 
Theseus. Bacon wants to capture these imperceptible movements in a portrait, a kind of 
instant. He beckons those fluctuations in structure—the way one’s posture worsens every 
moment they sit, how hunger or sickness bubbles up to the surface, and the constant 
horizon of aging and death. The external presentation of these minute forces wedged deep in 
the body are what Deleuze defines as hysteria, and it is here that we come full circle back to 
this term.  
This description of hysteria does somewhat beg the question as to why Deleuze opts 
for a hysteria and not schizophrenia of painting. What is interesting is that a division is in 
fact made once in The Logic of Sensation between hysteria and schizophrenia, which helps to 
clarify Deleuze’s choice. At the end of the section on hysteria in The Logic of Sensation, 
Deleuze concludes: 
                                                            
86 Though note that even here it is music or painting, not music and painting.  
87 Deleuze, The Logic of Sensation, 40.  
88 Yoshitaka, “What is the ‘Haptic,’” 21.  
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In a sense, music begins where painting ends, and this is what is meant when one  
speaks of the superiority of music. It is lodged on lines of flight that pass through  
bodies, but which find their consistency elsewhere, whereas painting is lodged farther 
up, where the body escapes from itself. But in escaping, the body discovers the 
materiality of which it is composed, the pure presence of which it is made, and which 
it would not discover otherwise . . . [Music] gives a disembodied and dematerialized 
body to the most spiritual of entities . . . This is why music does not have hysteria as 
its clinical essence, but is confronted more and more with a galloping schizophrenia. 
To hystericize music we would have to reintroduce colors, passing through a 
rudimentary or refined system of correspondence between sounds and colors.89  
 
Deleuze is cryptic in this passage, so let us start to unpack it—although such a task requires 
frequent visitation throughout this thesis. The fundamental difficulty in this passage is that 
Deleuze appears to be claiming that music is an aesthetics of the heights; it deals with 
immaterial, noncorporeal faculties like time and sound. Here, these forces in turn 
correspond to schizophrenia, and what is perplexing is that Deleuze now situates 
schizophrenia in the heights, while in The Logic of Sense it belonged without a doubt to the 
depths. 
To explain Deleuze’s rationale, it may help to know that his claim about music in the 
above passage is in reference to Mozart’s Requiem. Echoing Stendhal, Deleuze finds within 
the Requiem Mozart making an address to something from “another world.” The reason 
music can make this move is that it is not tied to the body, flesh, and their inertia. So this 
appears to be what separates painting from music: an embodiment surpassed by the latter. In 
what way is this schizophrenic (if by this we take its definition from The Logic of Sense and 
conceptual persona with Artaud)? Is not schizophrenia markedly connected to the depths of 
bodies? As we found with Artaud, everything finds a way to attack the body, even the 
immateriality of language. As we shall see in Chapter III, this “other world” should be 
interpreted as the cosmos and the natural world, each a perspective beyond the raw 
sensations of our personal bodies. Furthermore, if Bacon’s ability to “record the fact” of 
                                                            
89 Deleuze, The Logic of Sensation, 47. 
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sensation at a molecular level gets at something universal about bodies as they act and are 
acted upon—something that painting in particular can remind us of—music seeks to tell us 
more about what lies beyond our bodies. Animal territories, unknowable minds, the deep time 
of the cosmos—these, for Deleuze, represent the musical pole in his aesthetics.      
 In painting, when Deleuze writes that one discovers the materiality of the body as 
one escapes from it—and this being the ontological importance of the Body without 
Organs—he is describing a feeling of hysteria. Arguably, the schizophrenic does not follow 
such a path and instead experiences the immaterial as if it were something embodied, for 
example the attack of language on the body.90 Music, like language, is the immaterial 
paradoxically embodied; painting, the hysteric art, discloses embodiment as such and 
demonstrates through the systole-diastole rhythm the genesis of the subject and its perpetual 
erasure.     
~ F R O M  P A I N T I N G  T O  M U S I C ~  
 Deleuze’s move to an aesthetics of sensation that is built on the affinity between 
painting and hysteria furthers his transition from a discursive to nondiscursive sign, all the 
while engaging with questions that span his entire corpus. Grounded in a discussion of Proust 
and Signs and Deleuze and Guattari’s engagement with Proust more generally, Chapter II 
inquires into the limits of the painterly pole of Deleuze’s aesthetics and the need for music, 
this other pole. One must emphasize that this distinction has less to do with the primary 
senses each relies on (sight for painting, hearing for music), than it does the particular 
capabilities each medium contains. For example, where painting gestures inward to what 
unmediated sensations, sensations unbridled by dogmatic images of thought, look like and 
                                                            
90 This is not to say that the schizophrenic’s experience is necessarily external. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze 
and Guattari write of “[t]he schizo body, waging its own active internal struggle against the organs . . .” (Deleuze 
and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 150).  
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speaks to our nervous system directly, music points outward, offering us entry into the 
natural world and the speeds and slowness of time. Proust serves as a significant figure when 
it comes to the musical model and, for Deleuze, he stands at the juncture of literature and 
music. In demonstrating how the painterly model fails to encapsulate Proust, we can then 
turn toward the end of Chapter II and the duration of Chapter III to develop the musical 
pole fully.  
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“We become universes.”1 
C H A P T E R  I I  
~ O N  T H E  S E N S E S ~  
In his 1967 study, Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty, Deleuze puts forward a provocative 
claim about language and the body. He writes of language reaching “its full significance 
when it acts directly on the senses [sur la sensualité].”2 Neither the expression of concepts nor 
commands appears to be the essence of language. Leaving this claim without full 
examination, Deleuze offers any curious reader a subdued deferral to the original works of 
Sade and Masoch to find out the implications of his thought. This is unlike his usual energy. 
No doubt, one cannot help but feel that Deleuze was not ready to see the idea to its end just 
yet. While some may suggest that Deleuze does end up discussing it at length in Masochism in 
his account of a “demonstrative”3 use of language—a claim that very much anticipates the 
“order-words”4 of A Thousand Plateaus—I argue that this notion of a language that acts 
directly on the senses should also take us down another path. Rather than A Thousand 
Plateaus as the culmination of this tie between language and the body, one finds the “full 
significance” of this immediate and unmediated sensation in Francis Bacon: The Logic of 
Sensation. For this reason is a return to Masochism so important. It bears the traces of one of 
Deleuze’s central remarks on aesthetics.  
There is a remarkable similarity between this unmediated experience of language and 
what, in The Logic of Sensation, Deleuze sees in the art of Francis Bacon. As discussed in 
Chapter I, Bacon’s paintings make an attack on our nervous system and work directly on the 
                                                            
1 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 169.  
2 Gilles Deleuze, Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty, trans. Jean McNeil and Aude Willam (New York: Zone Books, 
2006), 17. 
3 Ibid., 15-23. 
4 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 76. 
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body. Through the priority of colour over form (certainly indebted to the likes of 
Kandinsky), Bacon’s modernist work exudes a world below the individualized subject. 
Sensation, we recall, is the interruption of form and concept, or in the words of Peter 
Hallward, “a force of creative intensity that pulses through actual bodies or materials.”5 
Subsequently, when this theory of sensation is held side by side with Masochism, one starts to 
see the germination of Deleuze’s later aesthetics.  
Peering back to his work in the 60s, however, one also encounters another study of 
aesthetics in Proust and Signs, and unlike the cleaner sublimation at work in how the 
embryonic aesthetics of Masochism is taken up in The Logic of Sensation, his work on Proust 
resists the categories of the depths and molecular matter. To frame it in terms of Deleuze’s 
aesthetic disjunction, Proust does not attract to the painterly pole.6  
Part of the allure of Deleuze’s book on Proust is just how much its aesthetic vision 
contrasts with his study of Francis Bacon. Whereas Masochism, with its depictions of 
contorted bodies, shocks to the senses, and purely material formula of language, is reflected 
in Bacon’s paintings, Proust’s image is not. In fact, what Deleuze says about Proust far more 
closely resembles what Félix Guattari and later Deleuze and Guattari say about music. The 
almost metric repetitions and series of lovers, the spiritualism and incorporeal use of 
language and time, the concepts of the refrain and motif—all this points to Proust as 
embodying another aesthetic framework entirely: the musical pole. The beauty of Deleuze 
and Deleuze and Guattari’s work on aesthetics is that they take these sudden turns, at one 
moment focused on a purely material conception of art and another totally enamoured by 
immaterial forces like time and metric rhythm. And yet, as we inferred in Chapter I from The 
                                                            
5 Peter Hallward, Out of this World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation (London: Verso, 2006), 106. 
6 Such an analogy of “attraction” may call to mind magnets and magnetic poles, though I am sure Proust would 
prefer we think of it as an “attraction” of lovers—far more Proustian that way.  
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Logic of Sensation, on a closer reading, there is a certain univocity of aesthetics offered by the 
painterly mode. This is to say, the painterly pole teaches us to bring to the surface immaterial 
forces, and in doing so to display that the material and immaterial speak in one and the same 
sense. With this in mind then, whether the general aesthetics found in Proust and Signs can be 
integrated into The Logic of Sensation is the “apprenticeship” I take up in this chapter and 
conclude that it demands to be taken on its own terms.7 Proust is not a painter, but a 
musician—a peculiar thing to call a writer, though, as we shall see, central to understanding 
Deleuze’s system.   
~ R E M E M B R A N C E  O F  T H I N G S  P R O U S T ~  
 To paraphrase Thomas Baldwin’s adaptation of a Derridean formula: there is a 
spectre haunting Deleuze’s Logic of Sensation, the spectre of Proust. In The Picture as Spectre in 
Diderot, Proust, and Deleuze, Baldwin acknowledges one of the questions I aim to address in 
Deleuze’s aesthetics this chapter: what is the effect Proust has on Deleuze’s aesthetics as 
found in The Logic of Sensation? Is Proust a subtle mutation, another gene entirely, or a virus? 
Quite literally, Proust is the ghost in the machine—to use Gilbert Ryle’s famous image of 
Cartesian dualism. Proust and Signs is riddled with references to the spirit and to forces that 
resist any reduction to an immanent, brute materialism (hence providing a dualism). 
Particularly due to his interest in sense, meaning, the Idea, and most notably the virtual, there 
is certainly a part of Deleuze that is hesitant to affirm, even in the realm of aesthetics, that all 
things boil down to materialism. To approach these issues, first, I shall discuss the direct 
references Deleuze makes to Proust in The Logic of Sensation, before retreating to Proust and 
Signs so as to face the Deleuze-Proust chimera on its own terms, rather than as the mere 
antithesis to the Deleuze-Bacon thesis explored in Chapter I.  
                                                            
7 Gilles Deleuze, Proust and Signs, trans. Richard Howard (New York: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 3.  
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Whether Deleuze is overstating the differences between Bacon and Proust and 
perhaps forgetting certain claims he had made in Proust and Signs, claims that might bring the 
two into cohesion and show that their aesthetics are not in opposition, is the primary 
experiment here. Second, one must discern the effect Félix Guattari had on Deleuze’s 
interpretation of Proust, as evidenced by the extended edition of Proust and Signs and 
references made to Proust in A Thousand Plateaus.8 One must be careful not to reduce 
Deleuze’s interpretation of Proust and treat it monolithically. Principally dealing with his 
later interest in the faciality machine (a concept from A Thousand Plateaus), I shall distinguish 
Francis Bacon, the great dismantler of faces, from Marcel Proust, whom Deleuze and 
Guattari accuse of “stuff[ing] . . . characters down [into the black] hole [of subjectification]” 
and “plumbing the depths of black holes and composing faces.”9 Along with this disparity, 
others include the role of narration, and the incommunicability of viewpoints in Proust 
(primarily through the example of jealous lovers).  
This last aspect enters us into the Leibnizian philosophy that Deleuze finds within 
Proust’s work. As I argue, while the faciality machine and the problem of narration as two 
elements that differentiate Proust from Bacon can be resolved, the irreducibility of 
perspective, which is to say the chasm separating each singular, subjective viewpoint, is 
something in Proust that cannot be integrated into the Deleuze-Bacon framework which 
insists on the dissolution of the subject—the indiscernibility of self and world, the 
organization of the organism and the disorganization of the BwO, animal and human, 
material and immaterial. Yet even with all this said, there then comes along in Proust the 
force of involuntary memory, wherein the subject plunges into the pure past and travels 
                                                            
8 While I do not take them up here, there are also copious references to Proust in Anti-Oedipus. For example, 
Deleuze and Guattari explore Oedipal and anti-Oedipal forms of homosexuality in Sodom and Gomorrah.     
9 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 186.  
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somewhere beyond consciousness. Proust is obsessed with these moments, whether in the 
trickling in of consciousness as one awakes from sleep at the beginning of Swann’s Way, to 
the jealous lover’s desire to occupy the unique point of view that emanates from the object 
of their desire, be it Odette or Albertine. As I hope to show, the barriers between Deleuze-
Proust and Deleuze-Bacon are vulnerable to such underground passages that connect the 
two once again—a truly rhizomatic character, akin to how Deleuze and Guattari observe the 
distribution of space in Kafka’s work. There is always the possibility that a door may connect 
a room in the house to any another. The avenues between Bacon and Proust seduce us 
several times to synthesize their aesthetic frameworks.  
Despite the possibility of integrating Proust into the Bacon model of aesthetics, in 
the end it appears that the Leibnizian aspects of Proust are those that prevent him from fully 
conjugating with Bacon—a rather Proustian tragedy of love indeed. And, naturally, it is the 
Leibnizian windowless monad that offers us no escape, no trap door, to again link up 
underground with Bacon. It is, then, not surprising that one of Deleuze’s last books, The 
Fold, turns to Leibniz and his aesthetic implications. After all, in successfully resisting the 
thesis found in The Logic of Sensation, the Leibnizianism that informed Deleuze’s Proust is 
then given its own stage.  
~ P R O U S T  T H E  R E V E N A N T ~ 
 That Proust appears in The Logic of Sensation is not categorically out of place. For 
reasons that I address in Chapter III, Deleuze’s preferred narrative device in this monograph 
is to compare Bacon’s work to writers like Beckett, Kafka, and even Proust, just as much as 
to other painters. What is strange is that the majority of the nine times Deleuze refers to 
Proust in The Logic of Sensation betray a stark opposition between the two artists. As a result, 
Deleuze must know that he is sentencing himself to (at least) two aesthetic frameworks. On 
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the one hand, there is Bacon and his hysterically pre-conceptual forces that act on the body. 
On the other hand, there is Proust who overcodes the world with signs, faces, and 
signification like the paranoid despot of A Thousand Plateaus. Proust’s is also a world of 
territories and the rhythms of divergent perspectives as they conjoin, to adopt some of 
Guattari’s formulations that I focus on in Chapter III.  
 Proust is characterized with what I see Deleuze situating on the side of the musical 
pole. Recalling the parallel distinction from Chapter I between hysteria-painting and 
schizophrenia-music in The Logic of Sensation, it should also be emphasized that Deleuze 
thinks Proust is very much like a musician, stating: 
Certainly music transverses our bodies in profound ways, putting an ear in the 
stomach, in the lungs and so on. It knows all about waves and nervousness. But it 
involves our body, and bodies in general, in another element. It strips bodies of their 
inertia, of the materiality of their presence: it disembodies bodies. We can thus speak 
with exactitude of a sonorous body and even of a bodily combat in music—for 
example, in a motif—but as Proust said, it is an immaterial and disembodied combat 
‘in which there subsists not one scrap of inert matter refractory to the mind.’ In a 
sense, music begins where painting ends, and this is what is meant when one speaks 
of the superiority of music.10 
 
I cited elements of this quote last chapter and there, as now, sense its difficulty. Given the 
emphasis on the body conceptualized by both schizophrenia and hysteria, one would think 
they should equally be called expressions of the same materialism. Time and again in The 
Logic of Sensation, however, Deleuze distinguishes the two.  
Things get even more complicated when one returns to Proust and Signs, where 
Deleuze emphasizes the value of a hysteric conception of the body vis-à-vis Proust. Deleuze 
quotes Proust—“Words themselves instructed me only if they were interpreted in the 
fashion of a rush of blood to the face of a person who is disturbed, or again in the fashion of 
a sudden silence [III, 88]”—before adding that in this instance it is “no surprise that the 
                                                            
10 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. Daniel W. Smith (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), 47.   
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hysteric makes his body speak. He rediscovers a primary language, the true language of 
symbols and hieroglyphs. His body is an Egypt.”11 Nondiscursive signs, hieroglyphs, and 
Egyptology are all themes that will be returned to, and the presence of each in Proust 
punches a hole in the barrier that separates Proust from Bacon.12 In Proust and Signs, Deleuze 
emphasizes that Proust is an Egyptian, and in The Logic of Sensation that Bacon is as well, 
although for some perplexing reason Deleuze does not bring them together on this point 
even in the slightest. 
 The main quality that Deleuze uses to bring Proust and Bacon together is 
involuntary memory and the ability for us to get at that which is neither figurative nor 
abstract. Unsurprisingly, this connection comes more from John Russell’s book on Francis 
Bacon, though Deleuze makes use of it. Something would not have sat right had it come 
directly from Deleuze who boldly states in Proust and Signs that In Search of Lost Time is not 
about memory. Nevertheless, Deleuze builds on Russell’s invocation of Proust, noting that 
“Proust did not want an abstract literature that was too voluntary (philosophy), any more 
than he wanted a figurative, illustrative, or narrative literature that merely told a story.”13 It is 
the Figure that Proust wants, and he achieves this by “coupl[ing] together two sensations 
that existed at different levels of the body and that seized each other like two wrestlers, the 
present sensation and the past sensation, in order to make something appear that was 
irreducible to either of them, irreducible to the past as well as to the present.”14 This 
discontinuity between the present and the past marks the Bergsonian virtual that informs 
Deleuze’s philosophy. Waves and resonances are created between sensations and Deleuze 
                                                            
11 Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 93. 
12 Yet let us not forget that these are lowly signs according to Proust, “sensuous signs,” as Deleuze calls them. 
These signs are far too tied to bodies. What Proust strives for in art “is the splendid final unity of an immaterial 
sign and a spiritual meaning” (Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 86). 
13 Deleuze, The Logic of Sensation, 56. 
14 Ibid., 57.  
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sees in Bacon as in Proust a kind of differential calculus at work in sensation. Forms appear, 
yet only as the result of unformed intensities as they rise to the surface. The work of art 
points to this very contingency, of the thunderbolt and its dark precursor, to recall Deleuze’s 
image from Difference and Repetition.15 
 If some differential combination of memory and a present sense impression is a way 
of harnessing the forces of sensation, it is nevertheless one among several modes of doing 
so. For this reason Deleuze states Proust’s work is an apprenticeship in signs rather than in 
memory or lost time. The latter concepts are just ways of getting at the former, which is all 
about reaching the essence of subjectivity and truth through the interpretation of a 
worldview. In the second and third editions of Proust and Signs, the motif Deleuze uses to 
define this process is the spider. He declares that Proust’s narrator is a spider: limited like the 
tick for its lack of perception, and only able to sense its prey through the vibration of its 
web. The fly only comes into its world by first being mediated through the vibrations of the 
web; it must speak the language of the spider to enter into its world. The fly can be placed 
before the spider and the eyes of the predator will not realize this is its prey. This closed 
world of the spider is the perfect image for Proust’s narrator who is, like the spider, 
incapable of accessing signs outside its subjective world. The spider can only access the fly’s 
being as a spider, just as a lover cannot access their partner’s being as the object of desire—
only as the active subject.  
However, that this process of accessing the Other acts through sensations is what 
brings Proust the closest he can possibly be to Bacon; that the truth Proust finds is 
individual and ultimately incommunicable between all our worlds is what takes him once 
again away. Framing it in the language of Kant’s third Critique, Bacon’s use of sensation has 
                                                            
15 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 145. 
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the potential to achieve a kind of sensus communis. The vibrations of matter, while its 
intensities may change, acts on us in one univocal way—simply with different modes of 
expression as Spinoza would put it. Proust does share this goal of achieving a sensus communis. 
His whole project lies in entering into another point of view. But the impossibility of doing 
so is then what forces him to create a work of art, which engages in a spiritual truth. 
Channelling Proust, Deleuze says that “[t]he superiority of art over life consists in this: all the 
signs we meet in life are still material signs, and their meaning, because it is always in 
something else, is not altogether spiritual.”16 Perhaps this transcendence of the work of art is 
achievable in a way that getting beyond sensation, and the arbitrariness and 
misinterpretations of signs that pervade our being, is not. 
~ O V E R C O D E D  F A C E S ~  
One can hazard a guess that Francis Bacon is turning in his grave at the thought that 
our cellular devices can be unlocked not just with a passcode or fingerprint, but rather now 
by simply looking at it. What is more you than your face?, the Apple gods announce. A process of 
selection is at work, sorting out the owner from the imposter through our facial codes. While 
there is something to be said for how these machines read our faces with perceptive 
algorithms that certainly get beyond the visible surface and are able to read our every pore, 
there is still a fixation on good and bad models, likeness and dissimilarity, that grounds this 
technology. Likewise, the rhizomatic powers of the Internet have been re-territorialized by 
selective, highly personalized newsfeeds and ad content. Its powers of connection have in 
fact closed off our worlds even further, though here I digress. What matters in the first 
example is that the face has been made infinitely small. Deleuze and Guattari cannot be 
                                                            
16 Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 41. 
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clearer: the molecular and the molar do not necessarily equate to the imperceptibly small and 
to visible, surface-level aggregations.  
It is also problematic simply to divide them up into the good (molecular) and the bad 
(molar), since the two are always already mixed together and there are plenty of molar forces 
that are able to take on symbiotic relationships with molecular, rhizomatic ones. Take the 
mycorrhizal relationship between certain fungi and tree roots. The arborescent growth of the 
tree reaches upward to the sky and gains carbohydrates through the process of 
photosynthesis. It passes some of these on to the mushrooms which have never seen, and 
never will see, sunlight. In exchange, the fungi pass on the courtesy of added water retention 
for the tree and disease-fighting chemicals. No doubt this exhibits the becoming-fungus of 
the vascular tree and the becoming-tree of the mushroom. The key is not to deny fixed 
forms, but to harness the forces capable of making more and more connections. In this way 
Deleuze and Guattari propose “a logic of the AND.”17 
What is problematic about the overcoding of faces though is how they negate this 
kind of growth by stymieing possible connections. One of the central misfortunes of 
Proust’s narrator is that his loves all seem to be repetitions of a past one. A cyclical 
repetition girds his ability to desire. As Daniel W. Smith summarizes, “the hero’s various 
loves (for Gilberte, Mme. De Guermantes, Albertine) indeed form a series in which each 
successive love adds its minor differences and contrasting relations to the preceding loves.”18 
This is not some path that leads back to the Oedipal mother, however, since “his mother is 
already a repetition of other adult loves (Proust’s hero replays with his mother Swann’s 
passion for Odette), and the mother’s love in turn refers to repetitions he has not himself 
                                                            
17 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 25. 
18 Daniel W. Smith, Essays on Deleuze (Great Britain: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 23. 
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experienced.”19 Something in this repetition should worry us. It neglects the very novelty 
from which love is born in this first place. Proust is correct when he acknowledges that what 
draws us into love is not just the image of the beloved, but precisely that they see us from a 
world that is not our own. They offer up a vantage point that we so desire. 
There is something here quite like the schizophrenic potential to take in signs. 
Recalling Artaud’s experience, signs do not clearly demarcate their objects of reference.20 
Rather, they rise from an unformed realm of possible meanings, and this inability to tie 
down interpretation allows them to excite a kind of painful pleasure. As a reminder though, 
this is more so the potential of the schizophrenic and not a description of universal actual 
experience. Naturally, it was not always achieved by Artaud who was more often than not 
simply subjected to pain by his condition. The Body without Organs is quite tricky, and 
entering into it all at once can simply be suicide. As Deleuze and Guattari prescribe in A 
Thousand Plateaus, one cannot overstate  
how necessary caution is, the art of dosages, since overdose is a danger. You don’t 
[make yourself a Body without Organs] with a sledgehammer, you use a very fine file. 
You invent self-destructions that have nothing to do with the death drive. 
Dismantling the organism has never meant killing yourself, but rather opening the 
body to connections that presuppose an entire assemblage, circuits, conjunction, 
levels and thresholds, passages and distributions of intensity, and territories and 
deterritorializations measured with the craft of a surveyor.21  
 
Yet still, connection and the possibility of generating the new (i.e., the event) must gather its 
energy from this realm of the Body without Organs. It even happens for Proust, though he 
finds in the call from the lover’s gaze something transcendent, a good object of the heights 
and not a rumbling of the depths.22 This is what Christian Kerslake in “Desire and the 
Dialectics of Love” calls Deleuze and Guattari’s “attack on the notion that it is possible to 
                                                            
19 Ibid.  
20 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 82-93. 
21 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 160.  
22 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 189-90. 
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extrapolate a transcendent object from the process of desire [which] . . . originates in 
Deleuze’s Proustian analysis of the experience of love.”23 Kerslake adds that, “Deleuze 
would agree that desire does lead towards love but would disagree that love is the 
achievement of mutual recognition; in fact love is the first real encounter with an other, it 
does not lead towards mutual recognition, but towards increasing jealousy and deception.”24 
Deleuze’s representation of Proustian love as that of a jealous lover should recall a similar 
characterization of philosophers that he makes throughout his writing, though most 
explicitly in “Plato and the Simulacrum,” which bookends The Logic of Sense. The philosopher 
is like the suitor who must pass through the unparticipated (father) to get to the participated 
(daughter/fiancée), thus making them a kind of claimant. For example, the unparticipated 
idea of justice is accessed through a participation in the quality of justice, and the claimant is 
the one who is just in action. By introducing the false claimant or simulacrum into this 
structure, Deleuze is equally so challenging the notion that philosophy is this kind of love 
affair. But what then is to go in its place?  
Although it gathers its greatest intensity in What is Philosophy?, Deleuze’s alternative to 
the jealous lover/philosopher finds its roots in Proust and Signs and expresses an idea similar 
to the immediacy of sensation found in The Logic of Sensation. The idea can be put succinctly: 
truth does not find the one who looks for it, but acts as an unexpected event upon us. Here 
Deleuze is stating that the jealous lover who seeks out, for instance, the signs of his lover’s 
betrayal will find just this even if it does not actually exist. Plagued by a dogmatic image of 
thought, the mind is overcome with false objects that cloud its ability to get at the truth (and 
by the truth let us state, quite broadly, that it is becoming, the event, and the simulacrum—
                                                            
23 Christine Kerslake, “Desire and the Dialectics of Love: Deleuze, Canguilhem, and the Philosophy of Desire,” 
in Deleuze and Psychoanalysis: Philosophical Essays on Deleuze’s Debate with Psychoanalysis, edited by Leen de Bolle 
(Belgium: Leuven University Press, 2010), 63. 
24 Ibid., 71. 
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all really different ways of saying the new). By way of a similarly oriented critique, Friedrich 
Nietzsche states in “On Truth and Lying in a Non-moral Sense” that:  
If someone hides something behind a bush, looks for it in the same place and then 
finds it there, his seeking and finding is nothing much to boast about; but this is 
exactly how things are as far as the seeking and finding of “truth” within the territory 
of reason is concerned. If I create the definition of a mammal and then, having 
inspected a camel, declare, “Behold, a mammal,” then a truth has certainly been 
brought to light, but it is of limited value, by which I mean that it is 
anthropomorphic through and through and contains not a single point which could 
be said to be “true in itself,” really and in a generally valid sense, regardless of 
mankind.25 
 
Truth, if it exists, cannot be something sought out. Such a quest can only be veiled with the 
curtains of expectation, cliché, and judgement. These are the great idols Nietzsche works 
against, and they are also undoubtedly those battled by Deleuze, Bacon, and Artaud. For 
them all, the force of truth must somehow act directly on us. Deleuze states this explicitly in 
Proust and Signs: “We must first experience the violent effect of a sign, and the mind must be 
‘forced’ to seek the sign’s meaning.”26 A little while before this claim, we also learn that 
“Truth depends on an encounter with something that forces us to think and to seek the 
truth . . . Precisely, it is the sign that constitutes the object of an encounter and works this 
violence upon us.”27 If, then, Bacon demonstrates the violence of sensation, Proust might 
then be read as offering “violence in thought.”28 In one of his many critiques of the 
dogmatic image of thought, which is to say the belief that rational thought and the human 
mind are naturally fit to decipher truth, Deleuze claims, “the philosopher . . . is a thinker 
who presupposes in himself the benevolence of thought, who attributes to thought the 
natural love of truth and to truth the explicit determination of what is naturally worked out 
                                                            
25 Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lying in a Non-moral Sense,” in The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, 
ed. Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs, trans. Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 
147.     
26 Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 23. 
27 Ibid., 16. 
28 Ibid.  
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by thought.”29 When the philosopher/lover becomes open to the signs that beckon one as if 
from another world, therein they find the one possible path to truth. 
~ T H E  F A C E  O F  T H E  L O V E R ~ 
 As we learn from Francis Bacon, one of the barriers that cordons us from getting at 
the truth of sensation (he calls these sensations “matters of fact”) is the face. Proust’s work 
can be read as an immanent critique of the jealous lover and of the prejudices of thought 
that limit our access to the world outside us.30 This would, however, require a fairly generous 
reading of Proust’s intention. Such an interpretation requires a certain level of generosity 
given that Deleuze and Guattari state in A Thousand Plateaus that Proust is one of the chief 
authorities on generating the machine of faciality. According to this characterization, Proust 
finds a face in all things, making all objects a marker of subjectification. Allow us to unpack 
this claim. 
In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari offer the image of the despotic king.31 
The way this figure organizes signs is by marking each with a face that stands in for himself. 
One thinks of the face of royalty on money, magazines, and so on. The despotic king 
overcodes the world with his face because all signs are meant to lead back to him. As 
Deleuze and Guattari recount, money originally existed simply as a tribute to pay to the king, 
and surely one must give back, for example, what is Caesar’s unto Caesar. Similarly, the key 
crisis for the despotic king is one of interpretation. His signs refer back to a definite desire 
and the messages he sends out into the world reflect this desire clearly. But his reign has no 
boundaries and radiates out in concentric circles. In a broken telephone-like process, the 
signs become harder to denote. The king’s personnel seek to enforce these signs, though, as 
                                                            
29 Ibid., 30.  
30 As Chapter III explores, entering this other world, which most notably envelops animal territories, the 
cosmos, and the rhythms of nature, is the aesthetic focus of music and one of the ways in which, for Deleuze, 
Proust explains music and music explains Proust.   
31 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 111-16. 
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Wittgenstein famously avows, no sign is intrinsically meaningful and it will eventually fall 
into misinterpretation as the king soon realizes. This crisis is inherently linked to the 
machine of faciality. The king’s face, which he stamps on everything, is supposed to speak 
for itself. Yet it is, in the end, a sign that comes as if from another world. Such a process is 
intrinsic to Proustian desire, since the hero wants to access his desire from the point of view 
of the other. The despotic king does this as well, and the thought of his sign appearing as 
anything other than what he intended plummets him into paranoia. Thus he overcodes the 
world with repetitive signs made in the likeness of his image, though these can only ever fall 
into self-referential meaninglessness or misinterpretation, all the while negating the original 
possibility of perceiving oneself as if from a gaze outside oneself. In contrast, what Deleuze 
sees Proust as reaching for in art is this unity of the self-same sign—a sign whose reference 
is itself, yet in a way that is neither tautological nor nonsensical: “Art,” Deleuze states, “is a 
veritable transmutation of substance. By it, substance is spiritualized and physical 
surroundings dematerialized in order to refract essence, that is, the quality of an original 
world.”32 
For Proust’s narrator, a similar paranoia to the despot seems to be at work in the 
repetition of his loves. No matter the novelty that each brings, they all somehow get placed 
within a series of past loves. There is a level of expectation and signification that resists the 
new, and, as I shall now elaborate on, Deleuze and Guattari argue that Proust’s overcoding 
of the hero’s world with faces is a chief reason for this barrier to the new. After describing 
this critique, I explain the destruction of the face that is part and parcel of Francis Bacon’s 
artwork. In attempt to bring Proust and Bacon together again, I employ a few examples 
from In Search of Lost Time, as brought to my attention by Thomas Baldwin’s aforementioned 
                                                            
32 Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 47. 
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work. If Proust is not entirely, as Deleuze and Guattari contend, trapped in the machine of 
faciality, this once again offers a possible reintegration of their aesthetic systems.      
~ P L U M B I N G  T H E  D E P T H S ~  
In their apprenticeship in signs, one of the actions that Proust and his hero repeat is 
the inscription of faces on all things. Though this is the power and the beauty of something 
like the madeleine—that is, the fact that our memories are inscribed in the objects outside of 
ourselves—there is still a danger of being closed off from the world when desire and 
meaning (sense) take on a specific form. This is, after all, the danger of any ideology, as well 
as an important rejoinder to the Oedipal complex. If you start looking for the desire of the 
mother everywhere, that is likely what you will find.  
The machine of faciality is, at its core, a process of sameness that integrates things by 
selecting and sorting what fits into our world and what does not. It is ultimately a process of 
fitting a norm, as in when one excludes others based on categories such as race or gender, 
establishing a line between similarity and difference. Recalling the aforementioned despotic 
king from A Thousand Plateaus, the face is a kind of icon through which all other signs (at 
least as the despot intends) will refer back to. Beyond the face lies the unwavering desire of 
the despot. For example, think of the master signifier evident in the phrase “because I am 
the king”—an argument-ending, self-evident phrase that stops the circulation of meaning 
and signs. In the Search, Deleuze and Guattari realize that Odette’s face follows this despotic 
structure. For Swann, everything starts to revolve around Odette’s face. All the world’s signs 
start to relate in some way to Odette. This totalizing force, however, has its limit. As there is 
an inherently paranoid-despotic structure that it follows—a need to refer everything back to 
a master signifier like Odette’s face—the smallest tear in its consistency leads the jealous 
lover into a frenzy. The face is then turned away from. Deleuze and Guattari identify this 
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turning away from the face as connected to the postsignifying regime.33 Signs once again 
enter a free play as Swann doubts Odette’s love, suspecting Odette of treachery and betrayal, 
of turning away from him. Brent Adkins lists some of Swann’s neuroses: “Swann turns away 
from Odette in order to discover what she’s hiding from him. Why is he forbidden to see 
her on certain days? What really happened in Marseille? . . . [All this leads Swann to] lurking 
outside the wrong apartment and knocking on a stranger’s window.”34 When his love for 
Odette finally fades, signs break from their despotic chain.35  
The face looms over Swann and pervades the majority of signifiers in the Search. It is, 
after all, a tale of love, and there is something about love especially that gravitates all signs 
toward the face. It is no surprise, then, that Deleuze and Guattari’s prime example for the 
face is Christ’s—his religion is after all said to be a religion of love.36 All these black holes 
that pull us into the subjectification of faces demonstrate a stark contrast with what we 
encounter in Francis Bacon. His artwork intends to annihilate the face, and accomplishes 
this by demonstrating the process of disintegration and decay, instead of simply plummeting 
directly into abstract non-representation. This is critically important for Deleuze and Bacon; 
both acknowledge that we must witness the destruction of signification or else risk it not in 
fact disappearing. One might compare this to the importance of seeing the villain of a film 
die on screen; otherwise there remains the possibility of their return. Now, the face is 
something that always returns, and this is the crux of re-territorialization. What one must 
attempt, however, is to create new faces before they once again fall into repetition and 
master signifiers (as in Proust) or cliché (as in Bacon). Yet it remains to be seen whether 
                                                            
33 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 119-30. 
34 Brent Adkins, Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus: A Critical Introduction (Great Britain: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2015), 116. 
35 It even seems as though Swann is on his way to the asignifying regime, where language has a direct impact on 
the body. Again Proust curls back into the Bacon model of sensation.   
36 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 167. 
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characterizing Proust as a real constructor of faces is entirely fair, since in Swann’s case we 
truly witness a destruction of Odette’s face as master signifier. 
Thomas Baldwin brings attention to several instances where Proust effectively 
presents the destruction of faces. In doing so, Baldwin emphasizes that the Bacon-Proust 
dichotomy, as produced through the machine of faciality, is not an effective tool for marking 
their differences. Just as Bacon is never intent on rendering the whole face destroyed and 
prefers more to display a process of becoming and erasure, so too might we call Proust a 
similar type of demiurge. Baldwin illuminates this destruction of the face:  
While Proust, according to the writers of Mille Plateaux, stuffs his characters into the 
‘trous noirs’ of a ‘visage-bunker’, Bacon, according to the Deleuze of Logique de la 
sensation, is the supreme painter of heads, the destroyer of faces. But things are not as 
stable, or as clearly opposed, as they might seem. The spectacle of the ‘Bal de têtes’ 
can be understood as the epitome of, or even the blueprint for, the Baconesque 
defacialization that Deleuze so admires. Recalling Swann’s fascination at the faces 
distorted by monocles at the Marquise de Saint-Euverte’s (he subsequently dreams of 
a facially disfigured Madame Verdurin and of gouging out Odette’s eyes, the 
narrator, having returned to the ‘fête travestie’ that is the ‘matinée chez la princesse 
de Guermantes’, is astounded by the insect-like metamorphoses, ‘la prodigieuse 
transformation de visage’ of his former acquaintances. He reflects on the relationship 
between words and things, faces and names; names are disconnected from their 
habitual faces and a world of new words can finally appear.37   
 
Naturally, this disruption of the face’s despotic signification is what gives Swann the ability 
to connect with the world in new ways. Sceptics to these counter-examples might address 
the fact that these destructions of the face are few and far between in the Search, albeit 
inevitable moments given the sheer volume of Proust’s work. Even the purest of faces have 
their blemishes every once in a while, they might claim. Still, one must realize that the 
objection raised by Baldwin is one Deleuze must have known about, since Guattari himself 
proposed it in “Swann’s Love as Semiotic Collapse” from The Machinic Unconscious.  
 
                                                            
37 Thomas Baldwin, The Picture as Spectre in Diderot, Proust, and Deleuze (Taylor & Francis Group, 2011), 107-8. 
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~ G U A T T A R I ’ S  P O R T R A I T ~  
 “Swann’s Love as Semiotic Collapse” charts several instances where the face is no 
longer the means through which the world appears to Proust’s narrator. Guattari outlines 
two possible avenues created by faciality: on the one hand, it “disrupt[s] the organization of 
other semiotic components and develop[s] ‘liberating’ transformations in Swann’s life;” and 
on the other, it “open[s] up obsessive and repressive reterritorializations (But it is above all 
this second perspective which will prevail).”38 In stating the primacy of the second force in 
Proust, Guattari seems in agreement with Deleuze’s characterization. However, and this is of 
paramount importance, Guattari adds that “faciality traits . . . end up losing all their 
effectiveness” [my emphasis].39 For Guattari, Proust is well aware of this failure. In fact, the 
whole second half of the novel on Swann demonstrates a transversal, maddening aspect of 
becoming. What Proust demonstrates is the fragility of organization. While the “little 
phrase” of Vinteuil’s music for example seems inescapably to recall Odette’s face, the 
transversal element presented by Proust, according to Guattari, is that somehow this image 
of thought will suddenly end. Not only is this consistent with Bacon’s interpretation of the 
image of thought (Form as he calls it), it is his aesthetic par excellence.  
 In framing Proust as a more intentional destroyer of faces than at first meets the eye, 
Guattari is opening up what we are led to believe is the primary disjunction between Proust 
and Bacon, as each is presented in Deleuze’s aesthetic schema. As if coming from Bacon 
himself, Guattari writes of Proust’s interest “in the mutations of perceptive components, in 
the phenomena of the magnification, displacement, overlapping, acceleration, or deceleration 
                                                            
38 Félix Guattari, “Swann’s Love as Semiotic Collapse,” in The Machinic Unconscious: Essays in Schizoanalysis, 
translated by Taylor Adkins (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2011), 236.  
39 Ibid.  
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. . . of sensorial coordinates.”40 There is in this sensation what Guattari calls its “internal point” 
which is his way of explaining the “existential consistency of such unclassifiable realities.”41 
Put another way, despite the fact that sensations hit us all differently, there is still behind 
them an underlying molecular reality of chaos that we all share. This is the crux of Guattari’s 
Spinozism, which interestingly enough seems to guide his reading of Proust. Though 
Deleuze is just as much a Spinozist in his writing, when it comes to Proust, Deleuze could 
not be more Leibnizian.  
 The difference in Deleuze and Guattari’s respective approaches to Proust, as also the 
difference between Leibniz and Spinoza in general, may be clarified using the concept of 
expression. This is to say, and as I have been alluding to, what makes Proust such a 
Leibnizian is the abyssal separation between perspectives. For Spinoza as for Leibniz, there 
is but one world—and though it is overrun with the problem of the infinite, it is all still 
wrapped up within God or nature. Yet where Spinoza’s modes of existence establish a 
radical continuity between entities, Leibniz’s is grounded on the notion of a closed 
perspective. The whole world is folded in each point of view, though there is something 
irreconcilable between them derived from the fact that each monad is causally independent. 
As Leibniz claims, the monad must be independent insofar as its being mirrors its creator. 
Conversely, Spinoza finds free will and contingency abhorrent notions, born simply out of 
our inability to determine a cause. These are the fundamental first principles that send 
Leibniz and Spinoza down different paths. As each might apply to the work of Proust, the 
question is to what extent our worlds interact with each other’s? The Guattari-Spinoza 
reading interprets the transversal breakdowns of our categories (such as faciality) as those 
moments of the real cutting through our world, as Lacan might also have put it. Worlds 
                                                            
40 Ibid., 232.  
41 Ibid., 233. 
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demonstrate that they are entirely connected. The Deleuze-Leibniz interpretation insists 
rather on the plurality of monads, and how each cannot come into contact with another and 
yet, paradoxically, contains the totality of the world in itself. There is in fact here in Leibniz 
an early idea of the unconscious: the monad contains the totality of the world, though the 
majority of it appears as indistinct waves and murmurs below the surface of consciousness.  
In one of my own early encounters with Leibniz’s work, a professor once described 
Leibniz’s world to me as a series of strings that connect with all the parts of the world. While 
the lines reach out infinitely and we cannot perceive their every connection, they are all 
woven together and follow the laws of sufficient reason and compossibility. This professor 
also disliked Deleuze and Guattari quite strongly, although I am confident he would accept 
the beauty of these Leibnizian strings in Deleuze’s reading of Proust. As Deleuze says, and 
as I have mentioned above, the narrator is a spider who does not relate to other individuals 
but who contains each relation by way of a vibration made on its web (of strings). 
~ E G Y P T  R I S E S  U P ~  
Though I shall ultimately conclude that, for Deleuze, this Leibnizian aspect is what 
keeps Proust from fitting within the Bacon aesthetic, there is another perplexing similarity in 
how Deleuze describes their art. The striking resemblance is that Deleuze describes each as 
an Egyptian. For Deleuze, Bacon is an Egyptian artist since his work takes on a haptic 
quality, blending together the senses of touch and sight. Through bas-relief techniques that 
give the work of art an absence of depth, all its parts rest on an uncoordinated surface 
directly in front of the viewer. This is also what Deleuze is getting at when he discusses the 
landscape/geography distinction in A Thousand Plateaus and The Logic of Sensation. Where 
geography involves a separated viewer who surveys [from the French survol] and gazes down 
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upon fixed coordinates, the landscape is characterized by an inherent immersion wherein 
sensations move at an incredible speed and as if right in front of us.  
Following Alois Riegl, Deleuze defines the Egyptian presentation as “the flat surface 
[his italics], which allows the eye to function like the sense of touch.”42 The same applies the 
other way in the becoming-eye of touch. Despite Bacon’s sphinx being “scrambled, treated 
in a malerisch manner” he approaches his art as an Egyptian—one focused on bringing depth 
to the surface, showing depth as a surface effect, despite everything ultimately having its 
origin in the depths of matter.43 Yet given that he remains a colourist, what Deleuze 
concludes is that “a new Egypt rises up, composed uniquely of color and by color, an Egypt 
of the accident, the accident that has itself become durable.”44 An interesting point to raise 
briefly is the striking similarity between this aesthetic formula of accident and durability and 
one found in What is Philosophy? There, Deleuze and Guattari state that a work of art is a 
being of sensation, composed of affects and percepts, which in turn are the durable 
becomings of accidental affections and perceptions. In their words, “[w]hat is preserved—
the thing or the work of art—is a bloc of sensations, that is to say, a compound of percepts and 
affects.”45 Art takes the personalized, individualized affections and perceptions and makes 
them “independent of a state of those who experience them,” but in such a way that they 
“stand up on [their] own.”46 What Cézanne, for example, critiqued in Impressionists was 
precisely this lack of durability; he wanted sensations that were not fragile, that could outlast 
the creator such as “‘the perpetuity of blood’ in Rubens.”47   
                                                            
42 Deleuze, The Logic of Sensation, 99. 
43 Ibid., 100. 
44 Ibid., 108.  
45 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 164.  
46 Ibid.  
47 Paul Cézanne, quoted in Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 165. 
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Returning to Deleuze’s Bacon, in considering how uncommon references to 
Egyptology are in his work, it should come as a shock that the only other figure he has 
referred to as an Egyptian is Proust. Given the sense that he has excommunicated Proust 
from the Bacon aesthetic model in The Logic of Sensation, it is highly surprising that Proust and 
Bacon share such a unique trait. Their shared Egyptology demands further exploration.  
When Deleuze calls Bacon an artist of Egypt, this does a great deal to bring an artist 
of the depths, back up to the surface. Though surface effects (meaning, interpretation, 
effect) are all abstract results of the machine of the depths in Deleuze’s thinking, it is rather 
striking that Bacon’s depths, at least insofar as he is an Egyptian, are equally so the result of a 
play of the surface. This is a highly Proustian idea of art, whose aesthetics is said to be 
immaterial and spiritual—qualities assigned to the surface and the heights. This seems to be 
the radical potential in any work of art according to Proust, namely, that it somehow wrests 
free of material constraints to take on immaterial resonances: time, emotion, subjectivity. 
That these are generated in the depths is out of the question. In line with Deleuze’s thinking, 
it is always some sensation (be it the madeleine or the look of a lover) that excites 
interpretation, rather than interpretation (the surface of sense) appearing on its own. There 
must be some material vibration that prompts it. What is intriguing, nevertheless, is that 
meaning and interpretation also exist—well, subsist, if we are to be faithful to the language 
of The Logic of Sense. Matter in motion finds its way into series, repetitions bleed together to 
form meaning (sense).  
This play of the material in the spiritual, the depth in the surface and the heights, is 
also the nature of montage and the selective gaze of the camera and frame. Bacon’s triptychs 
accomplish this framing effect. Furthermore, in trying to get at the scream in itself (the 
scream without a face not unlike a grin without a cat) Bacon approaches the paradox of the 
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Kantian noumena, which is that the scream only results from the play of two distinct 
rhythms. This resistance to the noumena explains the prevalence of wrestling bodies and 
blended figures in his work. Moreover, it explains why even his solitary portraits seem 
pluralistic. The faces are always multiple as if two distinct personalities were trying to escape 
the flesh. This accounts for Bacon’s play of signs, and I shall now account for Proust’s 
before explaining how they come together under the shared identity of an Egyptian. Finally, 
the division created between Bacon as a painter of the depths and Proust as a writer of the 
surface (though I prefer to say musician of the heights) is once again pierced with holes.48  
What takes place at the surface is meaning and Proust’s apprenticeship in signs 
depends primarily on the fact that truth is replaced by interpretation. A sign offers itself as 
something to be deciphered—it is a hieroglyph. There is something important about the 
hieroglyph because it is an image that contains its own meaning. Contrast this with standard 
alphabets where the relation between signifier and signified is arbitrary (there may be a few 
exceptions, for example, the letter o).49 The hieroglyph is the beginning and end of 
interpretation. Meaning is extracted from all that is found within the sign and from nothing 
beyond it. We cannot appeal to some mental image or Idea to garner its meaning. This is 
what is so significant about art. There is a unique cohesion where the sign and the meaning it 
reveals are unveiled in one and the same gesture of interpretation enacted by the audience. 
For this reason does Deleuze grant a radical autonomy to art (durability as he calls it in What 
is Philosophy?). In Proust and Signs, he qualifies it as follows: “to the degree that we achieve art, 
the relation of sign and meaning becomes closer. Art is the splendid final unity of an 
                                                            
48 Chapter III explores this music of the heights. 
49 Indebted as he will later be to C.S. Peirce’s semiotics in Cinema 1 and 2, it is valuable to note that Peirce refers 
to the sign that contains its own meaning as an icon, and to the arbitrary relation of signifier and signified as a 
symbol.  
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immaterial sign and a spiritual meaning.”50  This conflation should again recall the experience 
of both Artaud and Bacon. We know Deleuze prefers to call this type of art hysteric in The 
Logic of Sensation. What is more confusing, and this quote was mentioned in passing already in 
this chapter, is that in Proust and Signs, Deleuze references “the hysteric [who] makes his body 
speak. He rediscovers a primary language, the true language of symbols and hieroglyphs.”51 
The jealous lover that interprets the hieroglyph that is, for example, the look of interest, 
flirtation, pity, whichever it may be, must decode the hidden meaning at work within the 
other lover’s sign. This process, if successful, can only reveal one thing: the virtual. Beneath 
the facial expression is something beyond the mere reflection of an inner mental state. 
Rather, it is an infinite series of feelings, each with a degree of power fighting to rise to the 
surface like a diver running out of oxygen. Indeed just as the negation of oxygen causes the 
rising to the surface, so too does the negation, the withdrawing, of certain degrees of 
intensity result in the appearance of desire upon the lover’s face.  
This Nietzschean understanding of subjectivity as a play of forces is valuable for its 
ability to explain the self by way of an immanent critique. Deleuze echoes Nietzsche’s 
underlying worldview in affirming that “There is no Logos, there are only hieroglyphs.”52 The world 
does not rest upon nor emanate from heavenly Forms. Its origin is a virtual realm of 
difference—potential without telos, pure movement without grounding. The brilliance of 
Proust’s work is how he discloses this realm, and we shall soon see in Chapter III that the 
“floating time” found in modern music reveals just the same.  
                                                            
50 Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 86. 
51 Ibid., 92-3.  
52 Ibid., 101.  
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Deleuze’s primary definition of the virtual in fact comes from a Proustian formula: 
“Real without being present, ideal without being abstract.”53 The Egyptology in this pertains 
to the idea of a surface effect. The appearance of the self from the virtual, egg-like smooth 
play of forces, just like the gaze of the lover, is at once distinct and obscure. A form has 
emerged, though it brings forth its own contingency and the indecipherability of its ground. 
Like the hieroglyph, what we see before us will give us access to the truth of the lover’s gaze, 
though all the while it contains such complexity and is fuelled by unconscious and 
complicated processes that there is never a ground—an intention or truth—to reach. There 
are only deeper caves within the caves, and such is the reality of interpretation. Is not this the 
central lesson of deconstruction? The work calls forth an interpretation and re-
interpretation, or as Deleuze prefers to call the process, “folding, unfolding, refolding.”54 
Again, it is thoroughly Nietzschean, and Deleuze’s opening chapter to Nietzsche & Philosophy 
supplements this argument from Proust and Signs. Just as with Proust we are caught in the 
chiasmus of art as interpretation and interpretation as art, so too does Nietzsche procure 
“philosophy’s highest art—that of interpretation.”55  
In Nietzsche’s case, Deleuze sees a perspectivism or pluralism, which in Proust takes 
the form of a plurality of worlds or possessivism as I call it. Remember that the world of 
lovers is one of possession, that the object of desire holds something of us that we reach out 
to, but any success in acquiring this something simply folds it back into our world. We want 
that other consciousness and tragically realize we only have our own. Interpretation as 
possession is also further explained in Nietzsche & Philosophy, for a “thing has as many senses 
                                                            
53 Marcel Proust, cited in Gilles Deleuze, Proust and Signs, translated by Richard Howard (New York: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2000), 61. 
54 Gilles Deleuze, The Fold, translated by Tom Conley (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 
137. 
55 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche & Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 
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as there are forces capable of taking possession of it.”56 When Deleuze goes on to say that 
“the art of interpreting must also be an art of piercing masks,” it is enticing to read Francis 
Bacon, the great destroyer of faces, back into the narrative.57 Yet it remains the case that 
Proust, as it is for Nietzsche, sets forth an art of pluralism, of other worlds, masks behind 
masks. Bacon, however, aspires to the bedrock of molecular forces, the “matter[s] of fact.”58        
~ T H E  R E M A I N D E R ~ 
Despite the palpable affinity between Proust and Bacon that remains in spite of 
Deleuze’s tendency to juxtapose their aesthetic frameworks, we must nevertheless accept the 
irreducibility of their systems. In fact, this is what makes Deleuze’s writing on art so rich—
the machine built to explain one artist cannot help but stutter when confronted with 
another’s work. That being said, stuttering is highly valuable and can help us to extract 
different motifs from an artist’s work. For example, in viewing Proust as a Baconian 
destructor of faces and Bacon as in search for the transcendent scream in itself, each work of 
art takes on an undeniable novelty. We allow it to get beyond its own limits and clichés, 
introducing something new into its framework. Yet still, just as there is value in the cross-
fertilization at work in this Bacon-Proust chimera, it is also important to acknowledge, and 
build on, the uniqueness of each creator, to accept in the end that they do not speak the 
same language and must resort to analogy.  
While Bacon was explained more or less on his own terms in Chapter I, this second 
chapter has done much to read Proust as Baconian. The result is fairly confounding, insofar 
as the very limits that Deleuze sets up between the two artists—most notably faciality and 
hysteria—do not cordon them as much as would be expected, especially considering that we 
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58 Deleuze, The Logic of Sensation, 128-9. 
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have called into question these divisions using nothing more than Deleuze’s own writing on 
these artists (paired, of course, with some ideas found in collaboration with Guattari and 
from Guattari by himself). There remains, however, a drive to explore Proust outside of the 
Bacon lens and the spectre of The Logic of Sensation. Somewhat ironically, if at the beginning 
of this chapter we invoked Thomas Baldwin’s notion of the spectre of Proust haunting The 
Logic of Sensation, it is quite obvious that what has grown throughout this chapter is instead 
the spectre of Bacon on Proust. Better yet, let us call this not a spectre but a shadow. If the 
spectre haunts the present despite it being a thing whose place should be the past, the 
shadow is that which is of the present yet casts its darkness backwards. This is what The Logic 
of Sensation has done to Proust and Signs, and while there is a wide range of application for the 
former’s categories and concepts to artistry other than Bacon’s paintings, there is an even 
more diverse field of aesthetic possibilities ready to unfold in the latter. Though the hysteric 
violence of sensation and the destruction of faciality apply in more ways than anticipated to 
Proust’s work, beyond these concepts lies several that seem to fit far more organically with 
the framework. Specifically, they are also the categories of Deleuze and Deleuze and 
Guattari’s thinking on music that I gestured to at the start of this chapter. When exploring 
the concepts of rhythm, motif, and immateriality on their own terms, one not only discovers 
a far more fitting aesthetics for Proust, but also the development of what could very well be 
a Deleuzian theory of music. 
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“Every closed system also communicates.”1 
C H A P T E R  I I I  
~ W H E N  T H E  A R T S  O V E R L A P ~  
The appeal of Deleuze’s aesthetics is the seamless connections he makes across 
distinct media. Literature, painting, music, and cinema are each drawn on to explain the 
other despite working with different functions (for example, lines and colours in painting 
and time- and movement-images in cinema). In fact, the arts do not exist in isolation; their 
differences are not quarantined and seen as reason to avoid comparison. It is this aesthetic 
continuum that has driven us to account for a general aesthetics in Deleuze’s thought, one 
that appreciates the overall function of art. As we have studied, Deleuze appears to offer just 
this in The Logic of Sensation and What is Philosophy? He discusses how art harnesses forces and 
deals with “the being of sensation,” namely affects and percepts, independent of an 
experiencing subject.2 According to a logic common to his work on Masoch up until Bacon, 
art moves towards this goal by acting directly on the senses. In sum, art gathers its strength 
from the pre-conceptual realm of experience and the body. It tells us something unknown 
yet primordial about the body. At the very least, this is the wellspring of good art, art worthy 
of the name. It does not resort to cliché or to the expected, but rather launches us out onto 
something new.  
Given this unnatural nuptial with the new, art uses established forms selectively and 
primarily as a way to show how they undergo erasure. Boundaries—be it the “stubborn 
geometry”3 spoken of by Cézanne or the tried and true II-V-I progression across music 
composition—ought to exist as harbingers of revolt from the very structures they build, and 
                                                            
1 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 16.  
2 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New 
York: Columbia, 1994), 164. 
3 Paul Cézanne, quoted in Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. Daniel W. Smith 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 91. 
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certainly not as hypnotic appeals to stability and sameness, articulated, for example, so well 
by Horkheimer and Adorno’s thought on the culture industry.4 We should construct forms 
(style, genre, standard musical progressions) carefully, contingently, so that we can feel the 
weight of their dissolution, fulfilling what we might call the aesthetic equivalent of the sado-
masochistic relation. This is to say, recalling Deleuze’s finding in Masochism: Coldness and 
Cruelty, that where the masochist draws up contracts, the sadist destroys them. Art does just 
this with form and chaos, like strata and the Body without Organs, building up a system of 
rules to feel the effect of transgression.  
The artist must embody this battle, generating form and order only then to disavow 
the rules they are following. This is, for instance, often said of the late work of John Coltrane 
who very well might have taken the saxophone to its absolute limit as free form overtook 
modal jazz with its howls-squeals and saxophonic breaths. Calling it a breath is deliberate, 
for it should recall the limit of language offered by Artaud’s experience of nondiscursive 
signs.5 Both Coltrane and Artaud approach this wall of chaos. Indeed this can hold true of all 
art; all artists harnessing the force of sensation must confront the chaos of the primary world 
of the senses, not just painters or musicians. Of course, one of its greatest expressions and 
one of Deleuze’s preferred examples is the work of James Joyce and his chaosmos, 
demonstrating the connection between literature and chaos akin to painting’s relation to it.6  
Yet what this chapter shows is the intimate connection specifically drawn between 
Deleuze and Guattari’s thought on chaos, the cosmos, and music. That is, the aesthetic 
implication of the cosmos applies chiefly to music in their writing on art. In explaining this, I 
                                                            
4 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception,” in 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University 
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5 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, ed. Constantin V. Boundas, trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 88, 193.  
6 Gilles Deleuze, “The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy,” in The Logic of Sense, ed. Constantin V. Boundas, 
trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 260-1.   
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show that where painting demonstrates the immediacy of sensation, music, under Deleuze 
and Guattari’s conception, is aligned more with territories and refrains that can reach out 
onto chaos. Each of the arts has its share of chaos—defined as the realm of the senses 
where discrete forms have yet to impinge upon our thinking—although Deleuze and 
Guattari draw on music to explain chaos in the natural world, chaos outside ourselves, far 
more than the internal experience of molecular sensations demonstrated by painting.  
~ C H A O S M O S ~  
For Deleuze and Guattari, philosophy, art, and science each possess the ability to 
“cast planes over the chaos,” though it is quite easy from here to fall deeper, as so many 
creators do, into dogmatism, opinion, Urdoxa.7 But just as much as impressing an order on 
chaos by “cast[ing] planes,” Deleuze and Guattari appreciate that the philosopher, artist, and 
scientist must “tear open the firmament and plunge into chaos.”8 This double move of 
territorialization and deterritorialization shows that the cosmos has a certain chaos to it, 
chaosmos as Joyce so well put it. The world has order, though we must not elide the variable 
intensities that ripple through its consistencies. Deleuze and Guattari explain these intensities 
as follows: “[w]hat the philosopher brings back from the chaos are variations . . . 
reconnections through a zone of indistinction in a concept. The scientist brings back . . . 
variables . . . finite coordinates on a secant plane of reference. . . . [and] the artist brings back 
from the chaos varieties . . . a being of sensation.”9 Deleuze and Guattari call this process of 
creation “the leap that leads from chaos to composition,” and great compositions find a way 
of showing this dual movement of chaos and cosmos in one act.  
Contemplating the “violent” poetry of D.H. Lawrence, Deleuze and Guattari draw 
on the image of an umbrella:  
                                                            
7 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 202. 
8 Ibid.  
9 Ibid., 202-3.   
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people are constantly putting up an umbrella that shelters them and on the underside 
of which they draw a firmament and write their conventions and opinions. But 
poets, artists, make a slit in the umbrella, they tear open the firmament to let in a bit 
of free and windy chaos and to frame in a sudden light a vision that appears through 
the rent.10 
 
It is useful to imagine the umbrellas of Francis Bacon, alluded to at the outset of Chapter I, 
in this light. And to make one critical distinction, let us stress that art is neither the umbrella 
nor the rent “but a composition of chaos that yields the vision or sensation . . . Art 
transforms chaotic variability into chaoid variety.”11 This primordial unity of chaos and 
composition, which I also see as emblematic of the refrain of the cosmos in the milieu-
territory-cosmos triune of Plateau 11 from A Thousand Plateaus, will be returned to further on 
in this chapter.  
Moreover, done properly albeit carefully, the power of art lies in showing us what 
our bodies had but we did not know, and providing something entirely new in our bodies 
that we did not think possible. Spinoza’s conviction that “we do not yet know what a body is 
capable of” becomes a formula for Deleuzian aesthetics.12 This is precisely the point in 
making invisible forces visible and non-sonorous forces sonorous, of rendering chaos 
somehow perceivable.  
Just as much, art criticism shows us how we can read one medium as another, for 
example Francis Bacon as a writer of the body (like Artaud), or Marcel Proust as a musical 
composer of duration, lovers and territories (like Boulez or Messiaen, as I shall elaborate on 
in this chapter). Deleuze’s engagement with art masterfully crosses disciplines to illuminate 
what a work of art expresses.  
                                                            
10 Ibid., 203. 
11 Ibid, 204. 
12 Baruch Spinoza, quoted in Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues II, trans. Hugh Tomlinson, Barbara 
Habberjam and Eliot Ross Albert (London: Continuum, 2006), 46. 
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Now although appreciating this continuum—how in Deleuze all art weaves 
together—has been a central goal of my work thus far, and indeed has taken us to the limit 
case with the ultimate disjunction between Bacon and Proust, the focus now is more to 
allow music to speak on its own terms. Rather than trying to explain music by way of a 
theory on painting (The Logic of Sensation), let us develop Deleuze’s thought on music 
independent of this medium. In doing so, we shall treat music as painting’s other, its outside, 
demonstrating the divergences between these two aesthetic systems and how they stand as 
two poles of Deleuze’s system.  
Through its distinct uses of time and immateriality, we reveal how music takes us 
somewhere painting could not go, and how Deleuze frequently turns to Proust to show us 
where this takes us, despite him being a writer. But yet again, that Proust is a writer and not a 
musician is imperative, for it once again shows Deleuze’s marvellous pedagogical tendencies 
to transgress the confines of aesthetic discourse. Though each of the arts deals in unique 
ways to harness forces, there is still a blend, an assemblage of artistic tendencies, that 
emerges, signifying how some artists are perhaps painterly-musicians or literary-musicians. 
Before delving into these areas, however, allow us first to salvage in one final clearance sale 
certain aspects from Deleuze’s thought on painting; for despite its opposition to Deleuze’s 
thought on music, it still manages to offer a significant amount of insight into how we can 
understand the function of music. After all, as we have come to see, the allure of The Logic of 
Sensation is its virtuosic ability to account for art in general, despite it being an exposition on 
painting and even more specifically the habits of a particular artist in Francis Bacon. The 
seduction to keep within the confines of The Logic of Sensation in my second chapter still 
weighs heavily on us here, although we now know the system found there only takes us so 
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far, and that we require Proust and Signs, A Thousand Plateaus, and What is Philosophy? to grasp 
the full effect of music—the other side of aesthetics in Deleuze’s work.   
~ F O L D I N G  S I D E S ~  
In demonstrating Deleuze’s tendency to explain works of art by way of other media, 
I place him in line with an insight by Walter Benjamin, a thinker whom Deleuze certainly 
read, though as far as I am aware only mentions once (in The Fold). In an unpublished 1920 
fragment, Benjamin writes of the creative artist and their relation to a work of art (their 
medium) as follows:  
For the creative person, the medium surrounding his work is so dense that he may 
find himself unable to penetrate it directly . . . he may be able to penetrate it only in 
an indirect manner. The composer might perhaps see his music, the painter hear his 
picture, or the poet feel the outline of his poem when he seeks to come as close to it 
as possible.13 
 
This resonates quite strongly with the aesthetic dimension of the Body without Organs I 
have discussed, where the “organized” relation of seeing with your eyes is transformed into 
something nonorganic, for example, how bats see through sound using the Doppler effect in 
their sonar hearing. In a similar vein, building on the work of Jakob von Uexküll, a biologist 
and Spinozist, Deleuze and Guattari point out “aparallel” evolutions that get beyond the 
standard filial descent of species.14 They offer the domestic cat and the baboon as an 
example, where certain genetic information is transmitted from one to the other by way of a 
type C virus, despite the two animals never having interacted.15 Through such processes, 
capacities are achieved that stretch beyond the limits drawn by the categories of our 
thinking, and moreover what is signified is a kind of prosthesis unlike organic processes and 
hierarchized forms that have become entrenched habit for our bodies.   
                                                            
13 Walter Benjamin, Collected Writings (1913-1926), ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), 235. 
14 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, translated by Brian 
Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 10. 
15 Ibid. 
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 In Bacon’s paintings, recall his focus on what Deleuze calls a close-up vision or 
haptic sensation, which he defines as the ability to feel touch through sight. If the Body 
without Organs creates a prosthetic relation in certain cases through the overlapping of 
organisms or sensations, in the case of the haptic work of art, we literally feel this capacity to 
develop a phantom limb. The audience senses touch when really all the artist gives us is 
something to see. Benjamin’s fragment, which explains how art criticism (especially personal 
artistic reflection) must resort to a kind of translation, an analogical or metaphorical 
explanation of the artwork’s truth, encapsulates Deleuze’s aesthetic theory as well. This 
thread will be picked back up as we explain how to read Proust as a musician and Bacon as a 
writer. But allow us now to turn to the critical distinction between painting and music 
presented in The Logic of Sensation before providing several key concepts across Deleuze and 
Guattari’s writing on music to understand its aesthetic quality more directly.    
The topic of music makes two important appearances in The Logic of Sensation. There 
is of course the relation of music to schizophrenia that has plagued both my chapters. I have 
oft repeated Deleuze’s claim that “music begins where painting ends . . . giv[ing] a 
disembodied and dematerialized body to the most spiritual of entities . . . This is why music 
does not have hysteria as its clinical essence, but is confronted more and more with a 
galloping schizophrenia.”16 Then there is another reference, this time to a kind of 
instrument: the synthesizer. In Chapter I, we addressed Deleuze’s distinction between 
analogical and digital synthesizers and his claim that painting is the most analogical art form 
given its immediacy and modularity when it comes to sensation. It is perplexing because 
Deleuze thus uses a musical example in the synthesizer all the while claiming that its truest 
form actually occurs in painting. As we should now be aware, this deferral of an analogy—
                                                            
16 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. Daniel W. Smith (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), 47.  
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how painting is the truest form of something musical—is essential to the relation between 
art forms. It is a perplexity that will carry Deleuze until the end of his life’s work and his final 
aesthetic monograph in The Fold. There, Deleuze turns to the Baroque and in part the figure 
of Gian Lorenzo Bernini, famous for the bel composto or the unification of the arts.17 The 
univocity of being that Deleuze defended his entire oeuvre turns in part to the univocity of the 
arts and the Baroque commitment to their overlapping and communication.     
Yet before his study of the Baroque, Deleuze was already unearthing the intricate 
boundaries between each of the arts. Principally, I argue, the way in which each medium 
communicates with its other can be understood by way of the similarities and differences 
between painting and music. As in The Logic of Sensation, it is the music of the synthesizer (in 
its analogical and digital form) that does much to explain the two media.  
~ S Y N T H E S I Z E R S :  A N A L O G  A N D  D I G I T A L ~  
Before its cameo in The Logic of Sensation, the synthesizer makes frequent appearance 
in Deleuze and Guattari’s work, primarily A Thousand Plateaus. As Alexander R. Galloway, 
Alexei Monroe, and Martin Scherzinger have all independently argued, there is a radical 
affinity between Deleuze and Guattari as thinkers and the synthesizer as an instrument. This 
connection is not just cultural or historical (seeing as the writers and the instrument are to a 
certain extent emblematic of the 1970s) but also philosophically. As Scherzinger notes in his 
essay, “Musical Modernism in the Thought of Mille Plateaux, and Its Twofold Politics,” while 
the “informing social context for [A Thousand Plateaus] may have been the uprising in Paris a 
decade earlier [May 1968], the book’s informing technical principle was a new electronic 
instrument, a piano keyboard-based musical apparatus . . . commonly known as the 
                                                            
17 While Bernini gives one of the greatest human examples of the total artwork, Deleuze and Guattari also 
inform us that certain birds like Scenopoetes dentirostris that mark their territory with “colors, postures, and sounds 
. . . [are] complete artist[s] . . . that sketch out a total work of art.” (Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 
184).  
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synthesizer.”18 Appealing for its ease of use and affordability (a slightly more modern 
equivalent for us might be the democratization of electronic and hip-hop music brought 
about by Roland’s TR-808 drum machine), the synthesizer also stands on a more conceptual 
level as “a metaphorical model for a way of thinking that replaces Kant’s a priori synthetic 
judgment.”19 Scherzinger continues, if the synthesizer is at its core an amalgamation, insofar as 
it operates by “blending signals of different frequencies,” it breaks with the common 
philosophical schema of form and matter.20 What the synthesizer marks for Deleuze and 
Guattari is a mobility and consistency offered to thought. The “thought synthesizer,” as they 
call it in A Thousand Plateaus, is in other words the rhizomatic potential in philosophical 
inquiry.21 Certain connections seen as a priori and essential—be it the Oedipal complex or the 
arborescent nature of thought from Descartes to Hegel—unfold, being met with escape 
routes in the form of new modes of production.  
The monophonic element of many synthesizers, for instance, activated several 
miraculous tendencies in music that ruptured how we conceive of arpeggios. It paradoxically 
separated out chords into their fundamental, singular elements, all the while doing so with 
bizarre additions made to the frequency, resonance, and other sound modulations that 
demonstrated how the sound was always in some way plural. Furthermore, much like 
postmodern architecture where buildings appear to be made inside-out with pipes, wiring, 
and ducts completely visible, the synthesizer is famous for its machinic sound, as if one can 
hear the very clicks and hums, the metallic white noise, of this computer-like instrument.  
Alexei Monroe correctly notes that, with Deleuze and Guattari’s conviction that 
music depends on making the inaudible into something that can be heard, “the electronic 
                                                            
18 Martin Scherzinger, “Musical Modernism in the Thought of Mille Plateaux, and Its Twofold Politics,” in 
Perspectives of New Music vol. 46.2 (2008), 131. 
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid.  
21 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 343.  
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musician’s sound palette . . . include[s] not just the mechanical noise aestheticized by the 
Futurists and their successors in industrial music, but the normally non-audible or super-
audible ‘noise’ of the digital age: the sounds of hard drives and system codes.”22 But if the 
synthesizer is so new and unprecedented for these features, and belongs to the function of 
music, how is it the case that in The Logic of Sensation Deleuze makes use of it to explain 
Bacon’s painting? It is a comparison further confused by how adamant Deleuze is in The 
Logic of Sensation that painting and music stand in opposition. Stating that music begins where 
painting ends, Deleuze presents three apparent binaries between these art forms: the hysteric 
vs. the schizophrenic, the material vs. the immaterial, the inner molecule and the external 
cosmos. With such dichotomies in place, does it make sense for him to use the synthesizer 
to explain painting? 
Before turning to this question, I wish to add one final dichotomy, which I call the 
communicable vs. the incommunicable. Following Deleuze’s reading of Proust’s work as a 
representation of the incommunicability of perspectives, and his reading of Bacon as 
signifying the essence of shared experience (the brute matter of the earth we all share), we 
thus find yet another disjunction in Deleuze’s aesthetics. While I do not consider this final 
dichotomy to translate all that well into painting (communicability) and music 
(incommunicability), and just to re-emphasize, the first two dichotomies 
(hysteria/schizophrenia, material/immaterial) do match up nicely, I nevertheless find this 
sensus communis in Deleuze’s aesthetics rather important as well. As Deleuze argues in What is 
Philosophy? one of the central problems art deals with is perspective.  
The merit of exploring communicability in art (sensus communis, Kant’s idea of 
common sense; the claim that our aesthetic tastes are sharable) is that Deleuze addresses 
                                                            
22 Alexei Monroe, “Mille Plateaux: Deleuzoguattarian Praxis and Electronic Music,” (presentation, Theory and 
Analysis Graduate Study (TAGS), King's College, London, May 27, 2000).  
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analog and digital synthesizers in The Logic of Sensation to account for just this aspect of 
aesthetic experience. While this is not utterly apparent on the surface, tracing the use of 
these terms (analog and digital) in Deleuze’s work reveals this role. What this then shows us 
is why a seemingly musical concept (the outside of painting according to Deleuze) is used in a 
discussion of painting. After settling this apparent contradiction (how music seems to be 
used to explain painting), I then turn to Deleuze’s thought on music more generally and the 
role it plays in his interpretation of Proust. This will also give us greater insight into how the 
arts can be used to explain one another and the networks Deleuze makes in his work: how 
music is rarely used to explain painting, but takes on a fundamental role in explaining 
literature, and in turn how certain aspects of literature (Artaud, Masoch, Sade) can explain 
painting rather effectively. We observe this in the case of Francis Bacon and the 
impressionist lineage he stems from. We may again note the striking similarity between 
Deleuze’s Masochism formula of language working directly on the body and painting working 
directly on the senses. This does not therefore mean that certain aesthetic media must 
correspond and communicate with each other more than others—that composers, for 
example, have a profound understanding of literature but occupy a paradigm that does not 
translate to thinking about cinema. After all, the profound effects music can have on 
conceptualizing movement, emotion, and narrative plot prove that the opposite is true. To 
say that certain arts gravitate more to one another, as Deleuze argues painting and music do 
not, is to admire specific points of resonance across disciplines and to observe the powerful 
tropes at work in Deleuze’s thinking. This should also not deny any potential points of 
contact music and painting may end up making. It is simply that Deleuze has pedagogically 
separated the two and feels they rarely speak the same language.       
Yet as for how the analog and digital synthesizer—seemingly musical concepts—are 
 100 
used to explain painting, Alexander R. Galloway relieves us of our confusion in arguing that, 
while it appears to be the case, this connection is not exactly one between music and 
painting. Since Deleuze situates music and painting as oppositional, Galloway’s argument 
comes as a relief in upholding the consistency of the two “poles” in Deleuze’s aesthetic 
schema. Rather than it being a musical connection per se, Galloway suggests we turn to 
Deleuze’s essay, “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” to understand the greater meaning 
behind the analog and the digital. While commenting on a particular contemporary 
technology (the computer), the “Postscript” nevertheless defines the logic [logique] of 
software [logiciel] as relating to technology in general, not simply the synthesizer as a musical 
instrument. The synthesizer thus does not exclusively deal with music; it is an expression of 
how we organize ourselves into systems and languages: either in an analogical or binary way. 
Deleuze writes in the “Postscript,”  
The different internments or spaces of enclosure through which the individual passes 
are independent variables: each time one is supposed to start from zero, and 
although a common language for all these places exists, it is analogical. On the other 
hand, the different control mechanisms are inseparable variations, forming a system 
of variable geometry the language of which is numerical [Galloway translation: digital] 
(which doesn’t necessarily mean binary). Enclosures are molds, distinct castings but 
controls are a modulation, like a self-deforming cast that will continuously change 
from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point 
to point.23  
 
Deleuze’s point is that where the analogical establishes an immediate connection that is 
unfiltered by homogenous rules, regulations, and codes, the digital is grounded in structures 
of division—be it through binaries, oppositions, or stable identities: precisely what Bacon’s 
art and Artaud’s language escapes to get to the heart of sensation. In an interesting 
comparison, Galloway parenthetically notes that we “can begin to see why the fields of post-
structuralism, deconstruction, hermeneutics, and semiotics are so inherently digital; as a rule 
                                                            
23 Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” in October, vol. 59. (1992), 4. 
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they prohibit immediacy.” And in contrast, we must stress that Deleuze’s aesthetics of 
painting is analogical for it harnesses the unmediated powers of experience. Arguably, when 
it comes to music we are dealing with a digital media for, as we shall soon see, Deleuze 
defines music by its relation to territories and refrains—the former a structure of division, 
the latter one of deferral, say, between harmonic and melodic changes.   
 Claire Colebrook recognizes just this in her interpretation of Deleuze’s Logic of 
Sensation. Employing the language of the analog and the digital, Colebrook states that the 
distinction is not so much a musical one as it is a “problem of art in general.”24 However, in 
Deleuze’s mind, it still seems to be the musical synthesizer that elucidates what exactly is 
going on in Bacon’s painting. She claims that art that does more than repeat the history of 
Western aesthetics taps into an analogical force. As Colebrook effectively distinguishes in 
her commentary on Deleuze’s distinction between the analog and the digital: “The analog 
synthesizer begins from the sounds of the world and introduces further variation, releasing 
the potentialities for difference and becoming in given matters. Digital synthesizers operate 
from formal units that are then composed and combined to create varying sounds.”25 What 
all art shares is this battle between the countable (digital) and the immediate, unformed 
sensation (analog).  
It would not be far off to claim that, much as Deleuze’s philosophy follows Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s “reversal” of Platonism, Deleuze’s aesthetics inherits the Nietzschean strife 
between the Apollonian and the Dionysian.26 To do this inheritance justice, I shall turn to 
music to explain how Deleuze interprets this battle—it was after all music for Nietzsche that 
signified this battle more than any other art form. From Nietzsche’s Apollonian and 
                                                            
24 Claire Colebrook, Blake, Deleuzian Aesthetics, the Digital (New York: Bloomsbury, 2012), xxiv.  
25 Ibid., xxvii. 
26 Gilles Deleuze, “The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy,” in The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester and 
Charles Stivale (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) 253.  
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Dionysian to Pierre Boulez’s pulsed and non-pulsed time, we gain insight into Deleuze’s 
interpretation of these cosmic forces that define the aesthetic function of music. After this, 
the remainder of this chapter will continue to explain, through Deleuze’s overall aesthetic 
model as found in The Logic of Sensation and What is Philosophy?, how each of the arts speaks 
with and for its other. This is to say, how we can use music or painting to explain literature, 
how we might make ourselves into a Body without Organs so as to see music or hear painting. 
~ D E L E U Z E  A F T E R  N I E T Z S C H E ~ 
 Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy gives us a vision of the arts as a struggle between the 
forces of Apollo and Dionysus. Where the former is the god of reason, a purveyor of form, 
measure, statuesque control and indifference, the latter is the god of wine, bacchanal 
affirmation, a passion-filled primal unity between contradictory essences: man and woman, 
divine and human. As Deleuze nicely puts it in Nietzsche & Philosophy, “Apollo is the divine 
incarnation of the principle of individuation. He constructs the appearance of appearance, 
the beautiful appearance, the dream or plastic image . . . [and] Dionysus, on the contrary, 
returns to primitive unity, he shatters the individual, drags him into the great shipwreck and 
absorbs him into original being.”27 While Nietzsche himself would tinker with the opposition 
between the Apollonian and the Dionysian, nauseated by its dialectical undertone and how it 
“smells offensively Hegelian,” as he says in Ecce Homo, following Deleuze we can attempt to 
save the opposition by seeing these forces not as antithetical but as divergent solutions to the 
problem of suffering as understood by the ancient Athenians.28  
To wit in classic Deleuzian fashion, with a foot in the philosophy of the virtual and 
another in evolutionary biology, the Apollonian and the Dionysian are each actual solutions 
                                                            
27 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche & Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 
11. 
28 Friedrich Nietzsche, quoted in Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche & Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2006), 11. 
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to the virtual problem of suffering. Just as the gills of a fish and the nose of a primate are 
both solutions to the problem of taking in oxygen, so too might we see the Apollonian and 
Dionysian as having equal stakes in their capacity to solve suffering. It would of course be 
nonsense to read the fish and primate as in dialectical opposition. Nietzsche feared that the 
Apollonian and the Dionysian conveyed a sense of dialectical negation. The trap, the 
seduction of viewing them dialectically, is that they require each other. They coexist as forces 
in any creative act. The artist feels both drives and appreciates the mutual dependence of the 
Apollonian and Dionysian to create a work of art. Yet as Deleuze argues quite convincingly,  
Dionysus and Apollo are . . . not opposed as the terms of a contradiction but rather 
as two antithetical ways of resolving [suffering]; Apollo mediately, in the 
contemplation of the plastic image, Dionysus immediately in the reproduction, in the 
musical symbol of the will. Dionysus is like the background on which Apollo 
embroiders beautiful appearances; but beneath Apollo Dionysus rumbles. The 
antithesis of the two must therefore be resolved, ‘transformed into unity.’”29  
 
How Deleuze reads Apollo as a mediating force and Dionysus as an immediate one is a 
concept we are already quite familiar with for its manifestation in Deleuze’s aesthetic strife 
between sensations that act directly on the body and those that pass through reason, form, 
and pre-given images. From the analog against the digital, to the body before an image of 
thought emerges, here in Deleuze’s Nietzsche & Philosophy we observe how Nietzsche’s 
interpretation of Apollo and Dionysus evolves into a theory of mediation and art. 
 Anticipating Deleuze and Guattari’s interpretation of Messiaen and the way music 
mirrors nature (the original impulses of territory and creation), Deleuze’s encounter with The 
Birth of Tragedy would have already offered up this idea to him. In The Birth of Tragedy, 
Nietzsche writes of “the blissful ecstasy which arises from the innermost ground of man, 
                                                            
29 Deleuze, Nietzsche & Philosophy, 12.  
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indeed of nature itself, whenever this breakdown of the principium individuationis occurs.”30 As 
the “whole of nature is pervaded by lust for life,” the Dionysiac is felt, and therefore it is 
clear that the creative potential of existence (nature) is repeated to us in the dithyramb and 
what Nietzsche sees as its modern analogues (primarily the work of Wagner).31 Furthermore, 
in a line that very much anticipates the schizophrenic capacity for music observed in The 
Logic of Sensation—namely its ability to leave behind the inertia of bodies—Nietzsche refers 
to music as “the imageless art.”32 As Deleuze interprets music, it has a “galloping 
schizophrenia” which moves beyond actualized bodies and toward the virtual realm of pure 
thought.33 Insofar as music is not tied to an image, to the actualized Ideas and forms we 
encounter in the world and which sculpture as the art of Apollo the “image-maker” cannot 
reach, music resembles the immaterial, raw potential of pure thought.34 This somewhat 
clarifies Deleuze’s claim about the “superiority of music.”35 My conclusion shall return to 
this. What matters at this stage is the affinity between Nietzsche’s claim that music is 
imageless and mirrors the creative force of nature. As we now examine, Deleuze also finds 
these Dionysian drives of a measureless art in the work of Pierre Boulez.  
~ B O U L E Z  T E A C H E S  U S  T O  C O U N T ~ 
 The theory and practice of French writer and composer, Pierre Boulez, provides 
Deleuze with another perspective on this tension between Apollo and Dionysus, this time 
through metric and free form music. An overview of Deleuze’s engagement with Boulez will 
aid in understanding Deleuze’s aesthetics as well as uncover the key elements of music that 
differentiate it from painting. This will further entrench the two poles of aesthetics I see in 
                                                            
30 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, ed. Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs, trans. 
Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 17. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 14.  
33 Deleuze, The Logic of Sensation, 47. 
34 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 14. 
35 Deleuze, The Logic of Sensation, 47. 
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Deleuze’s thought between painting and music and the way in which each uniquely expresses 
this battle between form and chaos. 
Deleuze has written extensively on Boulez, from direct praise for his orchestral 
technique in A Thousand Plateaus to more nuanced, philosophical interpretations of his use of 
sound in his essay, “Making Inaudible Forces Audible,” and of time in “Occupy Without 
Counting: Boulez, Proust and Time.” While these three works do not exhaust the Deleuze-
Boulez connection, they contain the fundamental frequencies necessary to appreciate 
Boulez’s effect on Deleuze’s aesthetics. As will also be expanded on in the second half of 
this chapter, Deleuze’s interpretation of Boulez sheds light on how Deleuze uses music 
theory to understand Proust and vice versa. In Deleuze’s thinking, reading Proust musically is 
one among a numerous set of analogies where the arts are used to explain one another. It is 
thus valuable not only to focus on the disjunctions in his aesthetics (painting and music), but 
also how distinct art forms conjugate and then communicate with one another (e.g., music 
explaining Proust).  
 To launch us first into a discussion of Boulez, there is an interesting way in which he 
has already snuck into this chapter so far: the synthesizer. As Martin Scherzinger picks up 
on, in Deleuze and Guattari’s writing, “the philosophical figure of the synthesizer derives its 
argument less from the actual instrument . . . than it does from Boulez’s writings on musical 
modernism nearly two decades earlier.”36 For Boulez, the idea of the synthesizer was like a 
set of “conjugations of existent instruments”—its strength lay in “assembling modules, 
source elements, and elements for treating sound (oscillators, generators, transformers), by 
arranging microintervals, the synthesizer makes audible the sound process itself . . . and puts 
                                                            
36 Martin Scherzinger, “Musical Modernism in the Thought of Mille Plateaux, and Its Twofold Politics,” 136. 
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us in contact with still other elements beyond sound matter.”37 The synthesizer Boulez 
imagines would fulfill new conjugations in sound as well as composition, conjugations 
achievable based on our willingness to “address ourselves to the machine.”38 The synthesizer 
is a tool for becoming-other, and particularly in its capacity to achieve what the human hand 
alone cannot, it reconceptualizes notions of agency, authorship, and quite simply music 
(which now seems to teeter on the brink of sound beyond obvious signs of harmony and 
melody). 
 The synthesizer is a real emblem of modernism, with its power of conjunction39—“a 
logic of the AND”—much like the conceptual work of Deleuze and Guattari.40 Their 
rhizome is to biology what the synthesizer is to technology. As far as the concepts that 
Deleuze wracked his brain over in developing the musical side of his aesthetics, one can 
sense how much an effect Boulez’s synthesizer had on Deleuze as a contemporary case study 
and theoretician. While Deleuze’s list of contemporary influences usually reads something 
like Guattari, Foucault, Sartre, Canguilhem, Hyppolite, Alquié, Gandillac, and then 
Klossowski as the artist of the group, it is a mistake to elide the conceptual influence that 
exists between Boulez and Deleuze. Two essays in Two Regimes of Madness unveil this kinship 
while giving us a more intense understanding of Deleuze’s aesthetics, music in particular. 
While unpacking these essays, I also voyage to A Thousand Plateaus to fill in the gaps on 
Deleuze’s thought on music, though we should note that what we find there is arguably 
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more of Guattari’s contribution (if we can entertain a dismemberment of the authors’ “two-
handed writing” in this case).41  
 The first text under examination is “Making Inaudible Forces Audible,” whose title 
alone echoes a trope throughout Deleuze’s writing. Painting is said to make invisible forces 
visible, and one could even say that Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism, which contends 
that the abstract does not explain but must itself be explained, is committed to another kind 
of visibility, this time to the reality of the sensible over the priority of transcendent Ideas (in 
Plato, Descartes). We can interpret this as a kind of re-territorialization wherein the abstract 
is made concrete, or the untouchable capable of being felt. And if this is the case, let us not 
forget the de-territorialization that also occurs, this time with the sonorous becoming 
inaudible or the visible fading from view. For example, the erasure of faces in Bacon’s art 
brings into view deep concepts like aging and time, while making invisible, for one, the 
separation between the human and the animal. To say that Deleuze is only interested in a 
materialism where all sensation lies out in the open would be to overlook the way re-
territorialization and de-territorialization are part and parcel of the same process. With this 
caveat in mind, I turn to Deleuze’s essay on Boulez.  
 “Making Inaudible Forces Audible” introduces us to the distinction between pulsed 
and non-pulsed rhythms. Drawing from biological examples such as the circadian rhythm, 
Deleuze inquires into the broader metric repetitions that inform our daily lives. By this he 
means the commonalities, habits, and continuities that inform our sense of subjectivity. As 
Locke famously states, memory is the guiding thread to our sense of self, and the stability of 
the self is one of the most unshakable ‘rhythms’ in our lives. Deleuze, as is often the case, 
probes into the molecular forces of the self and extracts the notion of the machinic 
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assemblage. Likewise, in “Making Inaudible Forces Audible” he applies a similar gesture to 
music. In other words, does music need some, any, kind of rhythm to be music? If rhythm is 
not necessary, what then is this non-pulsed time? This is a question perhaps better answered 
in the following discussion on “Occupying Without Counting,” though Deleuze’s reference 
to it in this first essay calls for at least some explanation now.  
 The idea of a non-pulsed time is clear enough, though its achievability is far more 
complicated. As for a working definition of it, let us refer to non-pulsed time as a “kind of 
floating time that more or less corresponds to what Proust called ‘a bit of pure time.’”42 This 
is to say, freed from measure, we enter into time without “common measure or a metric 
cadence.” In “Making Inaudible Forces Audible,” Deleuze addresses directly the five works 
picked for discussion at Boulez’s IRCAM seminar where Deleuze’s paper was presented. 
The five are Ligeti’s Chamber Concerto, Messiaen’s Mode de valeurs et d’intensités, Boulez’s Éclat, 
and Stockhausen’s Zeitmasse, which stand as examples of this non-pulsed time, and Carter’s 
A Mirror on which to Dwell, which “could lead to a new form of original pulsation.”43 Listening 
to these examples may well convince us what this non-pulsed time is, and for Deleuze this is 
because they tap into the musical equivalent of “a certain type of individuation that is not 
reduced to a subject (I) or even a combination of a form and a material.”44 The dissolution 
of the subject (I) shoots across Deleuze’s aesthetic studies, and in music this appears to be 
the capacity to tap into something beyond metre. To use a distinction that informs Deleuze’s 
writing from The Logic of Sense well throughout A Thousand Plateaus, the difference between 
pulsed and non-pulsed, subject and assemblage, is also the difference between the time of 
Chronos and Aion (Aeon). Framing it in these terms is the most effective analogue to 
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understanding music, which after all is, along with cinema, at the apex of art’s ability to 
represent time and for us to feel it both chronologically and non-chronologically. This is also 
one of the key temptations driving Deleuze to conceive of Proust in musical terms—with his 
mastery over the senses of durée, that is, how time speeds and slows in the wake of 
consciousness as Bergson puts it.  
 Where Chronos is “the time of measure that situates things and persons, develops a 
form, and determines a subject” Aion is raw potential, a future yet to come and a past 
waiting to pass. For example, Proust’s madeleine does not evoke the Combray of the past 
but “Combray like it never was, is, or will be lived.”45 Thus it is “the indefinite time of the 
event, the floating line that knows only speeds.”46 To hijack the discussion of “Making 
Inaudible Forces Audible,” in A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari bring this directly in 
relation to Boulez. They write, “Boulez distinguishes tempo and nontempo in music: the 
‘pulsed time’ of a formal and functional music based on values versus the ‘nonpulsed time’ 
of a floating music, both floating and machinic, which has nothing but speeds or differences 
in dynamic.”47 When music like the synthesizer offers us modulations and speeds more than 
forms and repetitions, we begin to feel the nomadic potential of sound characterized by non-
pulses and the subjectivity of Aion. To leave this all for a short while, which will be further 
explored in relation to “Occupy Without Counting,” there is an important second 
movement (to use a musical term deliberately) to Deleuze’s “Making Inaudible Forces 
Audible” and it deals less closely with time per se, which was the focus on Boulez’s seminar, 
and shifts to a discussion of how the arts communicate with one another. How an art form 
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evokes the image of another form, and furthermore what they end up sharing and saying 
about one another, is something Deleuze turns to explicitly.   
 For Deleuze, as for Proust, the power of music is how it evokes more than just 
sound. On the one hand, there is in this claim an appreciation for how the whole body—and 
not just our ears—is used to apprehend music. Our bones and the vibrations on our nervous 
system play a fundamental role especially in interpreting low frequencies. Yet on the other 
hand, music evokes images, places, and other art forms, such that music might feel like a 
painting. Deleuze says, “a piece of music can remind us of a landscape . . . Sounds can also 
evoke colors, either by association or by so-called synaesthetic phenomena. Motifs in operas 
can finally be connected to people, for example: a Wagnerian motif is supposed to designate 
a character.”48 As he then adds, the overlapping experiences in these three examples 
generates “sound landscapes, audible colors, and rhythmic character,” respectively, and all are ways of 
entering us into “non-pulsed floating time.”49 The watershed moment in this instance is that, 
as Deleuze argues, non-pulsed time and the underlying synaesthesia of the arts are not two 
distinct processes but entirely connected in aesthetic experience.  
 When music participates in a kind of becoming-painting brought on by its evocation 
of colours, Deleuze claims that this overlapping of presents is emblematic of non-pulsed 
time, the time of Aion. It is not the time of Chronos with interlocking presents stretching 
back to the past and forward to the future. It is that of Aion, as each present holds the 
contraction of a future yet to come and a past still not previous. Likewise the contraction of 
colour in music enters us into this infinite plane of Aion. Rather than concrete, Aion is 
characterized by its infinite capacity to be subdivided and from this, in the case of sound, 
comes “sound landscapes, audible colors . . . rhythmic character” and we can intuit that this list must 
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go on.50 To experience this continuum, this plane of consistency between something like 
colour and sound, is to experience art as event—namely, the unformed, infinite becoming of 
Aion. The Dionysian in Nietzsche’s aesthetics plunges into just the same force, and we can 
confidently add that Boulez’s non-pulsed time does too. But in Deleuze’s thought, these 
have been updated in terms of the Stoic conception of Aion and the Bergsonian philosophy 
of the virtual.  
 To fill in certain gaps that remain in properly articulating these aspects of Deleuze’s 
aesthetics, I now switch over to the second essay on Boulez, “Occupy Without Counting.” 
On top of further explaining pulsed and non-pulsed time, the essay shows how music 
represents time in its purest state, how it renders time perceptible, and finally touches on 
what Deleuze calls the multiplicity of time in the work of Boulez and Proust. First, to grasp 
pulsed and non-pulsed time more fully, what “Occupy Without Counting” raises as a helpful 
point is Boulez’s indebtedness to Messiaen. In Deleuze and Guattari’s work, Messiaen’s 
most notable appearance comes in Plateau 11: Of the Refrain from A Thousand Plateaus, a far 
more frequented text than the essays found in Two Regimes of Madness. There in A Thousand 
Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari outline Messiaen’s distinction between metre and rhythm. The 
former is repeatable and uniform, whereas the latter “scorns repetition, squareness, and 
equal divisions, and . . . is inspired by the movements of nature, movements of free and 
unequal durations.51 For Messiaen nature accomplishes what we have thus far been told by 
Boulez the synthesizer and technology does. Thus, while each approaches it from a different 
direction, their definitions of rhythm and non-pulsed time are near identical and should be 
read as one and the same theory—Boulez as an extension of Messiaen. Explaining Messiaen, 
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as Deleuze himself does to account for Boulez, will give us what is needed to understand 
non-pulsed time.  
 As we learn in A Thousand Plateaus, what differentiates rhythm from metre is its 
unpredictability. It functions with speed and slowness and follows a nomadic distribution of 
time. This music constantly gets away from itself; there is rarely a moment of pure return—
although there are certainly cuts that circle back, which Deleuze and Guattari call the motif. 
In discussing the way in which music harnesses repetitions and non-pulsed time, Deleuze 
and Guattari distinguish three musical epochs: Classicism, Romanticism, and Modernism. 
They do not seek to concretize these art forms nor create a general historical narrative 
among them—they are postmodernists after all—but they bring them forward to address 
general tendencies and divergences between the eras. Inherited from Messiaen, Deleuze and 
Guattari differentiate the “milieu” of Classicism,” from the “territory” of Romanticism, from 
the “cosmos” of Modernism. Allow me to define these terms.  
In his “Notes on the Translation” of A Thousand Plateaus, Brian Massumi defines 
milieu as follows: “In French, milieu means ‘surroundings,’ ‘medium’ (as in chemistry) and 
‘middle.’ In the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari ‘milieu’ should be read as a technical 
term combining all three meanings.”52 A milieu, then, is much like a world. For example, the 
milieu of the tick has three things according to Deleuze and Guattari (following Jakob von 
Uexküll): the perception of light that allows it to find the extremity of a branch; the smell of 
butyric acid in its prey; and the tactile ability to burrow itself in the best place on its prey.53 
Together, these amount to the milieu of the tick, and one of the central questions for 
Messiaen as for Deleuze and Guattari is at what point this milieu becomes a rhythm or a 
territory—two very divergent evolutionary processes.  
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 As for rhythm, and just as before with Boulez, it refers to vibrations of speed rather 
than uniform metre. We can understand it as the process of two milieus coming together. 
While, for example, the spider’s web and the fly’s wings and their fluttering speed follow 
distinct metric orders, the product created by them coming together—the becoming-web of 
the fly, the becoming-fly of the web—is without this same organization. For Deleuze and 
Guattari, it is instead a non-organic process—a predatory one—but there are ones akin to a 
more symbiotic relation like between the wasp and the orchid. The wasp ends up playing a 
role in the orchid’s reproduction system because the wasp thinks the orchid looks like a 
female wasp, and the orchid happens to give nutrition to the wasp. While Deleuze and 
Guattari call this an example of aparallel evolution, it is equally so one of rhythm as defined 
by Messiaen.  
Thus far we have spoken to milieu and rhythm, which are both distinct from 
territory. Unlike milieu and rhythm, which are still wrapped up in a world of function, 
territory is said to be purely expressive. Bird songs represent this expression to the fullest. At 
first serving the function of courting—and so subject to the internal and external necessities 
of reproduction and attraction—something completely different occurs when the male bird 
starts to sing in the absence of its female counterpart. It may begin to whistle the sounds of 
its environment, cutting itself out a territory, a little block secured from the chaos of the 
natural world as a child does when humming in the dark.54 Or the bird may simply speak the 
language of the world for no reason in particular, simply for the inherent beauty of 
mimicking its surroundings. This is expression beyond function. It is also, for Deleuze and 
Guattari, proof of an aesthetic tendency in animals and what they see as the autonomy of art, 
or art for its own sake. Again, Deleuze and Guattari follow suit on Nietzsche, for whom the 
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Apollonian and Dionysian spring from all of nature and not just the human alone. In one of 
their most important claims, Deleuze and Guattari assert that art “[does] not wait for human 
beings to begin.”55 The territory in its priority of expression over function, moves us one 
step closer to the cosmic chaos that lies beyond our small worlds. Remember, as was the 
case for Francis Bacon, that form and faciality should be methods for getting beyond such 
parameters, not re-entrenching them, so that we can handle and appreciate the emergence of 
chaos. Pure chaos gives us nothing; yet to experience it on the border of form-matter and 
nomadic speed is in fact to render perceptible the imperceptible (of chaos in this case, and 
this line between the two I read as defining the cosmos in Deleuze and Guattari’s thought).  
 The origin of the concept of territory in Guattari’s thinking in particular explains a 
substantial amount with regard to its appearance in “Of the Refrain” and its relation to non-
pulsed, free-floating time. As Ronald Bogue observes in Deleuze on Music, Painting, and the 
Arts, “Guattari’s use of territorialization was originally used to refer to Lacan’s idea of the 
investment of the infant’s libido into erogenous and nonerogenous zones—a move away 
from the free-floating polymorphous perversity.”56 To unravel these concepts would get us 
too far from the task at hand, but I ask my reader to notice how territory and “free-floating” 
desire stand in relation to one another. The child’s experience of desire beyond the 
normalized constraints of the genitals, which are seen as the erogenous zone, mirrors how 
Messiaen and Boulez create music where our normalized categories may interpret merely 
sound. They reshape the boundaries of our perception, and this is precisely the goal of art 
for Deleuze.  
 Lastly, there is the cosmos. The terms cosmos and chaos act somewhat 
interchangeably, and while there is certainly a difference between them for Deleuze and 
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Guattari, allow me to offer a brief illustration of their relationship by way of the 
Pythagoreans. For Pythagoras and his followers, the cosmos has a mathematical order of 
intervals that rings out in musical harmony. As Michael Gallope explains in Deep Refrains: 
Music, Philosophy, and the Ineffable, this serves as a helpful image in understanding Deleuze and 
Guattari’s reading of music and the cosmos. For Deleuze and Guattari, unlike the 
Pythagoreans, “the structure of the cosmos,” while certainly musical in how it plays with 
intervals and rhythms, speeds and slowness, “is no longer based in the eternity of whole-
number ratios, and is no longer harmonic, static, or universal.”57 There is still a cosmos and 
still one of musical relations, though one grounded on a metaphysics “of interlocking 
counterpoints . . . difference, disjunction, and syncopated rhythms.”58 
Unlike a milieu or territory, the achievement of the cosmos is to render perceptible 
what is unthinkable. There is a certain primal truth to this—for the cosmos has always 
signified the impossibility of something coming out of nothing, time out of eternity, 
consciousness out of brute matter. The cosmos equally so marks the final break from a 
form-matter conception of being. As signified by quantum mechanics, stable entities become 
molecular intensities which are subject to force—of acting and being acted upon. We can no 
longer speak of milieus (earth), “which still constitute a great expressive Form, but [only] the 
forces of an immaterial, nonformal, and energetic Cosmos.”59 But of course this cosmos 
cannot be understood directly; we need to add some “consistency or consolidation” so that 
the unformed force it contains can actually be received. The central difficulty of all art is to 
find out “how to consolidate the material, make it consistent, so that it can harness 
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unthinkable, invisible, nonsonorous forces.”60 With milieu, territory, and cosmos now 
defined, let us explain the epochs Deleuze and Guattari relate them to.  
 In Classicism, the world is understood according to a “form-matter relation, or 
rather a form-substance relation (substance is precisely a matter endowed with form).”61 
Everything has its form, which is also to say that everything has its milieu. Yet while 
everything has its form, working according to a binary and hierarchy, there is an underlying 
power that Classicism uncovers: the power of rhythm, or that which happens when we pass 
across or conjoin distinct milieus. From these combinations, an artist “breaks down the 
milieus, separates them, harmonizes them, regulates their mixtures, passes from one to the 
other.”62 For Deleuze and Guattari, the artist realizes something maddening in this process, 
namely, that form is imposed on matter and that matter is originally “raw and untamed.”63 Like 
a god, the classical artist adds milieu upon milieu to their work. First there might only be a 
piano (a bird), then answered by a violin “from a neighbouring tree.”64 The artist plays 
through the process of creation, imposing order onto sound.  
 Then comes Romanticism; “everything is clearly different.”65 The artist no longer 
participates in God’s creation, but finds joy in “the ground or foundation,” the act of 
founding a territory set apart from original creation. As Deleuze and Guattari state,  
“[t]he artist is no longer God but the Hero who defies God: Found, Found, Found, 
instead of Create. Faust, especially the second Faust, is impelled by this tendency. 
Criticism, the Protestantism of the earth, replaces dogmatism, the Catholicism of the 
milieus (code).66  
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Unlike the Classical artist, the Romantic is committed to a continuous form of creation. 
Territories begin to vary, forms are far more difficult to uphold unlike the ideal creation of 
Classicism. The perfection of creation overtop of chaos is not given, as in Classicism, but 
rather traced and retraced in light of the unending variation of the earth. This is why the 
Romantic hero is a wanderer and why, to use Paul Klee’s formula, “the people is what is 
missing.” Since territories are purely expressive not ideal, the hero acts in the face of a stable 
order they do not actually trust in or seek to uphold—they defy God’s order like Faust or 
Prometheus. Think, for example, of Beethoven’s unforgettable “Symphony No. 5 in C 
Minor,” which intentionally depicts a hero’s journey not only in its grandiosity but also in its 
chosen key. Beethoven and later composers would reserve C minor for pieces they wanted 
to present a heroic tale, and this tale is specifically one of individual resistance, creation, and 
triumph. Finally, if in Classical art chaos exists between formed substances, in Romanticism it 
starts to enter into these forms and spark continuous variation. This spurs Faust’s 
dissatisfaction with his place in the eternal order, his choice to make earth his heaven despite 
this reward being entirely temporary.  
 As might be expected, Deleuze and Guattari characterize Modernism by its 
continued deterritorialization from the form-matter relation, and the introduction of what 
they call the refrain, which launches us out onto the chaos of the cosmos. The Modern 
artist’s concern is not to work among forms and territories—not to create or establish with 
clear and distinct boundaries—but to work on a molecular level with imperceptible forces. 
When Deleuze and Guattari discuss Messiaen’s notion of rhythm, they have in mind the 
forces of the cosmos and the artist’s ability to render them perceptible. Time is the central 
force for musicians to render perceptible and Modern composers address the unique speed 
and slowness that time can possess. Modernism addresses a central truth of Einstein’s theory 
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of relativity and functions in terms of “additions and withdrawals, amplifications and 
eliminations by unequal values.”67 There are always “different times” according to Proust, 
and Modern art wants us to feel these shifts.68 In the words of Messiaen, a composer must 
think in terms of time-scales and must generate new ones. There is, 
the endlessly long time of the stars, the very long time of the mountains, the 
middling one of the human being, the short time of insects, the very short one of 
atoms (not to mention the time-scales inherent in ourselves—the physiological, the 
psychological)  . . . [The composer] by means of his rhythms . . . can chop up Time 
here and there, and can even put it together again in the reverse order, as though he 
were going for a walk through different points in time, or as though he were 
amassing the future by turning to the past, in the past of which, his memory of the 
past becomes transformed into a memory of the future.69  
 
Messiaen’s discussion of rhythm and the Modern artists “walk through different points in 
time” launches us into the elements in Proust that Deleuze is convinced speak a musical 
language. He addresses this directly in “Occupy Without Counting,” which is also where the 
above summary of milieu, territory, and cosmos in Messiaen has been leading us.  
 What Deleuze notices in Boulez and Proust—something Boulez himself had spotted 
in Proust and wanted to recreate—was the way motifs detached themselves from places, 
people, or, put simply, individuated forms. While repetition compulsions and the power of 
memory are at the heart of Proust’s work, what Deleuze and Boulez argue is that to focus on 
these elements misses the continuous variation that signs and sounds can take on as they 
escape from the “characters, places and names to which they are first attached.”70 This is the 
potential for variation, for seeing something anew, which is the power of aesthetics. 
 Instead of stable identities, we receive virtual intensities as synaptic connections 
bifurcate onto unforeseen pathways. In Proust’s work, for example, “the successive loves, 
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jealousies, slumbers, etc., all detach from the characters so well that they themselves become 
infinitely changing characters, individuations without identity, Jealousy I, Jealousy II, 
Jealousy III…”71 There is a “musical composition” in Proust, as lovers vibrate at different 
frequencies, occupying durations of speed and slowness.72 Characters take on melodic and 
harmonic differences between one another, but follow a rhythm rather than a pre-
determined metre. As Deleuze says, there are only ever “distances and proximities” between 
the characters.73 The logic of Proust is what Deleuze calls musical “perception”—not 
memory, not even when memory is involuntary. The Search, just like Boulez’s compositions, 
deals with Time in all its immaterial and imperceptible splendour. Their shared aesthetic 
achievement is to have “given sound to the mute forces of time.”74   
~  A E S T H E T I C  C O N J U G A T I O N S ~  
 Now that the affinity between Proust and music—specifically Modern composers 
like Boulez and how they occupy time—has begun to come into view, let us examine 
another key analogue between artistic media, this time that of painting and writing. Recall 
that where a significant amount of explanations and descriptions of Proust’s work resort to 
music, in painting and Deleuze’s commentary on Francis Bacon, we are given conceptions of 
language and concepts from literature to help explain what is occurring on his canvas. 
Following Walter Benjamin’s conviction that the artist must approach their work from a 
point that crosses media, so that they may access a certain unknown truth about their 
creation, it is apparent that literature is Deleuze’s way of accessing painting, just as it was in 
turn music that illuminated Proust’s writing. 
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 After the publication of The Logic of Sensation, Deleuze gave an interview with Hervé 
Guibert entitled “Painting Sets Writing Ablaze.” In their conversation, Guibert probes 
Deleuze on this aesthetic affinity between painting and literature. He asks, “you establish a link 
between Kafka’s characters and those in Bacon. Writing about Bacon after writing about Sacher-Masoch, 
Proust and then Kafka, isn’t there also a connection?”75 Deleuze is rather equivocal in his response 
at first, explaining how each artist deals with Figures—the figural as opposed to the 
figurative. In Bacon, these are the “economical” bodily contortions that seem tortuous but 
are nothing more than the “natural postures” we take on over time—“someone who is 
forced to sit for a long time, like a child at school.”76 Such Manneristic movements exemplify 
what Deleuze calls the “violence of the poses” as opposed to the “violence of the 
situations.”77 Yet still, we already know this about Bacon from The Logic of Sensation, and what 
is less clear is the particular similarities in these “figural” movements found in painting and 
literature. Deleuze seems to think there is one, although he does not speak directly to it here.  
It is a frustrating moment considering how prevalent the theme is in Deleuze’s 
writing, although credit to Guibert for being, as far as I know, one of the first to hint at this 
intimate connection between painting and literature in Deleuze’s work. Would that Deleuze 
have spoken more to the linguistic affinity between Sacher-Masoch and Bacon, as well as the 
aesthetic problem of perspective that diverges between Bacon and Proust, and finally what 
literature in particular adds to how we write criticism about painting, all would become clear 
for us. However perhaps I should thank Deleuze for equivocating in this moment, for 
otherwise my project would have already been answered.  
                                                            
75 Gilles Deleuze, “Painting Sets Writing Ablaze,” in Two Regimes of Madness, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Ames 
Hodges and Mike Taormina (South Pasadena: Semiotext(e), 2007), 181. 
76 Ibid., 182. 
77 Ibid.  
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 In “Painting Sets Writing Ablaze,” however, Deleuze does not leave us entirely 
hanging out to dry. Addressing Deleuze’s critical style in writing about painting, Guibert asks 
“How do you write a book on painting? By calling on things or beings of literature, in this case Kafka, 
Proust, Beckett?”78 Again Deleuze could have been clearer, though this time he gives us more 
to work with. Re-emphasizing that painting deals with lines and colours, Deleuze then claims 
that lines—the rhythms of sentences, the calligraphy of words, almost like the brute material 
of letters à la Artaud the schizophrenic—are enveloped in the world of literature and 
painting. As Thomas Lamarre observes, “Deleuze’s logic of sensation often resonates eerily 
with many of the traditional Japanese and Chinese treatises on calligraphy and poetry.”79 
What literature and painting explain in one another is this construction and deconstruction 
of sense as words and pictures disclose the “pure line” of sensation.  
 Stepping back, when we realize the relations between the arts and how they can 
explain one another—literature on painting, music on literature—this nevertheless begs the 
question as to why music and painting are often contrasted in Deleuze’s writing. As I argued 
in Chapter II, the way in which Proust-the-musician resists the theory of sensation proposed 
in Deleuze’s impressionist-modernist theory of painting of The Logic of Sensation prompted 
the discussion here of what is unique to music: its relation to Time, and its ties to the natural 
world (Messiaen, Boulez). While the former may have been more obvious than the latter, let 
us not forget that Deleuze and Guattari’s thought on music, indebted as it is to Messiaen and 
Boulez, is transfixed on the natural world from evolutionary biology, territories, and the 
cosmos in a way that painting is not. To make a strong generalization close to Ronald 
Bogue’s in Deleuze, Painting, and the Arts, where music turns us outward to the natural world, 
                                                            
78 Ibid.  
79 Thomas Lamarre, “Diagram, Inscription, Sensation,” in A Shock to Thought, ed. Brian Massumi (New York: 
Routledge, 2002), 169. 
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painting is about the inner, molecular experience of sensation. The aesthetic experience 
between painting and music is for Deleuze in part one of the inner bodily experience of 
painting and and the outer spiritual experience of music and the natural world. To suggest, as 
I have, that Deleuze has constructed two aesthetic models between painting and music is 
supported by this standoff between sensation and the refrain. Bogue’s outline of this impasse 
is worth quoting at length:  
[Deleuze] frequently characterizes the capacities and limitations of music and 
painting by contrasting the two arts . . . In music, Deleuze finds the key to an 
understanding of art’s relation to the natural world. Through reflection on the 
elements connecting human music and birdsong, he develops a general theory of 
animal behavior and evolutionary biology as forms of thematic rhythmic patterning, 
ultimately extending the musical model to describe the interactions of the natural 
world as an extended symphony of contrapuntal refrains. Deleuze regards painting as 
the paradigmatic art of sensation, and hence as the medium that most fully discloses 
the inner dimension of aesthetic experience. The most carnal of the arts, painting 
engages the body in a “becoming-other” while disembodying sensation and 
reincarnating it in a world of apersonal affects and percepts.80  
 
The sensation of painting and the rhythms of the refrain therefore stand as the two poles of 
aesthetic experience, further clarifying the way in which, to echo Deleuze’s sentiment in The 
Logic of Sensation, “music begins where painting ends.” Aesthetic experience certainly is not 
exhausted by this distinction, and there are unique contributions from literature and cinema, 
which in Deleuze’s oeuvre are art forms that far exceed music and painting in ink spilled. 
Literature has contributed to my work in demonstrating how the arts can be used to explain 
one another (Artaud, Sacher-Masoch, Kafka, and Proust on painting and music), and has 
clarified most notably the painterly experience of the Body without Organs in feeling a 
language unmediated by concepts. To explain the unique ways in which cinema makes 
certain imperceptible forces perceptible, however, would require another project entirely. In 
my conclusion, I dwell once more on the music-painting dichotomy and return to Proust and 
                                                            
80 Bogue, Deleuze on Music, Painting, and the Arts, 2.  
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Signs to contemplate the “superiority of music” in its resemblance to pure thought and its 
ties to a philosophy of the virtual.81 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
81 Deleuze, The Logic of Sensation, 47. 
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“But whatever the importance of this process of analogy in art, art does not 
find its profoundest formula here.”1 
C O N C L U S I O N  
~ T H E  T W O  P O L E S ~  
Having set up Deleuze’s two aesthetic poles of painting and music, and remarked on 
how their sides (and media that fall in between like literature) can communicate with one 
another, we are left wondering whether a hierarchy exists among the arts. Naturally, Deleuze 
uses the two poles pedagogically to show what art is capable of. Furthermore, the distinction 
helps to unearth the functional merits (such as sensation, erasure, perception, and so on) of 
particular art forms. As we have examined, where painting is unmatched in disclosing unseen 
molecular forces, music enters us into infinite modes of time and the rhythms of the natural 
world. We are also aware that all art finds a way of actualizing invisible forces, making the 
non-sonorous heard or the imperceptible seen. Art creates new forms in this process of 
creation, picking up on virtual potentials beyond cliché and representation.  
In this way, aesthetics is an ode to the radical potential for creation, for affirming life 
rather than simply repeating or reacting to it—cardinal sins for any true Nietzschean like 
Deleuze. Yet we should not mistake the divergent creative accomplishments among the arts 
as a lack of a hierarchy. In fact, it is hard to forget the moment Deleuze interrupts The Logic 
of Sensation to state not only the difference between painting and music, but the “superiority of 
music” [my emphasis].2 To conclude my work, I weigh the implications of this apparent 
hierarchy and the reasons Deleuze sets it up. I find that it must have something to do with 
the capacity for music to pass through bodies, to lose their inertia as Deleuze says, which in 
other words is to break more freely from actualization and launch out onto the virtual plane.  
                                                            
1 Gilles Deleuze, Proust and Signs, trans. Richard Howard (New York: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 40.  
2 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. Daniel W. Smith (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), 47.   
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Following Peter Hallward’s claim in Out of this World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of 
Creation that aesthetics marks a pivotal step on the way to the immateriality of “pure 
thought,” I examine how music accomplishes this flight, this “galloping schizophrenia” as it 
were, in ways painting is held back from.3 By reflecting also on Deleuze’s engagement with 
aesthetics and the process of creation as encountered in Proust and Signs, we are able to 
appreciate what this immateriality, or spirituality (to use a synonym Deleuze frequently does) 
means for his philosophy. Like no other text, Proust and Signs stands as Deleuze’s foremost 
engagement with the intersection of creation, aesthetics, and the immaterial (spiritual). 
~ A R T  A S  I M M A T E R I A L ~  
Repeatedly in Proust and Signs, Deleuze writes of a spiritual function in art, which 
pertains to its capacity to include its own meaning within itself. All else in the world is caught 
up in a process of referents—things refer to other things to explain themselves. But this is 
not the case for art. In one of the most important statements in Proust and Signs, Deleuze 
recalls,  
Proust often speaks of the necessity that weighs upon him: that something always 
reminds him of or makes him imagine something else. But whatever the importance 
of this process of analogy in art, art does not find its profoundest formula here. As 
long as we discover a sign’s meaning in something else, matter still subsists, 
refractory to spirit. On the contrary, art gives us the true unity: unity of an immaterial 
sign and of an entirely spiritual meaning as it is revealed in the work of art.4 
 
This quote matters for two reasons. First, it appears to offer a critique of an analogical 
conception of the arts, which this thesis has advocated for—and I have used solely 
Deleuze’s commentary and style as proof for the usefulness of analogy. Second, the quote 
addresses a spiritual fulfillment in art, the likes of which we have only found Deleuze 
observing in music. Although Deleuze does speak of Francis Bacon attaining a level of 
                                                            
3 Ibid. 
4 Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 40. 
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spirit—“a pig-spirit, a buffalo-spirit, a dog-spirit, a bat-spirit”—I read those more as 
particular molecular forces that assert themselves on the surface of the canvas.5 They are 
examples of how Bacon “dismantle[s] the face, to rediscover the head or make it emerge from 
beneath the face,”—all intensities of the body and thus things that disclose “a spirit in bodily 
form, a corporeal and vital breath, an animal spirit.”6 Deleuze himself states that this 
becoming-animal on Bacon’s canvas “attests to a high spirituality, since what leads it to seek 
the elementary forces beyond the organic is a spiritual will. But this spirituality is a spirituality 
of the body; the spirit is the body itself, the body without organs.”7 As we have come to see, 
this is the spirituality of hysteria. In contrast, we are looking for the spirituality of 
schizophrenia, which Deleuze finds in music and that I argue is also what Deleuze is 
expressing in Proust and Signs. 
 Deleuze insists on “[t]he superiority of art over life . . . [insofar as] all the signs we 
meet in life are still material signs, and their meaning, because it is always in something else, 
is not altogether spiritual.”8 What I think we can read back onto Proust and Signs, however, is 
that some art breaks from “worldly signs” more than others; “sensuous signs are incapable 
of giving us the essence,” Deleuze says.9 Finally, Deleuze introduces the idea that art is that 
one thing that enters us into other worlds—a theme we reflected on in Chapter II. He claims 
that through art and it alone, “substance is spiritualized and physical surroundings 
dematerialized in order to refract essence, that is, the quality of an original world.”10 Posing it 
as an “original world” is important, for it allows us to make the connection back to 
Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy as well as forward to Guattari’s notion of territory. The 
                                                            
5 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. Daniel W. Smith (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002 19. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., 41. 
8 Ibid.  
9 Ibid., 38. 
10 Ibid., 47. 
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impossibility of entering into the other worlds of lovers is called into question in the work of 
art, since for Proust, as for Nietzsche, art dips into a primordial unity by way of the 
dissolution of the subject and the autogenic nature of creation. 
 Lastly, while I have examined the superiority of music through Proust (on spirit), it is 
also the case as I showed in Chapter III that Deleuze would have spotted this in Nietzsche’s 
work. To elaborate, in each of The Birth of Tragedy, “Schopenhauer as Educator,” and “The 
Case of Wagner” Nietzsche upholds the superiority of music. In part this is in resistance to a 
tradition (Hegel, Schelling) that placed epic poetry at the apex of the arts. Beginning with 
Schopenhauer, however, music received an elevated status and symbolized the Will itself. 
Music is not some mere copy of an Idea like the other arts. In short, music is the most 
autonomous art form since, as Schopenhauer argues, its elements do not precede the 
creative act. Where the colours of paint and the words of poetry pre-exist the work of art to 
come, the tones of music disclose an aesthetic power directly in the expression of the sound 
itself. This demonstrates the autonomy of music, and we also know that this possibility of 
self-sufficiency in art is what Deleuze examines in Proust and Signs. Along with its 
immateriality or spirituality, the superiority of music lies in how it achieves autonomy—the 
perfect link between sign and referent and its freedom from actualized bodies.  
~ P U R E  T H O U G H T ~ 
Drawing on the work of Peter Hallward, I claim that these ideas of immateriality, of 
counter-actualizing the world and creating the new, are what attract Deleuze to Proust’s 
aesthetics. As Hallward notes, these facets of aesthetic creation hold a striking resemblance 
in Deleuze’s oeuvre to his philosophy of the virtual and pure thought. As Hallward puts it, 
“[a]rt doesn’t expose truths or realities that would pre-exist it: it makes truth and participates 
directly in the creation of reality . . . Rather than represent something external to itself, a 
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work of art is a machine that generates its own reality.”11 As if picked right out of Proust and 
Signs, Hallward declares that for this reason does art enable “the full spiritualisation or 
dematerialisation of life.”12 Finally, Hallward connects this to the philosophy of Henri 
Bergson, particularly in distinguishing our reflex responses (to the actualized world) from 
our creative drives (the virtual):  
an organism geared toward the present tends simply to react more or less 
instantaneously and automatically, on the model of a reflex response. The urgency of 
an actual reaction prevails here to the exclusion of all indetermination and all 
virtuality (and hence of all creativity, all thought, all reverie, all art…) [whereas] the 
opposite tendency will tempt the organism to forego all concern for the present and 
for its actual interests or needs. A contemplative inaction can now prevail over 
action.13  
 
Clearly, Deleuze regards these moves away from dogmatic images of thought as 
characteristic of the autonomy offered by thinking. We know just how important this is for 
the work of Francis Bacon and how he wrenches free from cliché. What we have also come 
to see, however, is that music even more so lifts itself free from the heavy inertia of the 
actualized world. Music is not tied to bodies; it more so passes through them. Music certainly 
calls to mind images and actualized things (physical entities), though for Deleuze it can turn 
away from them and the semiotic systems they are caught up in with far more precision. 
Hallward beautifully captures this hierarchy between actualized and virtual art forms: 
there is already a sort of hierarchy within the arts themselves, depending on the 
materiality or opacity of the art. It’s not only that an art becomes less artistic the 
more it relies on the creatural norms of representation, figuration, interpretation, and 
so on: from time to time Deleuze also suggests some arts are less artistic than others, 
because the medium of their expression is itself more solid or opaque and thus more 
resistant to counter-actualisation. Architecture, sculpture and dance do not figure 
prominently in the Deleuzian pantheon of the arts, and it’s not surprising that 
Deleuze should pay more attention to the luminous art of film than to the more 
corporeal art of the theatre, the art of représentation par excellence. For the same 
                                                            
11 Peter Hallward, Out of this World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation (London: Verso, 2006), 104. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 105. 
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reason, even in the middle of his book on Bacon, Deleuze is prepared to 
acknowledge a certain “superiority of music.”14 
 
For Deleuze, the potential for thought and the creation of the new rests on an ability to 
break free from actualization. Aesthetics cannot achieve the level of freedom and 
autonomous creation that pure thought can, though it arguably stands as the most impactful 
symbol for demonstrating what creation looks like. We could even say that, for Deleuze, 
aesthetics renders visible this radical potential for creation embodied by pure thought. 
Aesthetics will always be burdened by the inertia of bodies, it is more or less always tied to 
the material plane. Yet how it harnesses chaos, reworks the world, and calls upon a new 
image of thought, is the critical importance Deleuze recognizes in art.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
14 Ibid., 128. 
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